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Democracy and Nation Formation: 
National Identity Change and Dual Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2011 
Shiau-Chi Shen 
 
As has been the case in many newly democratized countries, the transition to 
democracy in Taiwan entailed nationalist competition and the aggravation of ethnic 
conflict. Much research has shown that national identities among the general populace 
have experienced radical change. The Chinese national identity no longer occupies a 
dominant position, while the Taiwanese national identity is rapidly rising. The popular 
view is that democratization provides a political space for this nascent Taiwanese identity 
to challenge, and eventually replace, orthodox Chinese identity. This view, however, 
overlooks the very important phenomenon that, especially in the stage following the 
democratic transition, most people held dual national identity, i.e. both Taiwanese and 
Chinese national identities. This phenomenon presents a puzzle to the study of national 
identity in Taiwan, and in general as well. Why, in the fierce confrontation between two 
national identities in national politics, would most people prefer to see Taiwanese and 
Chinese national identities as compatible and show their allegiance to both? 
This dissertation challenges the assumption in previous research that the nature of 
national identity is exclusive—that it represents an either-or choice or attitude. This 
assumption has led to the incorrect view that the decline of Chinese national identity and 





conventional view, this study shows that the trajectory of the two identities are actually 
different processes which have occurred during different historical stages and in different 
international environments, and that they are the results of different political forces. 
Taiwanese national identity started to rise in the early 1990’s. Chinese national identity, 
however, began to decline only after 2000. The past two decades thus witnessed a great 
proportion of people with dual identity.  
This study focuses on the factors of state and politics, rather than history and 
ethnicity, to explain the rise of Taiwanese national identity, and also the phenomenon of 
dual identity. It is contended that the ethnic base of Taiwanese national identity, with its 
particular history and language, which has been much emphasized by many political and 
cultural elites, as well as scholars, constitutes only one route of nation formation. The 
other more important route is through political participation in the democratic regime. 
While democratic institutions and practices redefine the de jure territory of the state (the 
Republic of China), democratic citizenship provides a new base for collective 
self-understanding. Through participation in democratic political processes, identification 
with the Taiwan-wide political community is cultivated among the populace. The 
Taiwanese national identity engendered through this route does not challenge the 
ethnicity upon which the Chinese national identity is based. It thus is able to co-exist with 
Chinese national identity. The decline of Chinese national identity is hence not the result 
of the rise of Taiwanese identity, but of the rise of China. It is argued that the dominance 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the international community along with its 
staunch One China Principle has removed the important component of the Republic of 





means the elimination of the ROC and to be ruled by the PRC. People who have 
identified with the ROC no longer opt for a unified great China and hence forgo their 
Chinese national identity. 
Based on the study of the phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan, this dissertation 
proposes two important theoretical findings. First, contrary to the popular view among 
the students of nationalism and nationalist politics, it argues that democratization 
mitigates rather than exacerbates identity politics. Secondly, dual identity is difficult to 
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What is the “National Identity Question” in Taiwan? 
 
Since Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s1, the “national identity 
question” (guojia rentong wenti) has been one of the most often observed and commented 
upon terms in the media, political discourse, and academic studies.  The national 
identity question is the question concerning the fact that people in Taiwan have different 
views on which nation they belong to, who their compatriots are, and what the territorial 
boundaries of their country should be. 
Taiwan’s national identity question is not different from the “stateness problem”2 
that some European and post-communist countries have encountered.  However, the 
case of Taiwan is distinct from these polities in that the native nationalist movement is 
competing for people’s allegiance not with one single state but with two Chinese states.  
                                                 
1 Studies on Taiwan’s political development have a consensus to define the breakthrough of democratic 
transition in 1986, the year when the opposition party was illegally founded, while the authoritarian regime 
decided not to suppress it. For studies on Taiwan’s political liberalization and democratic transition, please 
see (Cheng 1989; Cheng and Haggard 1992; Chou and Nathan 1987; Lin 1998; Tien 1996; Wu and Cheng 
2011). 
 
2 A” stateness” problem is defined by Linz and Stepan as “a significant proportion of the population does 
not accept the boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate 





Taiwan’s national identity question hence involves not only center-periphery (and/or 
majority-minority) struggles, but also the triadic relationship among the native Taiwanese 
nationalist movement (Taidu yundong), the Republic of China (ROC), and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).  This distinctive feature is important for understanding the 
dynamics of national identity question in Taiwan since the 1990s. 
 
Definition of Nation 
Nation in this study is defined as a group or community of people who see 
themselves as distinct in term of culture, history, principles, or institutions, and who also 
aspire to self-rule in a political system (mostly a sovereign state).  The most widely used 
definition of nationalism and nation is by Ernest Gellner.  He defines nationalism as 
“primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent” (Gellner 1983:1).  Accordingly, nation is a cultural group which acquires a 
state (Gellner 1983).3  Snyder (2000) broadens Gellner’s definition to include groups 
which are not based on common culture but based on political institutions or political 
principles as nations.  Under Snyder’s definition, groups which seek some forms of 
political autonomy (if not a sovereign state) are also defined as nations.  Following 
Snyder’s definition, the definition of nation in this study is not limited to ethnic or 
                                                 
3 Gellner (1983)defines nations in term of culture and will. But he does not see nations as awakened ethnic 
groups. Nor does he see nationality as an inherent attribute of humanity. Rather, he argues that nationalisms 
create nations in the process of industrialization. Nations are modern artifacts. Nationalism sometimes takes 
pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometime invents nation, and obliterates pre-existing 
cultures. Gellner’s definition was shared by other students of nationalism, such as Hobsbawm (1990), 
Anderson (1991), and Breuilly (1994). In the literature, their works are put in the category of the 
“constructivist” in opposition to primordialist. The primordialist camp sees nations as ancient and deeply 
rooted in human history and experience (Connor 1978, 1994; Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975). Some of them 
agree that the doctrine that nation is the legitimate base of state is modern, but they also argue that nations 
have a primordial origin (Armstrong 1982; Connor 1994; Greenfeld 1992; Smith 1986). Nationalism 
represents “the transformation and universalisation of a pre-existing political and social norm” Smith 






cultural group.  This definition provides rooms for both liberal nationalism and civic 
nationalism.  It also distinguishes nations clearly from ethnic groups.  Only those 
groups seeking political autonomy are nations.  These two elements of nation, i.e. civic 
nature of nation and the claim of political autonomy are essential to understand the origin 
and dynamics of Taiwan’s national identity question. 
 
The Entanglement of National Identity and the Unification-Independence Issue 
“Guojia rentong,” in Taiwan’s political discourse and academic research, 
simultaneously involves two concepts: national identity (menzu rentong) and the issue of 
unification and independence (tongdu yiti).  National identity refers to one’s 
self-identification, based upon which one assumes he/she belongs to a certain nation.  
The issue of unification and independence (the Unification-Independence issue) refers to 
political claims surrounding Taiwan’s future political status, i.e. whether Taiwan should 
be united with China or claim independence. 
National identity and the Unification-Independence issue are different concepts. 
One’s attitude towards Taiwan’s future political status is not necessarily based on 
her/his national identity.  Pragmatic considerations might have a significant bearing on 
this, sometimes even changing one’s attitudes toward unification and independence.  
Comparative studies on separatist movements have found that the economy is an 
important factor in the development of nationalist movements.  First, demands for 
independent statehood usually come from the richer areas of a country.  Second, when 
a country faces economic crisis, it often confronts simultaneously the challenge of 





Federation, Giuliano (2000) argues that individuals’ job opportunities explain the 
change in popular support for nationalism and separatism.  When new jobs and 
opportunities were created by Russia’s economic liberalization in the early to mid-1990s, 
popular support for separatism declined in Tatarstan.  Tatarstans changed their goal 
from seeking ethnic economic equality to pursuing personal material gain and 
professional advancement within the newly evolving order.  In addition to material 
interests, political resources also have a significant effect on popular support for 
nationalist movements.  Linz and Stepan (1992) suggest that the sequence of elections 
is crucial to the relationship between peripheral nationalisms and the unitary state.  In 
Spain, they argue, since the first election after the democratic transition was union-wide, 
all-union parties and all-union agendas were thus strengthened.  They demonstrate with 
empirical data that the percentage of the population in Catalonia and Basque wanting to 
go independent decreased significantly after the 1979 referendum on devolution.  As 
governments were established with Catalan and Basque nationalist parties in office, 
popular sentiment for independence also began to decline. 
Theoretically, national identity and the Unification-Independence issue are different 
concepts.  Empirically, they do not always go in the same direction.  When one’s 
attitude towards Taiwan’s future political status is not based on national identity, his/her 
position may be understood as policy preference.  However, Taiwan’s political 
development had entangled the two concepts together.  For most people on the island, 
their attitudes towards Taiwan’s future political status are largely an expression of their 
particular national identity, which is less likely to change because of material interests.  





Chinese.  Supporting Taiwanese independence is an act of betraying the ancestors (beizu 
uangdian).  The Taiwanese nationalists tend to think along the lines of the phrase 
“Taiwan is for Taiwanese only” (Taiwan shi Taiwanren de Taiwan) coined by nationalist 
intellectuals under the Japanese colonialism.   For them, Taiwan has never been, and 
should not be, a part of China.  Only those having no love for Taiwan and no loyalty to 
Taiwan opt for unification with the Mainland China. 
   
The Role Nationalism Played in Taiwan’s Political Development 
The history of Taiwan’s political development can be divided into three periods: 
colonialism under Japan (1895-1945), authoritarianism by the nationalist Chinese 
Kuomintang (KMT) (1945- 1991)4, and democratic era (since the 1990s)5.  Taiwan was 
ceded to Japan in 1985 after Imperial Qing Dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese 
war.6  Japanese colonial administration institutionalized a series of nation-building 
programs, i.e. the policy of Dōka (assimilation) in 1915-1937 and the Kōminka 
movement (Japanization) in 1937-1945, aiming to cultivate Taiwanese into loyal subjects 
                                                 
4 Martial law was lifted in 1987. Nevertheless, only until 1991 when the Temporary Provisions was lifted 
and the first general election was held, challenges to the authoritarian KMT and the one Chinese ideology 
were treated as illegal and illegitimate. 
 
5 When a country experiencing democratic transition becomes a mature democracy? Some scholars say 
that democracy is consolidated when it becomes “the only game in town” which means no significant 
political party or social group can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions. In another words, no 
political actor seeks to come to power by means other than winning a free and fair election (Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1991). Some uses the “two turnover test”, which says that democracy becomes 
stable when power has transferred twice as a result of free and fair elections (Huntington 1991). Taiwan 
held the first general election (National Assembly election) in 1991, the first Legislative election in 1992, 
the first (also the last) direct election of the governor of Taiwan Province in 1994, and the first Presidential 
election in 1996. Taiwan had its first power turnover in 2000 when the candidate of the Democratic 
Progressive Party won the presidency, and the second turnover in 2008 when the KMT candidate won the 
election. 
 
6 The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1898 at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war included the 





of the Japanese Emperor (Chen 1984; Ching 2001; Lamley 1970-1971).  However, a 
Taiwanese consciousness emerged as a reaction against colonial policies of unequal 
treatment (Fix 1993; Wu 2003).  It is still under dispute if the Taiwanese consciousness 
developed during this period of Japanese colonial rule was national identity in its nature 
(Chen 2008).  But even if it was, as shown by many intellectuals at the time, it had an 
ambivalent relation with Chinese national identity.7 
The end of the Second World War released Taiwanese from fifty years of Japanese 
colonialism.  But, it immediately placed the population onto the battleground of Chinese 
civil war.  The KMT regime lost the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949.8  
It established an authoritarian party-state on the island.  The émigré regime legitimized 
its party dictatorship in terms of the Chinese nationalist project.  The KMT was founded 
on the idea of Chinese nationalism.9  The irredentist claim of “retaking the mainland 
back and uniting the Chinese nation-state” justified the practice of martial law and the 
deprivation of political rights.  As the KMT regime rooted its legitimacy in terms of 
Chinese nationalism, destroying its legitimacy became the main strategy political 
opposition adopted to overthrow the authoritarian regime.  During the period of political 
liberalization in the 1980s, an opposition movement, the Dangwei (literally, outside the 
party) movement, and later the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), constructed a 
                                                 
7 Chapter 3 provides a review on the studies of Taiwanese nationalism under Japanese colonialism. 
 
8 In 1949, the nationalist Chinese KMT with 1.5 million people withdrew from the mainland to Taiwan 
which had an indigenous population of seven millions. 
 
9 According to Article 2 of the KMT charter, the Kuomintang shall be “a revolutionary and democratic 
political party charged with the mission of completing the national revolution… recovering the Chinese 
mainland… promoting Chinese culture.” For a detailed description of the history and development of the 





Taiwanese nationalist discourses to challenge the official Chinese ideology.  The 
Taiwanese nationalist discourses proclaim that Taiwan is a distinct nation with its own 
history and culture; what the Taiwanese pursue is not the eventual unification with the 
Chinese mainland but autonomy and independence for the Taiwanese people.  In 1991, 
the DPP included in its party platform a plank identifying the island as “The Republic of 
Taiwan with independent sovereignty.”  It was the most articulate proclamation of a 
native Taiwanese nationalist movement.  The proclamation was a call to the people to 
replace orthodox Chinese nationalism with a new nation equipped with a new state.  The 
confrontation of the two nationalisms in political arena not only makes Taiwan’s national 
identity become entangled with the issue of unification and independence.  Political 
party competition also goes along the line of nationalist politics.10 
 
Ethnicity in Taiwan 
To understand the national identity question, one needs also to understand the ethnic 
situation in Taiwan.  As in many other cases of nationalism and nationalist politics, 
ethnicity and ethnic politics are very important factors.  But for the case of Taiwan, 
these factors must be clearly and carefully differentiated from nationalist politics.  There 
are two ethnic groups who have played important roles in the contemporary politics of 
the country: native Taiwanese and mainlanders.11  They also constituted, for a time, 
                                                 
10 Many researches reveal a close relationship between popular party identity/ party support and their 
national identities (Shyu 1996; Wachman 1994b; Wang 1998; Wu 1993). A recent study however argues 
that the close relation between party support and support for Taiwan independence is no longer evident (Qi 
2012). 
 
11 Both native Taiwanese and mainlanders are ethnic Han. Before ethnic Han migrated to Taiwan in the 
17th century, Taiwanese aborigines had already lived on the island. The indigenous peoples of Taiwan are 





important constituencies for national identities.12  The native Taiwanese, or benshengren 
(literally the local residents of Taiwan Province), are those whose ancestors immigrate to 
the island from Southern China from the early 17th century to 1895, the year the island 
was ceded to Japan.  The island was under the rule of the Japanese colonial regime for 
fifty years, until Japan receded the territory in 1945 to the KMT regime led by Chiang 
Kai-shek.  The native Taiwanese are composed of two sub-groups, Hakka and Holo.  
They constitute around 85 percent of the population of the island (Holo and Hakka 
constitute about 73%, and 12% respectively).  Although Hakka and Holo use different 
mother languages, they share the same historical experience and memory.  As Weber 
pointed out, ethnic groups in some cases are based on, and consolidated by, the historical 
“memories of colonization and migration” (Weber 1978: 398).  A previous research also 
found that their political attitudes, including party support, self-identity, national identity, 
and distrust of the mainlanders, are nearly identical between the two groups (Chang 1994; 
Wang 1998; Wu 2002a).  Hakka and Holo hence can be included in the group of “native 
Taiwanese” vis-à-vis the Chinese mainlanders.  Mainlanders or weishengren (literally 
residents from outside the Taiwan Province) are those who moved with the KMT regime 
to the island after the Chinese Nationalist government was defeated by the Chinese 
Communists in 1949.  They (and their offspring) now estimate to constitute about 13 
percent of the population.  During the four decades of authoritarian rule by the KMT, 
the Chinese mainlanders controlled all governmental, military, and cultural apparatuses, 
                                                                                                                                                 
culture and recognition issues. They play little role in party politics. They also seem less concerned with the 
nationalist issue of unification and independent. For study on the identity issue of Taiwanese aborigines, 
see (Brown 1996, 2004). 
 
12 For further studies on the relationship between ethnicity and national identity in Taiwan, see (Chang 





including schools and mass media.  The regime’s cruel repression during the uprising on 
February 28, 1947, in which many native Taiwanese cultural and political elites lost their 
lives, added another factor to the tensions and hostilities between native Taiwanese and 
mainlanders.  Although mainlanders no longer dominate national politics after the 
democratic transition in the late 1980’s, they still wield great influence in the mass media 
and educational institutions. 
 
 
National Identity Change: Public Opinion 
 
Figure 1.1: Change in Self-Identification, 1991-2012 
 
Data Sources: 1989: United Daily News, 1989.11.29. 1992-2012: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., 
important political attitude trend distribution 
 
Taiwan’s national identity experienced a sea change after democratization.  Within 
two decades, national identities among the general populace on the island had changed 





national identity shift.  The trends are: the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the 
decline of Chinese national identity.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates that in 1989, more than half of the population in Taiwan 
identified themselves as “Only Chinese”; however, in 2012, less than three percent of the 
population held an “Only Chinese” identity.  On the contrary, the number of people who 
self-identify as “Only Taiwanese” doubled within 10 years from 16 percent in 1989 to 36 
percent in 1996 (see Figure 1.1).   Since 2009, more than half of the population on the 
island reported an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity; the percentage kept rising in the 
following years.  In 2012, around 54 percent of the population on the island identified 
themselves as “Only Taiwanese” (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1: Change in the Unification-Independence Stances, 1992-2012 
 Unification Maintaining the Status Quo Independence 
No Opinion 
/DK 
1992 45.1 25.4 13.0 16.6 
1994 20.0 48.3 11.1 20.5 
1995 22.0 41.8 11.6 26.3 
1996 25.6 45.8 15.0 13.6 
1997 20.7 48.2 17.2 14.0 
1998 17.5 46.7 18.9 16.8 
1999 20.4 48.8 19.8 10.9 
2000 21.0 47.1 10.3 21.7 
2001 20.8 51.0 15.5 12.7 
2002 18.6 50.3 18.2 14.7 
2003 13.2 52.6 21.3 12.9 
2004 12.7 55.9 19.9 11.6 
2005 14.1 57.0 20.3 8.6 
2006 14.4 58.4 19.6  7.5 
2007 11.6 55.6 21.3 11.4 
2008 9.8 57.6 27.5 6.2 
2009 9.5 60.7 22.0 7.9 
2010 10.2 61.3 22.3 6.2 
2011 10.3 61.2 20.2 8.2 
2012 9.8 63.2 29.6 7.4 
Data Source: 1992: Taiwan Social Image Survey 1991; 1994-2012: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important 






In addition to the shift of popular self-identity, the other aspect of Taiwan’s national 
identity, that is, popular attitudes toward Taiwan’s future status also had undergone 
radical change.  In 1992, about 45 percent of the population preferred unification to 
independence; the percentage dropped to a single digit number in 2012 (see Table 1.1). 
Conversely, in two decades, the percentage of people who favor independence had 





This phenomenon of national identity shift in a short period of time has gained great 
attention from the political arena as well as academia.  How should this change be 
understood?  The focus of most studies is drawn to the striking trends found in public 
opinion surveys, i.e. the ascendance of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of 
Chinese national identity.  Two popular theories offer very different explanations, one 
from a top-down perspective and the other from a bottom-up perspective.13  The elite 
constructivist theory sees the rise of Taiwanese national identity as a product of native 
political elites in their pursuit for political power.  In challenging the ruling legitimacy 
of the KMT regime, they successfully mobilized, or even invented, the Taiwanese 
consciousness to replace the orthodox Chinese consciousness (Hsiau 1999; Wang 1996).  
The primordialist theory contends that Taiwanese consciousness was born of the 
repression of first the Japanese colonialism and then the KMT’s authoritarianism, which 
                                                 





together have dominated Taiwanese society for close to a century.  This Taiwanese 
national consciousness, engendered by inequality under two regimes, was allowed to be 
freely articulated only after the democratic transition (Chang 2004; Ho and Liu 2002; Lin 
2000; Wachman 1994a; Wu 1996).  Nevertheless, these two theoretical perspectives 
share the view that with the rise of this Taiwanese consciousness, the Chinese 
consciousness correspondingly receded.  Chu and Lin (2001) conclude that after 
democratic transition, “Taiwan had emerged as a closely bound community with a 
distinctive ethnic, cultural, and historical identity”.  Taiwan is seen as a case where a 
native nationalist movement had successfully forged a nationalizing state. 
The perspective that the Taiwanese nationalist movement triumphed over orthodox 
Chinese national identity, although popular, is challenged by the fact that even if most 
people no longer favor unification, independence has not prevailed (see Table 1.1).  
Surveys have consistently found the prevalent preference is for the “status quo”.  As 
Table 1.1 demonstrates, since 1994, “maintaining the status quo” had superseded 
“unification” and become the dominant category of popular preference on the 
unification-independence issue. 
But how can this phenomenon to be explained?  One possible explanation is that 
the fear of military retaliation from Beijing hinders the formation of preferences for 
people who hold Taiwanese national identity such that they are unlikely to opt for Taiwan 
independence.  This explanation indicates the drawbacks of using respondents’ 
preference of unification or independence to measure their national identities since their 
true attitudes toward unification and independence might be concealed under some 





measurement problem.  The current measurement of national identity assumes, wrongly 
in my perspective, that the Taiwanese national identity and the Chinese one are mutually 
exclusive.  This assumption prevents one from sketching a complete picture of national 
identities among the general populace.  A new measurement is proposed in this 
dissertation.  By adopting the new measurement, this study finds that those who opt for 
the status quo actually occupy a very small segment of the population.  In fact, a 
majority of the population supported independence for Taiwan.  Meanwhile, more than 
half of them also supported Chinese unification (see Figure 2.3 & Figure 2.4). 
Considering Taiwan’s political history and that antagonist rhetoric has prevailed in 
the political arena, it is not surprising that most studies of Taiwan’s national identity are 
preoccupied with the surge of Taiwanese national identity and the waning of Chinese 
national identity.  Focusing exclusively on these two trends, however, ignores an 
important episode of national identity change in Taiwan.  The episode is as follows: 
with the rapid decline of Chinese national identity and the soaring ascendance of 
Taiwanese national identity, there also emerged a dual national identity.  Figure 1.1 
illustrates not only the growth of people who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese”, 
but also that most people in Taiwan identified themselves as “Both Taiwanese and 
Chinese”.  The number of people who identified themselves as “Both Taiwanese and 
Chinese” had increased rapidly from 26% in 1898 to 46% in 1992 and remained above 
40% over the following two decades (see Figure 1.1).  It is the modal category of 






This important phenomenon of dual identity so far has rarely been tackled.14  The 
inability to address this phenomenon may be due to the fact that previous studies rely too 
much on the nationalist paradigm, which presumes a notion of “either-or” identity and the 
contradictory nature of different nationalities in a pluralist society. 
The rise of dual identity in the 1990s creates a dilemma for the understanding of 
national identity change in Taiwan.  If, as much research has assumed, to challenge the 
dominance of Chinese nationalism, the native Taiwanese nationalist movement forged a 
Taiwanese nation basing on a “core ethnie”15, or if the Taiwanese consciousness sprang 
from the experience of repression and hence was a reaction against domination by the 
Chinese, why did the decline of ‘Only Chinese’ self-identity among the population result 
not only in the rise of the exclusive Taiwanese identity, but also in the emergence of a 
dual identity?  Why did confrontations between the two nationalisms in the political 
arena become more fervent along with successive electoral contests, yet gain little 
resonance from the populace?  Why is the emerging Taiwanese national identity among 




Dual Identity in a Comparative Perspective 
 
                                                 
14 The phenomenon of multiple identities in some other cases, with its importance both to real politics and 
to the theoretical understanding of nationalism, has already gained some attention from the students of 
nationalism. For these studies, please see (Bluhm 1973; Laitin 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz et al. 2007; 
Miller 2000; Moon 2008; Stepan et al. 2010). 
 





The phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan is not exceptional around the world.   
As David Miller (2000) observes, in those countries where there are “nested 
nationalities,” people usually hold dual-level national identities.  They tend to think of 
themselves as belonging to two communities without experiencing schizophrenia.  
These countries are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Spain and Switzerland.  Linz and Stepan 
(1996) define these countries as “state-nations” and argue that most of their citizens tend 
to have multiple and complementary identities.  When people in Spain are asked 
“Which of the following sentences would you identify with most?” in polls, “Spanish and 
Basque/Catalan/etc.” is the most popular self-description.  The same is true in Belgium 
(Linz et al. 2007:66-69). 
Three conditional factors are given by Miller (2000) to explain this phenomenon of 
compatible existence of different national identities: cultural overlap, mutual economic 
advantage, and interwoven history.  He argues that these factors helped forge a common 
British national identity.  Linz, Stepan, and Yadav (2007), on the other hand, emphasize 
the role of political leadership in forging dual identity.  They argue that certain political 
engineering, especially “asymmetrical federalism,” helps create a sense of belonging with 
respect to the state-wide political community, while also simultaneously safeguarding the 
pre-existing politically activated diversity in Spain, Belgium and India. 
These studies show clearly that the idea of dual national identities is not a form of 
bigamy, and empirically, the phenomenon of dual identity has prevailed in some 
countries.  More importantly, these studies suggest that a particular type of national 
identity which has little, if any, ethno-cultural character is also possible. 





community in other cases is the state, while in Taiwan the state is the smaller community, 
contained in the larger community of nation.  Second, for those cases of dual identity in 
other areas, identification with the smaller community is pre-existent.  What needs to be 
explained is the emergence of identification with the larger political community.  For 
the case of Taiwan, however, identification with the larger community, i.e. the orthodox 
Chinese national identity, has long been present.  The research interest of this 
dissertation hence is the formation of the identification with the smaller community along 
with the continual identification with the larger one.  With this in mind, the case of 
Austria might be used to throw some light on our work. 
The first Austrian republic was established in 1918 and defined as part of the 
German nation in its Constitution.  During the interwar era, many Austrians were 
inclined very much toward unification with Germans, with whom they had the same 
language and culture.  An Austrian nation emerged only after the Second World War, 
following the defeat of the Nazis and the exposure of their crimes.  The rise of the 
Austrian consciousness, however, was neither due to, nor resulted in, the development of 
antagonism toward Germans.  Rather, as Bluhm’s study (1973) shows, most Austrians 
during the late 1950s and the 1960s upheld a “double identity,” retaining traditional their 
cultural identity as Germans along with a strong attachment to the Austrian political 
community.  Austria’s experience demonstrates that new national identity need not be 
based on the idea of a cultural nation.  Nevertheless, the object and content of German 
identity in this case was the traditional German language and culture.  Most Austrians 
replied “no” to the statement that “Austria and Germany should be united” in the polls 





polls conducted in the 1990s, around 60 percent of respondents responded “yes” to the 
statement “If Taiwan and the Chinese mainland were comparable in their economic, 
societal, and political conditions; then the two sides should be unified into one country” 
(see Figure 2.4).  The survey data illustrates that the Chinese national identity of 
Taiwanese people was not just an attachment to the Chinese “high culture”16.  
Nevertheless, the Austrian experience suggests that without political engineering 
connecting to a larger nation, the German nation in this case, a sense of belonging to the 
larger political community (Germany) cannot be created only by cultural or linguistic 
affinity.  Austrians’ identification with the German nation hence changed from a 
national/political identity (pursuing unification before the 1950s) to a cultural identity.  
The Austrian experience is inspiring in this respect in helping us to understand the 
decline of dual identity in Taiwan since 2003 (see Figure 2.6).  The decline of dual 
identity was mainly the result of the decay of Chinese national identity (see Figure 2.4). 
 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Taiwan’s experience poses an important puzzle to the study of nationalism.  Since 
transition to democracy, the rivalry between the two nationalisms grew more intense, 
while people on the island did not consider the two national identities as antagonistic.  
Taiwan’s case is very different from the East European countries and the successor states 
of the former Soviet Unions, where the transition to democracy was by and large 
                                                 





accompanied by the triumph of native nationalist movements.  The new Taiwanese 
national identity was formed not in confrontation with but rather compatible with the 
existing Chinese national identity.  Most of the population in Taiwan had dual national 
identity.  
This phenomenon of dual identity is unexplained and hard to reconcile with the 
existing literature.  Since the literature on nationalism treats national identities as if they 
are mutually exclusive, it provides no answer to the phenomenon of dual identity 
generally, and to the dynamics of national identity shift in Taiwan specifically.  The 
nationalist paradigm is inherent in current studies on Taiwan’s national identity.  Their 
presumption that the emerging Taiwanese national identity is in conflict with the 
orthodox Chinese national identity makes them blind to the phenomenon that a large 
portion of the people in Taiwan have identified themselves with both the Chinese nation 
and the Taiwanese nation.  The phenomenon of dual identity poses important questions 
for the study of the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan.  Why, along with 
the rivalry of the two nationalisms in political competitions, has a major proportion of the 
population identified themselves with both the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations?  
What are the forces which have caused national identity shift?  And what is the nature of 
the rising Taiwanese national identity? 
To answer these questions, this study proposes to bring Chinese national identity 
back to the analysis of the national identity shift in Taiwan.  Most work on Taiwan’s 
national identity change focuses primarily on the analysis and explanation of the rise of 
Taiwanese national identity.  Very few studies deal with the problem of Chinese 





Chinese national identity was losing ground and was replaced by Taiwanese national 
identity in the 1990s.  This research questions these assumptions.  First of all, this 
study challenges the nationalist paradigm underlying these assumptions which treats 
national identities as mutually exclusive.  Different from previous research, I argue that 
Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are not presumably 
contradictory, and that the national identity of the populace should not be seen as an 
either-or choice between the two nationalities.  Moreover, I suggest that the two trends 
of national identity change in Taiwan after democratic transition, i.e. the ascending trend 
of Taiwanese national identity and the descending trend of Chinese national identity, 
should not be understood as the two faces of the same coin.  The rise of Taiwanese 
national identity should not be presumed to have caused the decline of the Chinese 
national identity.  Rather, this study proposes to examine the waxing of Taiwanese 
identity and the waning of Chinese identity as two separate trajectories in which different 
mechanisms explain their dynamics respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The conventional thinking that holds different national identities to 
be incompatible is theoretically improper and empirically untrue.   
Hypothesis 1.1: Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are not 
mutually exclusive. 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between different national identities in a single 
state is not competitive in nature. 
Hypothesis 2.1: The rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decay of Chinese 







What explains the rise of Taiwanese national identity after democratic transition in 
the 1990s?  Most studies adopt a perspective of ethno-nationalism and argue that the 
frequent and large-scale ethnic mobilization by the native elites in order to gain political 
support during the early stage of democratization contributed to the surge of Taiwanese 
national identity in the 1990s.  This study suggests that this ethno-cultural account tells 
only a partial story, and proposes a theory involving two paths of Taiwanese national 
identity formation.  In addition to the ethno-cultural path, there is a political 
participatory path.  The surge of Taiwanese national identity was partly caused by 
nationalist ethnic mobilization.  However, the main force was a response to democratic 
transformation.  Democratic institutions and practice not only redefine the ROC’s de 
jure territory.  Democratic citizenship provides a new basis, different from nationalist 
ethno-cultural sources, for collective self-understanding.  Through participation in 
democratic political processes, identification with the Taiwan-wide political community 
has been cultivated among the population on the island.  Identification with the 
Taiwanese political community is not based on an ethnicity and culture different from 
those of Chinese.  Hence, it does not challenge the ethnic mythology upon which the 
Chinese national identity is based.  This is the reason why Taiwanese national identity is 
able to co-exist with Chinese national identity. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Democratization mitigates rather than exacerbates identity politics 





deliberation to resolve state-wide affairs, which engenders 
identification with the state. 
Hypothesis 3.1: The rise of Taiwanese national identity is a product of the 
transition to democracy. National identity is engendered through 
popular democratic political participation. 
 
If the new Taiwanese national identity formed after democratization does not 
challenge existing Chinese national identity, why have Chinese national identity 
experienced a decline since 2000?  This dissertation argues the wane of Chinese national 
identity was a response to the rise of the PRC in international institutions.  The 
dominance of the PRC in the international community along with its staunch One China 
Principle have fostered in the minds of the people in Taiwan a strong connection between 
the Chinese nation and the People’s Republic of China.  The Chinese national identity 
hence is deprived of the element of the Republic of China, which had been an important 
component of the Chinese national identity in Taiwan.  The Chinese nationalism of the 
KMT’s official ideology is a Chinese nation represented solely by the ROC state, the 
territory of which includes not only Taiwan but also mainland China.  The transition to 
democracy did not destroy this vision.  The ROC, now a democratic state, was still 
expected to rule great China one day, when the whole Chinese nation could be unified 
into a free, democratic, and prosperous nation.  The rise of the PRC however has turned 
this vision into a grand illusion.  There will no more be a great China, but only the 
People’s Republic of China.  Chinese unification will result in the disappearance of the 





by another state (the PRC). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Dual national identity is difficult to sustain if the larger nation 
pursues a state that denies political autonomy to the small nation.  
Hypothesis 4.1: The decay of Chinese national identity was a response to the rise 
of the PRC. The imbalance of power between the ROC and the 
PRC made those who identify with the ROC state no longer accept 





The following is a brief description of the research projects entailed by and data 
collected for the writing of this dissertation.  This dissertation obtained three types of 
data, namely, data from cross-sectional surveys, data from panel surveys, and data from 
in-depth interviews. 
One major source of survey data was acquired from the Survey Research Data 
Archive (SRDA) at Academia Sinica in Taiwan (http://srda.sinica.edu.tw/).  These 
datasets includes two survey data sets from “General Survey of Social Image in Taiwan.”  
The two face-to-face surveys were conducted by the Research Center for Humanities and 
Social Sciences at Academia Sinica and sponsored by the National Science Council of the 
ROC.  The data sets I used are: The Social Image Survey of June 1991 with a sample 





collected three data sets from the “Taiwan Social Change Survey.”  The surveys were 
conducted by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, and financed by 
the National Science Council of the ROC.  The datasets include the following three: (1) 
Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th Term, 1998. The sample size is 1798. 
(2) Follow-up telephone poll of the above poll, 2000 (sample size 1152). (3) Taiwan 
Social Change Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2003. The sample size is 2016.  I also 
collected five datasets from the “Political Change and Electoral Behavior Survey.”  This 
is a long-term nation-wide interview survey project.  All the face-to-face interviews are 
conducted months after national general elections.  The Political Science Department at 
National Taiwan University and that of Soochow University take turns carrying out the 
project, which is financed by the National Science Council, ROC. These surveys are: (1) 
The 1992 Legislative Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at 
National Taiwan University in 1993. The sample is size 1398.  (2) The 1995 Legislative 
Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at National Taiwan 
University in 1996. The sample size is 1383. (3) The 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 
conducted by the Political Science Department at Soochow University in 1996. The 
sample size is 1406. (4) The 1998 Legislative Election Survey, conducted by the Political 
Science Department at National Taiwan University in1999. The sample size is 1375. (5) 
The 2000 Presidential Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at 
Soochow University in 2000. The sample size is 1409. 
Survey data was also collected from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization 
Study (TEDS) of the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in 





are: the “Study of Election and Democratization in Taiwan: the 2004 Presidential 
Election House Interview Survey” (TEDS 2004P). The total sample is 1823.  The 
second is the “Study of Election and Democratization in Taiwan, A Four-year Plan (IV), 
2005-2008: the 2008 Presidential Election House Interview Survey” (TEDS 2008P). The 
total sample is 1905. 
This dissertation also includes data collected from two telephone surveys, focusing 
on national identity.  The first telephone poll is the “Analysis the Unification and 
Independence Preference of Taiwan’s Public”, sponsored by the National Science 
Council of the ROC.  The principal conductor of this project is Professor Yu Cheng-hua 
at the National Chengchi University.  The survey was conducted in October, 2010 with 
a sample size of 1132.  The second telephone poll is the “China Impact Survey I”, 
conducted in January 2011 by the “China Impact Group” of the Institute of Sociology at 
Academia Sinica.  The total sample size of the survey is 1217. 
This dissertation obtained a panel dataset conducted by Professor Wu Nai-teh of the 
Institute of Sociology at the Academia Sinica.  Two surveys each interviewed the same 
interviewees composed the panel data.  The survey conducted in 1998 was the Taiwan 
Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th Term, conducted in 1998.  The total sample of 
the survey is 1798.  The other is the follow-up survey conducted in 2000.  The 
follow-up survey had a success rate of 64 percent, and its sample size is 1152.  This 
dissertation utilizes the panel dataset in order to create the sample for conducting in-depth 
interviews. 
This dissertation used interview methods to supplement quantitative data gathered 





aspects to my study that are less accessible through survey data.  Firstly, since the 
‘national identity question’ used to be a highly controversial and sensitive issue under 
authoritarian rule in Taiwan, people might be reluctant to engage in discussion or hide 
their true opinions when they answer survey questions (especially in the case of telephone 
surveys since the respondents do not know who is asking these questions and for what 
purposes).  In-depth interviews, on the one hand, give the respondents a chance to 
understand the researcher herself/himself and the purpose of the interview.  Furthermore, 
in-depth interviews give the researcher an opportunity to explore further the different 
attitudes of the respondents underneath the “yes/agree” or “not/disagree” answers 
obtained from the survey questions.  In addition, in-depth interviews allow for 
discussion to be carried out in an informal and comfortable environment (mostly the 
informant’s house), and thus increase the possibility of getting reliable information.  
Secondly, very few consensuses have been reached about the proper questions to ask in 
surveys in order to test the concept of national identity in Taiwan.  The discussion 
format of the interviews ensures that participants talk in their own language, rather than 
reacting to the questions and language of the questionnaire.  This, in turn, enhances the 
likelihood of new and unexpected findings and conclusions emerging from focus group 
analyses.  As my research is interest in explaining why people’s national identity had 
changed, the target of my interviews was those individuals whose national identity had 
changed.  From the panel dataset, I selected those individuals whose national identities 
had changed from 1998 to 2000.  I conducted twenty-five interviews over a six-month 
field trip to Taiwan in 2003.  A paper copy of questionnaire was given to them to 







Theory: Nation, State, and Democracy 
 
The notion of the nation, as well as nationalism and nationalist movement, can only 
be conceived in relation to the notion of the state.  As Hobsbawm (1990) points out it is 
pointless to discuss nation/nationality except insofar as it relates to the modern territorial 
state.  The notion of the state can either refer to the Weberian notion of an 
administrative and legal order which possesses a monopoly of authoritative power, or to 
“political community,” in which a group of people, citizens, are held together in a given 
territory and interact through sovereign political institutions.  Nationalism as the 
political principle of congruence between nation and state requires that a nation not be 
separated and ruled by different states, and also that different nations should not be ruled 
by a single state.  John Breuilly (1994) points out there are three different historical 
processes that may fulfill this political principle.  Firstly, there is the process of 
separation, in which a nation tries to break away from its present state, such as the cases 
of Magyar and Greece.  There is also the process of reform, in which a nation reforms 
the state in the nationalist direction as in the cases of Japan and Turkey.  Lastly, there is 
the process of unification, in which a nation unites with another state to form a single 
nation state, as is the case with Germany and Italy.  All three of those processes aim at 
achieving the congruence of nation and state.  The study of the nation and nationalism 
thus cannot be done without bringing in the state.  As Breuilly claims staunchly, “the 





(Breuilly 1994: 2). 
But if the state is the key to understanding nationalism, what holds the key? 
Although nationalism can be adequately defined as a nation in search of an independent 
and sovereign state, the theoretical relationship between nation and state and the 
historical trajectories in which the two are made in congruence remain very problematic.  
Many students of nationalism, among them Anthony D. Smith being the most prolific, 
focus their studies on the issue of how the nation is formed on the basis of cultural and 
ethnic identities, and how it then demand its own state in the name of the nation already 
formed (Smith 1986, 1991).  Some are more inclined to take the nation, or nation 
formation, as a product of state, or an administrative unit with state power, rather than 
viewing state building as the project of an already-formed nation (Anderson 1991; 
Breuilly 1994; Brubaker 1996; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Marx 
1998, 2003).  John Breuilly (1994) starts from how the political environment of the 
modern world, in which states representing societies with their own cultures, having 
sovereignty over particular territories, and also competing with each other, have given 
rise to nationalist ideology .  Without this modern state system, many nationalist 
movements would not have emerged, or at least not have taken the form of nationalism 
and become aimed at the establishment of independent states. 
Some other scholars have gone down to the level of how states have contributed to 
the formation of nations.  Benedict Anderson (1991) in his famous work shows how 
nations in Latin America, although being imagined communities, were formed along the 
lines of administrative units under the former Spanish empire.  Rogers Brubaker (1996) 





by the policy of institutionalized social/national categories under the Soviet republics.  
Philip G. Roeder (2007) in his world-wide survey of why some nationalist movements 
succeeded and why others failed in building independent nation states argues for the 
importance of the role of the former “segmented states” in nation formation. 
This dissertation follows this line of thought to study two entangled national 
identities, the Chinese and the Taiwanese, in Taiwan.  This study is intended to add 
another case, not a deviant one, but rather a very unique and interesting one, to the state 
paradigm.  It is hoped that this research will not only provide a better understanding of 
the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan, but will also enrich the institutionalism theory of 
nation formation in the study of nationalism.  Because the issue of national identity has 
been the most salient in the country’s national politics, it has been studied by many local 
and foreign scholars.  But the important role of the state in (Taiwanese) nation formation 
and (Chinese) national de-formation is often ignored.  To be sure, the role of the 
(authoritarian) state in engendering (Chinese) national identity has been mentioned.  The 
indoctrination of national identity by the state’s educational institutions is a universal 
phenomenon.  It is well noted that the global prevalence of national identity has gone 
hand in hand with the establishment of compulsory education in the modern world.  The 
indoctrination of Chinese national identity by the KMT authoritarian regime for four 
decades may have played an important role in the forging of Chinese national identity, at 
least before the democratic transition of the country. 
But the situation in Taiwan concerning the relationship between nation and state is 
much more complicated as far as the rise of Taiwanese national identity in competition 





different nations, the orthodox Chinese nation and the nascent Taiwanese nation.  
Secondly, there are three different states, two existent with another imagined, and each 
competing with the others.  Bringing the state into the analysis of the nationalist 
phenomenon in Taiwan is only the first step.  This study will discuss how different 
states play various roles in conditioning the decline of one national identity and nurturing 
the rise of another. 
In studying the relationship between the state and the nation, the particular 
institution of the state at the particular historical moment cannot be ignored.  This study 
focuses on the role of democracy in forging national identity.  The relation between 
democracy and nationalism has been an important issue both in the theory of nationalism 
and in modern political thought.  Since democracy and nationalism both made their 
appearance in the 19th century, the relationship between the two has become an 
important issue among political thinkers.  It is evident that there is a strong connection 
between the ideas of democracy and nationalism.  As Liah Greenfeld points out, “the 
idea of popular sovereignty—the literal meaning of democracy—is also the idea which 
lies at the basis of nationalism.”(Greenfeld 1993: 329)  It was also partly the democratic 
implications of nationalism that drew people under colonial rule to support nationalist 
movements (Emerson 1954; Wallerstein 1966). 
 But the problem of democracy and nationalism is more than the connection of ideas.  
The more important issue is whether democracy can accommodate plural national 
identities.  John S. Mill (1952) has argued that democracy cannot survive in a society 
divided by different national communities.  When people are divided, they are unlikely 





even rational discussion of public policies and united public opinion are impossible in the 
divided society.  Many social scientists seemed deeply influenced by Mill’s perspective 
in this regard.  Rupert Emerson (1967) argued that democracy needs an affectionate 
framework sustained by identity consensus to tolerate political differences.  In his 
pioneering essay on democratic transition, Dankward Rustow (1970) took settled national 
identity as one of the preconditions for democratization.  On the other hand, Jack Snyder 
(2000) argues for reverse causality, insisting that democratic transition in a society 
divided by national identity only works to intensify identity division, which in turn will 
plague the new democracy.  Both of these lines of thought project a seamy picture 
concerning the relation between democracy and nationalism. 
The perspective of this dissertation however is much more optimistic.  It argues 
that, at least for the case of Taiwan, the issue is not whether democracy can accommodate 
plural national identities.  Rather, the issue is how democracy can help create a unified 
national identity.  This study hopes to show that democratic institutions with popular 
political participation have helped form a new Taiwanese national identity.  It further 
argues that the nascent Taiwanese identity forged by democratic institutions and 
participation is largely civic in nature, i.e. an identity characterized by a political 
community composed of equal citizens. 
The distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is nearly as old as 
the study of nationalism.  The pioneer of the study of nationalism Han Kohn 
differentiated Eastern nationalism from Western nationalism in his work published in 
1945 (Kohn 1945).  Kohn’s typology was later transformed into ethnic and civic 





Some would argue that the typology is a false differentiation since nearly all national 
identities are based on both ideas.  Another controversy centers on the issue of whether 
the national identity of the United States a case of civic nationalism.  A main argument 
of this dissertation is that nations formed under a democratic state are more likely to take 
the form of civic nationalism, while those formed under non-democratic and colonial 
states are inclined toward ethnic nationalism.  This dissertation will show that under the 
KMT’s authoritarianism and also in the early stage of the democratic transition in the late 
1980s, the Taiwanese national identity appealed strongly to Taiwanese ethnicity and 
culture.  Because an appeal to ethnicity and culture was the only possible tool for 
mobilizing national identity, ethnic nationalism became the main mode in the era.  It 
was also a period of ethnic tension in Taiwan’s politics.  But as democracy advanced 
and full political participation was experienced by the entire polity, Taiwanese national 
identity began to be conceived as a civic identity with political community.  Although 
some people still maintain an ethnic notion of Taiwanese nation, the civic one seems be 
become a mainstream. 
  A phenomenon side by side with the growth of civic Taiwanese national 
identity is the existence of a large portion of people holding dual identity.  The issue of 
dual identity has been studied by the students of nationalism in the context of other areas 
of the world.  David Laitin (1998), in his study of national identity in the former Soviet 
Republics, observed that some Russians in Estonia held dual identity.  He argues that 
people’s “identity projects” are more complicated than making either-or choice between 
pair of identity alternatives.  He further contends that multiple identities can co-exist 





Nevertheless, as discussed above, the case of Taiwan is different in two respects.  
Firstly, the larger community in other cases is the state, while in Taiwan the state is the 
smaller community, contained in a larger community of nation.  Dual identity in other 
areas of the world is engendered by the situation that a politically activated national 
identity, based on the culture and particular history of some ethnic group, is embedded in 
a larger state-wide political community.  The dual identity in such cases is the 
combination of cultural identity of a smaller nation and the political identity of a larger 
state, or state community.  The case of dual identity in Taiwan, however, is a 
combination of the political identity of a small state, or political community and the 
identity of a larger nation.  Secondly, for those cases of dual identity in other areas, 
identification with the smaller community is pre-existent.  What needs to be explained is 
the emergence of identification with the larger political community.  In the case of 
Taiwan, however, identification with the larger community, i.e. the orthodox Chinese 
national identity, has long been present.  The object of current research is the formation 
of identification with the smaller community along with continual identification with the 
larger one.  The core question concerning dual identity in Taiwan thus is to explain the 
particular political and historical situations that gave rise to this strange mode of dual 
identity and also to analyze how it changes with the political environment. 
 
 
Chapter Arrangement and a Brief Sketch of the Argument 
 





among the general populace in Taiwan.  The first task is to portray correctly the trends 
of Taiwan’s national identity shift over the past two decades.  Leading studies present 
partial and conflicting pictures of the dynamics of national identity shift in Taiwan.   
The conventional view focusing on the rapid and steady growth of Taiwanese national 
identity portrays the victory of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism.  It claims a 
Taiwanese-centered national identity replaced a Chinese-centered national identity and 
became the consensus among Taiwan’s public (Chu and Lin 2001; Corcuff 2002; Wang 
and Liu 2004).  Another view says that the stagnation of the Taiwanese nationalist 
movement indicates that the rising Taiwanese identity was not dominant yet and was still 
in contention with the orthodox Chinese identity.  The rivalry of the two nationalisms 
has made Taiwan a deeply divided society (Wu 2002a, 2005a).  In addition to the two 
views, other studies propose a static picture of Taiwan’s national identity.  Pinpointing 
the prevalence of a popular preference for the status quo over almost two decades, some 
studies state that the national identity of Taiwan’s public has not changed much.  They 
argue that the fact that the majority of the population prefers neither unification nor 
independence indicates that most people have no national identity.  Some assume the 
majority were pragmatists whose choice of Taiwan’s future status is based on material 
calculation (Chu 2004; Jiang 1998; Rigger 2000).  Others assume the national identity 
of Taiwan’s public is chaotic because the struggles of the two nationalisms have confused 
most people by giving them conflicting ideas about which nation they belong to.17 
What best characterize the dynamics of Taiwan’s national identity over the past two 
decades: the continuing struggle of two antagonistic nationalisms, or the conversion of 
national identity from orthodox Chinese nationalism to Taiwanese nationalism, or the 
                                                 





triumph of pragmatism/rationalism, or a chaotic society with confused national identity? 
Finding the answer to this question is the first step toward grasping Taiwan’s national 
identity problem.  Failure to envisage the dynamics of Taiwan’s national identity 
correctly would result in a misunderstanding of the process itself and the implications of 
the dynamics of national identity change after democratic transition, as well as the nature 
of the rising Taiwanese identity, and the forces which have caused the change.  Chapter 
Two is devoted to the task of characterizing the dynamics of national identity change in 
Taiwan.  As every empirical study of political attitudes among the general populace 
starts from the measurement of the attitudes concerned, the next chapter will begin with a 
discussion of the problem of measuring national identity in Taiwan.  Several different 
strategies of measurement have been attempted by local scholars.  The means of 
measurement adopted in this dissertation is a modification of one of them.  The 
modification is based on the assumption that Taiwanese national identity and the Chinese 
one are not mutually exclusive.  A two-level framework is also proposed in the chapter 
to analyze the different patterns occurring in different stages, of the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity and the decline of Chinese one.  This framework also opens the door 
for observation of the puzzling phenomenon of dual identity. 
The main focus of Chapter Three is the important phenomenon of dual identity.  In 
order to understand dual identity, it requests the analysis of the rising Taiwanese national 
identity.  A popular view among local scholars holds that Taiwanese national identity 
was nurtured throughout the island’s history of domination.  It thus is very much based 
on the Taiwanese ethnic identity.  This chapter proposed a quite different view.  It 





democratic transition in the late 1980’s by the popular political participation.  This new 
type of Taiwanese identity is civic in nature.  Verifying the civic nature of Taiwanese 
identity with the empirical data collected in the poll surveys from 1990 to 2000.  This 
chapter then proceeds to analyze dual identity.  It will point out the particularity of dual 
identity in Taiwan in a comparative perspective taking into account its counterparts in 
other areas of the world.  This particularity is a product of orthodox Chinese national 
identity, which has been around since the island was incorporated into the Chinese nation 
and its ROC state after World War Two. 
Chapter Four shows and explains the decline of dual identity.  This decline is not 
the result of the polarization of identity politics, but rather the decline of Chinese national 
identity.  It is argued that the decline of Chinese national identity is caused by the 
imbalance of power between two Chinese states, or more precisely the rise of China in 
the international community and cross-strait relations.  As the more powerful Chinese 
state, the PRC, tries to undermine the lesser Chinese state, the ROC, many people under 
the latter start to give up their Chinese national identity.  As the ROC was rendered an 
outcast and subjected to bullying in the international community, the Chinese national 
identity it embodies has also lost its appeal.  The fact that the decline of Chinese 
national identity has accompanied the rise of China also shows that Chinese national 
identity, at least among people in Taiwan, is not based on (or at least not solely base on) 
Chinese culture and history, as many people have wrongly assumed.  This phenomenon 
has many implications not only for the theory of nationalism, concerning the relation 








Possible Theoretical Contributions and Political Implications 
 
  The study of nationalism cannot be separated from that of the state.  In 
studying nationalist movements under colonialism, students of nationalism have taken the 
state as the target, or product, of nationalism.  As the discussion above shows, a 
different approach has emerged lately, one that emphasizes the important role of the state 
not only in creating national identity among its citizens but also in conditioning the 
formation of a new nation. 
The situation in Taiwan concerning the relation between the nation and the state is 
much more complicated.  Two different nations, the orthodox Chinese nation and the 
nascent Taiwanese nation are entangled with three different states, two existent and 
another imagined.  These states play various roles in conditioning the decline of one 
national identity and nurturing the rise of another national identity.  On the other hand, 
the particular role each state plays is also conditioned by historical factors and the larger 
political environment.  The factor of the state in nation formation thus goes beyond the 
conventional and simplified perspectives of either taking the state as a product of 
nationalism or seeing it as what engenders the nation.  The theoretical perspective of this 
dissertation is that the state and the nation are like fellow travelers in the historical 
journey of a society.  Sometimes they dispute with each other, but most of the time each 
conditions the behavior of each other.  Together they decide the destiny of a society. 





democracy and nationalist politics.  As mentioned above, the relationship between 
democracy and nationalism has been an important issue both in the theory of nationalism 
and in modern political thought.  Some have argued that democracy cannot survive in a 
society divided by national identity.  Others have contended that homogeneous national 
identity is a precondition for democratic transition.  Some have even argued that the 
transition to democracy will only intensify nationalist divisions and escalate conflicts 
between different nationalist camps.  The perspective in this dissertation is opposite to 
this pessimistic view.  The dissertation argues that democratic institutions with popular 
political participation have helped form a new Taiwanese national identity that is based 
on identification with the political community.  It also shows with empirical data that 
democratic participation did ease tensions in nationalist politics by facilitate the 
emergence of a consensus of political identity among the general populace.  Liberal 
democracy and nationalism are the most important ideologies of the modern world.  
This dissertation proposes that we may want to reconsider the relationship between the 
two.  Many areas in the world are still plagued by divided identity, either ethnic or 
national.  If the argument of this dissertation is correct, then we should welcome and 
encourage the coming of liberal democracy rather than preventing it. 
The Beijing government seems to misunderstand both the nature of Taiwanese 
national identity and the nature of Chinese national identity (in Taiwan).  Taiwanese 
national identity, as espoused by many if not all Taiwanese, in fact is compatible and not 
in conflict with the Chinese national identity.  After the democratic transition, a majority 
of people in Taiwan identified with two nations, one being the political community in 





the Chinese nation they identify with is not the ethnic notion of a Chinese nation to which 
the Beijing government subscribes.  It thus makes little sense to the people in Taiwan to 
claim, as the Beijing government does that “since we are all Chinese, we should pursue a 
unified China.”  The allegiance of Chinese nationalists in Taiwan is to the state of the 
Republic of China, which is not to be destroyed and replaced by the People’s Republic of 
China.  Therefore, it is a perverse strategy of the Beijing government in its pursuit of 
unification to bully the ROC in the international community.  The strategy fails to 
consolidate the Chinese identity of people in Taiwan.  It in fact works to diminish it.  
By contrast, the segment of the population oriented toward the status quo, that is, 
who are inclined toward neither unification nor independence has significantly increased.  
Yet, the most important of all is the fact that, as emphasized above, the rise of China 
along with the deep economic integration between two sides has failed to lure people in 
Taiwan to maintain or adopt a Chinese national identity.  This fact has important 








Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008: 




Students of nationalism and identity politics share the view that the central problem 
of studying national identity in Taiwan is how best to conceptualize and measure national 
identity.  So far, however, they have been unable to arrive at a consensus on these 
issues.18  Three methods have been used in poll surveys to measure national identity.  
The first section of this chapter reviews these three methods.  It also discusses why all of 
them are inadequate measurements of national identity and hence fail to detect the 
dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan.  They share in common an incorrect 
presumption that the Taiwanese and Chinese national identities are mutually exclusive.  
This chapter then proposes a new measurement which allows for the compatibility of the 
two national identities.  The proposed research design is discussed in detail in the 
second section.  The third section is devoted to a discussion of the validity of the 
proposed measurement.  Also discussed in this section is the efficacy of the proposed 
measurement as compared to the two conventional measurements in studying national 
identity politics in Taiwan.  The last two sections present the empirical findings from the 
                                                 
18 Shelley Rigger (1999/2000) has reviewed the different conceptualizations and measurements used in 





new method of measurement.  The first finding serves as empirical evidence showing 
that the two conventional views of national identity change in Taiwan are not correct.  It 
also shows the advantages of the new measurement.  The second finding is that 
Taiwanese national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese national identity.  The 
third finding is the rise and fall in the number of people belonging to the group with dual 
national identity in the past two decades.  Basing on these findings, the dynamics of 
national identity change in Taiwan can be differentiated into three distinct periods: the 
dominance of Chinese nationalism before 1992, the rise of dual identity from 1994 to 
2000, and the decay of Chinese national identity after 2000.  This chapter is concluded 
with a section which proposes research hypotheses on how to characterize the observed 
change and how to explain the different patterns of change as well as the forces causing 





The earliest strategy in measuring national identity in the poll surveys is to ask 
respondents the question “Do you consider yourself to be ‘Only Taiwanese’, ‘Only 
Chinese’, or ‘Both Taiwanese and Chinese’ [Qingwen ni renwei ziji shi Taiwan-ren, 
Zhongguo-ren, huozhe ji shi Taiwan-ren ye shi Zhongguo-ren?]”.   
The measurement was first introduced by Chang Mao-kui and Hsiao Hsing-huang in 
1987 in a survey of political attitudes among college students (Chang and Hsiao 1987).  





attempt to go beyond the objective status of the ethnic background (shengji, literally 
provincial origin) prescribed by the state at the time in order to capture the subjective 
dimension of national identity.  Having successfully done so, the measurement was a 
breakthrough in the study of national identity in Taiwan.  But this measurement based 
on self-identification as Taiwanese or Chinese is not adequate to probe the national 
identity question in Taiwan.  First of all, “Taiwanese” in the common usage is 
synonymous with benshengren.19  The term’s opposite is weishengren.  Some scholars 
therefore adopted it as a more adequate measurement of ethnic identity rather than 
national identity (Wu 1996; You 1996).  An additional problem of the measure is that 
when people say they are “Taiwanese,” what they are referring to is quite ambiguous 
(Wang and Sun 1996).  They may be using the term to denote the concept of Taiwanese 
nationality (vis-à-vis Chinese) or of ethnicity (vis-à-vis mainlanders), or they may be 
indicating that they conceive of themselves as citizens of Taiwan (whatever the state is).  
In some usages, the term may even connote a notion of local residency (like New 
Yorkers).  Many people in Taiwan use the term in different contexts. 
The second measurement design uses preference for Taiwanese independence or 
Chinese unification as an indicator of national identity.  The question “What is your 
preference regarding Taiwan’s future, unification or independence is posed to 
respondents.  This unification-independence preference later developed into several 
variations.20  One version pushes those respondents who opt for neither independence 
                                                 
19 The term benshengren is translated as “Taiwanese” in the English literature. Nevertheless, the term 
“Taiwanese” may also refer to ROC citizens, people residing in Taiwan. To prevent conceptual confusion, 
this dissertation translates the term benshengren as “native Taiwanese” instead of “Taiwanese”. 
 
20 For an evaluation of the different measurements of popular attitudes towards the issue of independence 





nor unification but the status quo to make a choice by posing the follow-up question: “If 
the status quo cannot be maintained, do you prefer independence or unification.” 
The exact wordings of the question are: There are debates about Taiwan’s future. 
Some people favor Taiwan independence; others favor unification. What is your opinion 
about Taiwan’s future [Guonei duiyu Taiwan qiantu de wenti you henduo zhenglun, 
youren renwei weilai Taiwan duli bijiao hao, youren renwei liangan tongyi bijiao hao. 
Qingwen ni de yijian zenyang].  If the respondent answers “maintaining the status quo”, 
he or she will be asked a follow-up question “If the status quo cannot be maintained, do 
you choose independence or unification [Ruguo xianzhuang wufa weichi, ni de xuanze 
shi?]”. 
Another version asks respondents to locate their preferences on a six-point scale: 
“immediate unification”, “immediate independence”, “status quo now, unification later”, 
“status quo now, independence later”, “status quo now, decision later”, and “status quo 
indefinitely”.  The exact wordings of the question are “There are different opinions 
about Taiwan’s future in relation to mainland China. Which of the following option do 
you prefer? “immediate unification”, “immediate independence”, “status quo now, 
unification later”, “status quo now, independence later”, “status quo now, decision later”, 
and “status quo indefinitely” [Guanyu Taiwan han dalu de guanxi, qingwen ni bijiao 
pianxiang na yi zhong? jinkuai tongyi; jinkuai duli; weichi xianzhuang, yihou zouxiang 
tongyi; weichi xianzhuang yihou zouxiang duli; weichi xianzhuang, kan qingxing zai 
jueding tongyi huo duli; yongyuan weichi xianzhuang.] 
Using preferences for unification or independence as the measurement of national 





inherent in the word “Taiwanese.”  But this measurement is not without its own 
problems.  The most serious one is shown by the fact that many poll surveys up to the 
present, whether conducted by news media or by academics, have consistently found that 
most respondents favor not unification or independence but the status quo (see Table 1.1).  
Some researchers suggest that the fact that the dominant proportion among the 
respondents favors the status quo is because their true national identities are obscured or 
have been blocked by pragmatic consideration (Chu 2004; Keng et al. 2009; Wang and 
Liu 2004; Wu 1993).  As for those inclined toward Taiwanese nationalism, in the face of 
the threat of military attack from Beijing if independence is declared, they would rather 
prefer the status quo to Taiwan independence for the time being.  In the same vein, those 
inclined toward Chinese nationalism may also opt for the status quo rather than 
unification because China lags significantly behind Taiwan in terms of economic and 
political development.  The intervention of these factors causes a great segment of 
people, whether inclined to Taiwanese nationalism or Chinese nationalism, to opt for the 
status quo.  Thus, we cannot simply claim that those opting for the status quo lack any 
national identity. 
The third design for the measurement of national identity was developed by Wu 
Nai-teh (1993).  In order to induce the respondents to reveal their true national identity, 
Wu’s measurement eliminated those factors which contribute to pragmatic reasoning 
from the questions it posed to respondents.  It asks them two questions at the same time. 
The first question is “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations 
with China declaring independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do 





heping de guanxi, name Taiwan jiu yinggai duli chengwei yige xin de guojia?]” 
The second question is “Some people say if mainland China were comparable with 
Taiwan in terms of the economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides 
should be unified into one country. Do you agree? [Ruguo Zhongguo dalu han Taiwan, 
zai jingji, shehui, zhengzhi ge fangmian tiaojian xiangdang, name liang’an jiu yinggai 
tongyi. Qingwen ni de kanfa ruhe?]” 
After the true national identity of respondents is revealed, Wu then cross-tabulates 
the replies from these two questions into four different groups: among them “Taiwanese 
nationalists” (those who agree with the first question but disagree with the second 
question), “Chinese nationalists” (those disagree with the first question but agree with the 
second question), “Pragmatists” (those who agree with both questions), and 
“Conservatives” (those who disagree with both questions).21  Since this method was 
proposed in 1993, it has been widely employed by empirical studies to measure national 
identities of the general population in Taiwan (Chu 2004; Marsh 2002; Niou 2004, 2005; 
Shyu 1996; Shen and Wu 2008; Wang 1998; Wu 1993, 1996, 2002a, 2005a). 
In controlling the factors preventing respondents from expressing their true attitudes 
on the issue of unification and independence, Wu’s method makes a significant 
advancement in the measuring national identity in Taiwan.  However, Wu’s research 
exhibits a problem similar to that of other methods.  The problem is their presumption of 
an either-or notion of national identity.  Thus, even if Wu’s method captures four 
attitudes, it identifies only those who treat Chinese national identity and Taiwanese 
national identity as mutually exclusive as possessing a national identity.  They are 
Taiwanese nationalists, who want independence if it will not bring war and oppose 
                                                 





unification even if Taiwan and mainland China are compatible in terms of economic, 
societal, and political development, and Chinese nationalists, who want unification if the 
two sides of the strait are compatible in terms of economic, societal, and political 
development and who oppose independence even if it is peaceful.  The other two groups, 
those who want both unification and independence and those who reject both, are taken 
as lacking any national identity.  When this method was first used in a 1992 survey, it 
was found that less than half (47%) of the respondents had a particular national identity 
(Wu 1993:46).  When this measurement was repeated in many subsequent poll surveys, 
the proportion of those presumed of having national identity (I+II in Table 2.1) even 
decreased (38% in 1993, 38% in 1996, 39% in 1998, and 43% in 2000, see Table 2.1).  
Wu’s measurement is intended to uncover the hidden identity of the majority supporting 
the status quo.  Nevertheless, it ends up finding that more than half of the population in 
Taiwan lacked any national identity (53% in 1992, 62% in 1993, 62% in 1996, 61% in 
1998, 57% in 2000, 56% in 2004, and 53% in 2008, see Table 2.1).  Is it really true that 
over half of the population in Taiwan lacked any particular national identity?  It does not 
seem to be a realistic picture that the majority of the population of a country should be 
without any national identity.  This dissertation contends that odd set of findings is 
attributable is the failure of the current measurements to reveal people’s national identity.   
The reason behind this failure is the presumption that national identities are mutually 







Table 2.1: National Identity of Taiwan’s Public, 1991-2008                      N (%) 
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82 ( 6.6) 
267 (19.9) 
173 (12.3) 
133 ( 7.5) 
127 ( 9.0) 
190 (10.4) 
172 ( 9.0) 
12 (1.0) 
18 (1.3) 





























100 ( 7.4) 
 40 ( 2.9) 
102 ( 5.8) 
93 ( 6.6) 
222 (12.2) 






































Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 1992 Legislative 
Election Survey, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th Poll 
of the 4th Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS 2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P. 
 
 
I.  Taiwanese Nationalist Identity (Taiwanese Nationalist) 






Conceptualization and Operationalization 
 
The nation, in its modern definition, refers to a population that has the right to 
demand independent statehood.  Despite whatever may have been ancient about the 
nation, the era of nationalism and the principle of national self-determination have 
transformed the term nation as to be the base for political legitimacy of the modern state 
(Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991).  Nation, therefore, is a political term, 
and different from the concept of ethnie, used by Anthony Smith (Smith 1986, 1991), 
which is demarcated by cultural (and/or linguistic) boundaries. (According to Max Weber, 
an ethnic group may also be based on shared historical experience.)  Nations and ethnic 
groups are sometimes are very hard to differentiate (Connor 1994).  But conceptually, 
they are different.  One contends to remain a cultural group, while the other demands, 
sometimes desperately, its own state. 
Taiwan’s national identity problem (guojia rentong wenti) is a “stateness” problem.  
The problem is not so much about the dispute over whether the population on the island 
is ethnologically or culturally different from the population of mainland China; rather, the 
dispute is in essence related to the boundaries of the territory of the state as a legitimate 
political unit.  People with a Chinese national identity display a preference for a single 
state that encompasses the whole Chinese nation.  They support unification because for 
them, the territorial boundary of a legitimate political unit should include both Taiwan 
and the Chinese mainland.  People with a Taiwanese national identity want an 






As discussed in Chapter one, in Taiwan’s political history and recent political 
development we may witness the entanglement of national identity with the issue of 
unification and independence.  Most research about Taiwan’s national identity thus 
defines and measures national identity as popular attitudes regarding the issue of 
unification and independence.  The most popular method measures national identity as 
popular preferences for unification or independence in the context of Taiwan’s future.  
The problem with this measurement is that although in Taiwan’s political context 
national identity involves the issue of unification and independence, a respondent’s 
unification-independence preference might not truly reflect her/his national identity.  
Due to interference from some factors in the current situation, respondents’ answers to 
the question of their unification-independence preference might be based on their realistic 
considerations rather than their national identities.  Under current configuration of 
cross-strait relations, when a respondent who has a Taiwanese national identity answers a 
question about her/his unification-independence preference, the fear of PRC military 
attack might prevent her/him from choosing independence.  Similarly, a respondent with 
a Chinese national identity might not prefer unification because her/his concerns about 
the existing disparity in economic, societal, and political conditions between the two 
sides of the strait. This problem can be corrected by controlling for the factor of realistic 
consideration.  After controlling for interfering factors, respondents’ attitudes toward 
unification and independence become expressions of their national identities. 
My research design entails adopting Wu’s two hypothetical questions regarding 





Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity respectively. 
The question that measures Chinese national identity asks the respondents “Some 
people say if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan in terms of economic, social, 
and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you 
agree?”  The question measuring Taiwanese national identity asks the respondents 
“Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China and declare 
independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree?” 
There are two advantages to adopting these hypothetical questions in order to 
measure the national identity of Taiwan’s public.  First, the hypothetical questions give 
respondents a chance to express their national identities by controlling for intervening 
factors.  Since the hypothetical questions are able to dismiss respondents’ pragmatic 
concerns about the contingencies of independence and unification, they reveal 
respondents’ wishes/true attitudes concerning Taiwan’s statehood.  Second, these two 
questions have been consistently adopted in most poll surveys since 1991.  Using them, 
instead of creating new ones, allows us to examine and analyze the long-term trend of 
national identity change since the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, a new typology of national identity in Taiwan based on new research 
assumptions is needed.  As pointed out in the previous section, the failure of current 
methods to detect the national identities of the populace in Taiwan is due to that 
research’s either-or presumption concerning national identities.  Under the assumption 
that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are mutually exclusive, 
current research finds that more than half of the population in Taiwan does not have any 





Taiwanese national identity as antagonistic to each other.  These studies thus capture a 
limited picture of national identity politics in Taiwan.  My study rejects the either-or 
notion of national identity and argues that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese 
national identity are not to be presumed contradictory to each other.  Different from 
current measurement techniques, this research will not locate a respondent’s national 
identity on a bipolar spectrum in which Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national 
identity are the two extremes.  Rather, this study proposes to measure Taiwanese 
national identity and Chinese national identity separately.  By relaxing the mutually 
exclusive assumption of national identity, the proposed method creates an opportunity to 
detect the existence of multiple and complementary national identities. 
 
Table 2.2: Typology of National Identity in Taiwan 
 
Chinese National Identity 
(Chinese Unification If No Economic, Societal, and Political 
Disparity) 
 No Yes 
Taiwanese National Identity 





Exclusive Taiwanese Identity 
(III) 







Exclusive Chinese Identity 
 
The new typology of national identity proposed in this study includes all possible 
relationships between Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity (see 
Table 2.2).  There are four types of national identity to be observed in Taiwan 
depending on how respondents perceive the relationship between Chinese national 
identity and Taiwanese national identity.  Both the types in the first category (upper-left 





contradictory and mutually exclusive.  Those in the first category would reject 
unification with China even if the economic, social, and political developments between 
two sides of the strait were comparable.  These respondents’ refusal to accept 
unification even after all the realistic obstacles have been removed apparently suggests 
that their refusal is not due to pragmatic reasoning but to the absence of Chinese national 
identity.  In the meantime, their support for Taiwan independence reveals their 
Taiwanese national identity.  Having a Taiwanese national identity without a Chinese 
national identity, those in this category seem to hold an exclusive Taiwanese national 
identity.  This study defines them as “Taiwanese nationalists.”  Likewise, the second 
category of respondents which opts for unification with China but not for Taiwan 
independence even under favorable conditions can be categorized as “Chinese 
nationalist.”  The fact that they object to Taiwan independence even if no war is 
provoked shows that their objection to independence is not due to realistic concerns.  
Since they have a Chinese identity without a Taiwanese identity, it seems that the 
respondents in this category possess exclusively Chinese national identities.  This study 
defines them as “Chinese nationalists.” 
In contrast, those in the third category (upper-right cell), who give positive answer to 
both questions, do not think the relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese identities is 
antagonistic.  In their minds the two are just compatible and can co-exist.  Respondents 
in this category seem to exhibit both national identities.  This study defines them as 
people possessing “dual national identity”.  
Previous studies, nevertheless, interpreted them as being without any national 





“rationalists” (Chu 2004).  Conceptually, it is illogical to interpret their attitudes as 
pragmatic or realistic.  As the two hypothetical questions are designed to eliminate 
pragmatic/realistic reasoning underlying one’s attitudes toward unification and 
independence, people’s responses to the two questions actually reveal their true attitudes 
toward unification and independence (that is their national identities).  To put it more 
specifically, those who have a Taiwanese national identity might not support 
independence and instead prefer maintaining the status quo because of pragmatic 
reasoning, i.e. the threat of military attack from the PRC if independence is declared.  
As a result, we cannot tell whether people prefer the status quo because of a lack of 
Taiwanese national identity or because of pragmatic reasoning.  However, as the 
hypothetical questions have removed their realistic concerns (independence can be 
achieved peacefully), their responses to the hypothetic question reflect not pragmatic 
reasoning but their national identity.  Thus, for those who have a Taiwanese national 
identity, if there is no need to consider realistic obstacles, their attitude toward 
independence would be to support it.  It is illogical to say that their support for 
independence is pragmatic.  The same logic applies to Chinese national identity.  
Those who have a Chinese national identity might not support unification but instead 
prefer maintaining the status quo because of pragmatic reasoning, i.e. China lags largely 
behind Taiwan in economic, social, and political development.  As a result, we cannot 
tell whether the fact that people prefer the status quo is because they lack a Chinese 
national identity or because of pragmatic reasoning.  However, since the hypothetical 
question has removed their realistic concerns (the two sides of the strait are comparable 





and not pragmatic reasoning.  Thus, for those who have a Chinese national identity, if 
there were no need to consider realistic obstacles, their attitude toward unification would 
be to supporting it.  It is illogical to say that their support for unification is pragmatic.  
If a respondent’s support for independence is an expression of her or his Taiwanese 
national identity and if a respondent’s support for unification is an expression of her or 
his Chinese national identity, why would a respondent who supports both be viewed as a 
pragmatist instead as of having both Taiwanese and Chinese national identity?  
Empirically, the hypothesis that interprets respondents whose true attitude of supporting 
both unification and independence as having dual identity is supported by survey data.  
Table 2.7 contains the cross-tabulations of respondents’ self-identity and the proposed 
measurement of national identity from 1993 to 2008.  The 2000 data in Table 2.7 
illustrates that if obstacles were no longer to exist, around 58% of those respondents who 
support both independence and unification would have a dual self-identify as “Both 
Taiwanese and Chinese” (see Table 2.7).  This finding suggests that the group of 
respondents who approves of both independence and unification under their respective 
favored circumstances are, as my research correctly defines, people holding dual national 
identity. (Further discussion can be found in the next section about the validity of the 
proposed measurement.) 
Another challenge to the definition of the dual identity category would be as to 
whether it is possible that respondents agreed to both unification and independence not 
because they had dual national identity but due to their confusion, ignorance, or a sort of 
thoughtless of giving answers without really paying attention.  Conceptually, it is 





that this category consistently contained a large number of people over the past 17 years 
(30% in 1991, 49% in 1996, 44% in 1998, 41% in 2000, 26% in 2003, and 23% in 2008, 
see Figure 2.6).  It is hard to imagine that such a large number of people (sometime 
around half of the population) would give illogical and meaningless answers.  Secondly, 
the data shows that most respondents in this category have good educational backgrounds.  
In 1996, 60.3 percent (35.3%+25%) of respondents who belonged to this category had a 
median level of education (12-15 years of education) or high level of education (above 15 
years of education) (see Table 2.3).  In 2000, 63 percent of respondents who belonged to 
this category had a median or high level of education (see Table 2.4).  We would not 
expect that people with good educational backgrounds would give ignorant or thoughtless 
answers.  Thirdly, the data shows that most respondents in this category pay good 
attention to political news.  In 1996, 45.3% of respondents who belonged to this 
category often watched political news from television programs, 29.2% of them watched 
sometimes, 21.7% of them seldom watched, and only 3.8% of them never watched TV 
news (see Table 2.5).  In 2000, 54.4% of respondents who belonged to this category 
often watched political news from television programs, and 28.9% of them watched 
sometimes (see Table 2.5).  They also pay attention to political news in newspapers and 
magazines.  In 1996, 45.3% of respondents belonging to this category often read 
political news in newspapers and magazines, and 22.8% of them read sometimes (see 
Table 2.5).  In 2000, 41.4% of respondents who belonged to this category often read 
political news in newspapers and magazines, and 30.7% of them read sometimes (see 
Table 2.5).  We would not expect that people who are concerned about politics and well 














































































































































































Table 2.5: National Identity and Political Interests, 1996, 2000                    N (%) 
Row  
Column  





Dual Identity Chinese 
Nationalist 
Status Quo Total 
























































































































































































































































































































Respondents in the fourth category (lower-left cell) seem not to hold any combination 
of the two national identities.  They do not hope for Taiwan independence or Chinese 
unification.  However, I do not assume they lack any national identity.  Thus, this study 
will not define them as having no identity.  Furthermore, this study will not label them 
as “conservatives,” who do not want to change or are even afraid of doing so (Chu 2004; 
Shyu 1996; Wu 1993, 1996).  Since respondents in this category want neither 
independence nor unification, they will be defined as the “status quo.”  Respondents in 
the status quo category might have Chinese national identity.  What prevents them from 
supporting unification might not be some realistic consideration, such as economic, 
cultural, or political disparity.  Instead, it might be the case that they do not support 
unification because they prefer the idea of a certain form of unification (for example, a 
loose confederation).  They thus will not accept unification if it is under the domination 
of the PRC.  Or, they might have Taiwanese national identity.  What prevents them 
from supporting independence might not be the fear of war, but the fact that they think 
Taiwan is already an independent state and what in needed is garnering more 
international recognition instead of changing the state’s name.  Thus, theoretically, it is 
possible that they have national identities but that the two hypothetical questions fail to 
reveal their national identities.  This was not the case before 2003.  Figure 2.6 
illustrates that the status quo group contained a very small number of people (4% in 1996, 
7% in 1998, and 8% in 2000).  The fact that more than ninety percent of the respondents 
(96% in 1996, 93% in 1998, and 92% in 2000) can be categorized as belonging to one 
national identity group indicates the efficacy of the two hypothetical questions in 





category also raises another question: is it possible that respondents answered “no” to 
both questions due to their ignorance, or out of thoughtless by giving answers without 
really paying attention?  As this category was insignificant during the period of 1991 to 
2000, this study will not interpret their attitudes for this period.  However, as Figure 2.6 
shows, since 2003, this category has gained considerable significance.  Twenty percent 
of the respondents in 2003 and nineteen percent of those in 2008 belonged to this 
category (see Figure 2.6).  Thus, their attitudes will be discussed for the period after 
2003.  Was their rejection of both unification and independence because of the absence 
of Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity, because of their 
identification with the status quo, or because of the inability of the two hypothetical 
questions to reveal their national identities?  
 
 
Validity of the Proposed Measurement 
 
The validity of the proposed measurement of national identity can be examined by 
attending to its correlation with the self-identity of the populace.  Table 2.6 is the 
Chi-Square test of the association between self-identity and the proposed measurement of 
national identity. The fact that the Pearson Chi-Square statistics of the 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2004 and 2008 data are all significant (p<.000) proves that respondents’ self-identity is 
associated with their national identity (see Table 2.6).  The test suggests that although 
the questions used as a proxy of national identity are not on their face about identity, their 







Table 2.6: Chi-Square Tests of the Correlation between the Proposed Measurement of National 
Identity and a Respondent’s Self-Identity, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 
Pearson Chi-Square Value df Significance 
1993 145.201 6 .000 
1996 200.083 6 .000 
2000 161.667 6 .000 
2004 230.444 6 .000 
2008 247.722 6 .000 
Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1995 Legislative Election Survey, 
2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS 2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P.   
 
The questioning that the proposed measurement is not about identity can be further 
examined by cross-tabulating the proposed measurement of national identity with the 
measurement on self-identity.  Table 2.7 contains the cross-tabulations of respondents’ 
national identities with their self-identities from 1993 to 2008.  Table 2.7 reveals some 
important information.  First, it shows that people who had a Taiwanese self-identity 
were more likely to support independence (have a Taiwanese national identity); 
meanwhile those who had a Chinese self-identity were more likely to support unification 
(have a Chinese national identity).  The 1993 data of Table 2.7 illustrates that 75 percent 
of those respondents who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” had a Taiwanese 
national identity (28.6% were Taiwanese nationalists and 46.8% held dual identity).  
The data from the subsequent years consistently shows a correlation between the 
respondents’ self-identity and their national identity.  In 1996, around 80 percent (43.4% 
+36.3%) of those who had an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity had a Taiwanese national 
identity.  In 2000, 85 percent (45.8% + 39.3%) of those who had an “Only Taiwanese” 
self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity.  In 2004, 81.5 percent (54.6% + 26.9%) 





And in 2008, 78 percent (59.3% + 18.6%) of those who had an “Only Taiwanese” 
self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity.  Likewise, most respondents who 
identified themselves as “Only Chinese”, (81% in 1993, 81% in 1996, 79% in 2000, 63% 
in 2003, and 70% in 2008) had a Chinese national identity (either an exclusive Chinese 
national identity (Chinese nationalist) or an inclusive Chinese national identity (dual 
identity)).  These findings suggest that because respondents’ true attitudes toward 
unification and independence (the proposed measurement of national identity) are closely 
related to their self-identity, their attitudes are not simply opinions on specific public 
policy.  Instead, they are an expression of their national identity. 
Second, Table 2.7 illustrates that most respondents with dual national identity had a 
dual self-identify as “Both Taiwanese and Chinese” (46.4% in 1996, 57.8% in 2000, 53% 
in 2004, and 50.8% in 2008) instead of an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity (36% in 1996, 
34% in 2000, 40.8% in 2004, and 42.3% in 2008) or an “only Chinese” self-identity 
(17.6% in 1996, 8.1% in 2000, 6.2% in 2004, and 6.9% in 2008).  These findings 
(among those who support both independence and unification, a bigger proportion had 
dual self-identity) suggest that the group of respondents who approve of both 
independence and unification under their respective favored circumstances are, as my 
research correctly defined, people possessing dual national identity.  Their responses to 
the two hypothetical questions are made on the basis of their national identities rather 
than out of confusion, ignorance, or a bias toward saying yes to every question.  
Last but not least, Table 2.7 indicates that the meaning of “Taiwanese” and 
“Chinese” has changed during the period of 1993 to 2008.  The percentage of 





national identity (Taiwanese nationalists) increased from 28.6% in 1993 to 43.4% in 1996, 
then to 45.8% in 2000, 54.6% in 2004, and 59.3% in 2008.  That is to say, in 1993, less 
than 30 percent of those respondents who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” 
were Taiwanese nationalists (who supported independence but disapproved of 
unification).  However, in 2008, around 60 percent of respondents who identified 
themselves as “Only Taiwanese” were Taiwanese nationalists (who supported 
independence but disapproved of unification).  The increase in the number of Taiwanese 
nationalists among respondents who had an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity suggests that 
when people said they were “Only Taiwanese”, the meaning of the term “Taiwanese” had 
changed over time and become more of a national concept of independent statehood than 
an ethnic concept.  By contrast, the percentage of respondents whose self-identify was 
“Only Chinese” having an exclusive Chinese national identity decreased from 57.4% in 
1993 to 54.6% in 1996, and then further to 50% in 2000, 45.7% in 2004, and eventually 
all the way down to 35.6% in 2008.  More specifically, in 1993, around 60 percent of 
respondents who identified themselves as “Only Chinese” were Chinese nationalists (who 
supported unification but disapproved independence).  However, in 2008 less than 36 
percent of respondents who identified themselves as “Only Chinese” were Chinese 
nationalists (who supported unification but disapproved independence).  The decrease in 
the number Chinese nationalists among people who had an “Only Chinese” self-identity 
suggests that when people said they were “Only Chinese”, what “Chinese” connoted 
changed from being a political concept of a Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu) to a 
cultural concept of being ethnic Chinese (huaren).  These findings suggest that using the 





indicates, the meaning of “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” changed between 1993 and 2008.  
Using one’s Taiwanese or Chinese self-identity as a proxy for national identity would 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the shift of national identity in Taiwan 
during the past two decades.  Since although the data indicates that the self-identity of 
the population in Taiwan had changed over the past two decades, it is hard to know 
whether the observed change was due to changes to people’s national identities or 
because the meaning of being “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” had changed.  Table 2.7 
demonstrates the advantage of the proposed measurement over measurement based on 
self-identity to studying the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. 
Table 2.8 examines the questioning that the proposed questions measure not national 
identity but policy preference.  Table 2.8 contains cross-tabulations of the proposed 
measurement of national identity with the question of public preference on the issue of 
unification and independence during the period between 1991 and 2008.  Table 2.8 
reveals some interesting findings.  Table 2.8 shows that in 1991, when asked “If Taiwan 
and the mainland were compatible in terms of economic, societal, and political 
development, do you agree the two sides should be united into one state”, 51.5 percent 
(47.4% + 4.1%) of the respondents who preferred independence approved of unification.  
These finding suggests that some people preferred independence to unification not 
because they were Taiwanese nationalists pursing their own state independent from the 
Chinese state, but because the existing huge difference between the two straits prevented 
them from choosing unification.  In the same vein, Table 2.8 shows that in 1991, when 
asked “if independence can be achieved peacefully”, 23.7 percent (1.5% + 22.2%) of the 





This finding suggests that some people preferred unification to independence not because 
they were Chinese nationalists pursuing one united Chinese state but because under 
current circumstances, independence cannot be achieved without PRC military attack.  
Thus, the question asking respondents’ position on the unification-vs-independence 
spectrum is not a measurement of national identity but of policy preference.  The 
respondents choose unification or independence not necessarily based on their national 
identity but more likely based on their pragmatic concerns and realistic calculations.  As 
the question asking popular preference on the issue of unification and independence is a 
policy preference question, the inconsistency between this question and the proposed 
measurement indicates that the proposed measurement is not about policy preference. 
Is the proposed measurement a measurement of national identity since the proposed 
questions had controlled for the interference of realistic considerations?  Table 2.8 
shows that although not all of them preferred independence, very few of those who truly 
want independence but not unification (we defined them as having exclusive Taiwanese 
national identity) chose unification (1.8% in 1996, 4.9% in 2000, 3.9% in 2004, and 2.6% 
in 2008).  The data suggests that respondents who had no Chinese national identity 
might prefer independence (based on their national identity) or the status quo (based on 
their realistic considerations).  Nevertheless, they were not likely to prefer unification.  
Similarly, although not all of them preferred unification, very few of those who truly 
want unification but not independence (we defined them as having exclusive Chinese 
national identity) preferred independence (1.5% in 1991, 2.2% in 1996, 1.9% in 2000, 
6.3% in 2004, and 1.7% in 2008) (see Table 2.8).  The data suggests that, those 





their national identity) or the status quo (based on their realistic consideration).  
Nevertheless, they did not prefer independence.  In contrast, some of those who truly 
want both unification and independence (we defined them as having dual national 
identities) preferred independence (28.3% in 1991, 19.6% in 1996, 22.8% in 2000, 22.9% 
in 2004, and 13.2% in 2008), others preferred unification (45.1% in 1991, 13.2% in 1996, 
25.4% in 2000, 22.4% in 2004, and 21.4% in 2008), and still another portion preferred 
maintaining the status quo (26.6% in 1991, 67.2% in 1996, 51.8% in 2000, 54.7% in 
2004, and 65.4% in 2008) (see Table 2.8).  Their preferences varied because they might 
have different concerns and calculations.  Even so, unlike those with exclusive national 
identity, they did not exclude unification or independence from their preferences.  Their 
difference can be explained by taking into consideration the fact that they have different 
national identities.  People who have exclusive Taiwanese national identity exclude 
unification from their set of preferred options because they lack Chinese national identity.  
Similarly, people who have exclusive Chinese national identity exclude independence 
from their options because they lack Taiwanese national identity.  However, for people 
who have both Taiwanese and Chinese national identities, either unification or 
independence can be their preference.  Because they identify with both the Chinese 
nation and the Taiwanese nation, they would not see unification or independence as 
leading to the creation of an illegitimate political unit.  These findings suggest that the 







Table 2.7: National Identity and Self-Identity, 1993-2008                         N (%) 























































































































































































































































Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1995 Legislative Election Survey, 







Table 2.8: National Identity and Unification-Independence Preference, 1991-2008     N (%) 

















































































































































































































































Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes 1991, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election 








Trends of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008 
 
Two Conventional Perspectives 
Because it assumes that Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity 
are mutually exclusive, the conventional paradigm places them at two opposite poles on 
the same dimension.  This paradigm has led in the studies of nationalism and identity 
politics to two popular conclusions concerning the dynamics of identity change in Taiwan.  
These two conclusions, however, offer contradictory scenarios for identity politics.  The 
first conclusive finding focused on the antagonistic relationship between Taiwanese 
identity and Chinese identity, as presented in Figure 2.1.  Highlighting the rapid 
shrinking of the Chinese nationalist group along with the continued expansion of the 
Taiwanese nationalist group, the first conclusion arrived at was that the rise of Taiwanese 
nationalism caused the decline of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1990s.  It thus 
concluded that the change of national identity in Taiwan could be understood as one in 
which the emerging Taiwanese identity supplanted the orthodox Chinese identity.  The 
second conclusion arrived at is a static picture of Taiwan’s national identity politics (see 
Figure 2.2).  Using the findings from polls in many different years that indicated that 
most people consistently picked the status quo over Taiwan independence and Chinese 
unification in their replies, it is claimed that the national identity of the general population 
in Taiwan has not changed much because most people desire neither an independent 
Taiwan nor Chinese unification.  Which conclusion correctly captures the dynamics of 






Figure 2.1: Trends of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008 
 
Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 
1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: 
Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential 
Election Survey, 2004: TEDS 2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P. 
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unification status-quo independence  




The analysis in this study suggests that neither is correct.  With different 
presumptions and theoretical hypotheses, this study offers a very different picture from 
the conventional one.  The core argument of this study is that Taiwanese national 
identity and Chinese national identity should not be seen as contradictory to each other.  





new perspective, this study measures Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national 
identity individually.  Utilizing the data collected from various nationwide surveys 
conducted during 1991-2008, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 illustrate the trends of Taiwanese 
identity and Chinese identity respectively. 
 




























1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2008
support indepedence reject independence no opinion  
Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 
1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1994: General Survey of Social Image 1994, 1996: the 
1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 
4th Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2003 Taiwan Social Change 
Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2008: TEDS 2008P. 
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support unification reject unification no opinion  






Contrary to the static picture represented in Figure 2.2, both Taiwanese identity and 
Chinese identity experienced a great change as shown in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4.  
These findings also reject the second conclusion that both independence and unification 
gained little support from Taiwan’s public.  As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, since 1996, 
independence has gained continuing support from more than half of the population in 
Taiwan.  On the other hand, Figure 2.4 shows that the majority continued to subscribe 
to Chinese unification until 2000. 
Information provided by Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 shows that the first conclusion 
from previous studies is correct: the national identity of Taiwan’s public has largely 
changed.  But those figures depict a quite different mode of change.  Two figures are 
combined in Figure 2.5 to show the point more clearly. 
 































1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2008
support indepedence reject independence support unification reject unification  
Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 
1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1994: General Survey of Social Image 1994, 1996: the 
1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 
4th Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2003 Taiwan Social Change 
Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2008: TEDS 2008P. 
 





that the two figures reveal are different.  Figure 2.1 proposes a nationalist mode of 
identity conversion insomuch as it shows that since 1996, Taiwanese national identity had 
replaced Chinese national identity.  Information provided in Figure 2.5 suggests that the 
argument that Taiwanese identity had supplanted Chinese identity is incorrect.  As the 
figure shows, the growth of popular approval of independence and the decline of popular 
acceptance of unification did not concur.  Furthermore, it also shows that Taiwanese 
national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese national identity.  Taiwanese 
national identity experienced its most significant growth during the period between 1991 
and 1996, when Chinese national identity did not much decline.  The majority of the 
population retained their support for unification (66.5% in 1991 and 60% in 1996).  
Although Chinese national identity began to decline after 2000, the decline was not due 
to the triumph of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.  During the period of decline of 
Chinese identity, popular support for independence did not grow.  Taiwanese national 
identity even declined as the Chinese national identity did. 
These findings show clearly that both conventional perspectives are inadequate to 
understand national identity change in Taiwan.  A new perspective with a new form of 
measurement is required for the analysis of the national identity phenomenon in Taiwan, 
one which can explain the relationship between the two national identities, as well as the 
trend of change for each national identity.  The empirical data seems to support the 
hypothesis of this study that the two national identities are compatible and hence can 
co-exist among the same persons.  In addition, the trend of change of Taiwanese 







The Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008 
 
Figure 2.6: Dynamics of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008 
 
Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1996: the 1996 Presidential 
Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential 
Election Survey, 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2008: TEDS 2008P. 
 
Using the typology of national identity developed in this study, Figure 2.6 depicts 
the dynamics of national identity in Taiwan from 1991 to 2008.  The figure contains six 
graphs, each illustrating the distribution of different types, or categories, of national 
identity in one specific year.  In each case, the category located in the lower-right corner 
represents those who agree with unification but not independence.  They are “Chinese 
nationalists” holding an “exclusive Chinese national identity.”  The category that could 
be considered opposite to it is located in the upper-left corner.  This category represents 
are who agree with independence but not unification.  They are “Taiwanese nationalists” 





right corner includes those who possess “dual identity,” because they agree with both 
independence and unification.  The category in the lower-left corner is labeled as people 
for the “status quo,” since they reject both unification and independence. 
The six graphs in Figure 2.6 provide us with some important information.  First of 
all, statistical information is provided in Figure 2.6 to challenge the assumption that 
Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are mutually exclusive.  The 
dotted line is the predicted regression line proposed by the contradictory hypothesis.  
The solid line is the estimated regression line obtained from empirical data.  These two 
lines are very different in all eight graphs.  This difference indicates the inadequacy of 
the assumption that the two identities are in contradiction.  The smooth slope of the 
actual regression line obtained from empirical data suggests that the two identities are 
weakly negatively related, meaning that for some people, the two identities are in conflict, 
but for most others, they are not. 
Second, these graphs demonstrate the advantages the proposed two-level perspective 
has over the conventional perspective.  The graphs in Figure 2.6 reveal that, except for 
the year 1991, the dotted line (conventional measurements) captured less than half of the 
respondents in the 1990s.  Therefore, the trends detected in conventional approaches 
could only apply to less than half of the population.  Actually, one major criticism of 
Wu’s measurement is precisely that a large portion of respondents were excluded from 
analysis because they were by definition people without a national identity (Rigger 
1999/2000).  On the other hand, the other approach, the one entailing a 
unification-independence spectrum, has repeatedly found that a great part of the 





(see Figure 2.2).  However, both the observed status-quo predominance and the 
inference of a static trend of national identity change (the continuing predominance of the 
status-quo attitude) are misleading.  Figure 2.6 demonstrates that those who are left out 
by the spectrum in fact comprise two groups with opposite attitudes.  The status-quo 
group which rejects unification and independence is located at the lower-left corner.  
The other group at the upper-right corner accepts both unification and independence.  In 
fact, Figure 2.6 reveals that the attitude preferring maintaining the status quo is the 
smaller part of that sizeable block in the 1990s (13% in 1991, 4% in 1996, 7% in 1998 
and 8% in 2000). 
Third, the information provided by Figure 2.6 supports the hypothesis that the two 
national identities are not necessarily in juxtaposed with one another.  Figure 2.5 
precisely indicates that the rising Taiwanese national identity did not replace the orthodox 
Chinese national identity.  They actually co-existed in Taiwanese society.  Figure 2.6 
further demonstrates that the co-existence was not antagonistic as has been supposed by 
previous studies.  The two can be compatible or even complementary.  The existence 
of the upper-right circle in each graph indicates that people may possess both Taiwanese 
national identity and Chinese national identity at the same time. 
Last but not least, Figure 2.6 captures the dynamics of national identity in Taiwan in 
the post-transition period from 1991 to 2008.  It confirms previous studies’ discovery 
that the exclusive Taiwanese identity was on the rise, illustrated by the fact that the circle 
in the upper-left corner of each graph became bigger and bigger as time went by (11% in 
1991, 27% in 1996, 28% in 1998, 28% in 2000, 34% in 2003, and 42% in 2008 (see 





previous studies, namely the rise and decline of the group with dual identity during this 
period.  In the first few years following the democratic transition, this group accounted 
for less than one third of the population.  But within five years of the transition, in 1996, 
almost half of the population belonged to the group of dual identity.  It however this did 
not last long.  The size of the group dropped rapidly after 2000.  In 2000, 41 percent of 
the population exhibited dual identity.  The percentage dropped to 26% in 2003, and 
further to 23% in 2008 (Figure 2.6).  
But most importantly, Figure 2.6 illustrates the three different patterns of 
distribution of national identity groups in different periods.  In the beginning of the 
1990s, the largest group comprised those with a Chinese nationalist identity (46%).  
Very few people (11%) possessed a Taiwanese national identity during this period.  
Over three quarters (46%+30%) of the population supported Chinese unification.  
During that same period of time, around 60 percent (46%+13%) of the population 
rejected the idea of an independent Taiwan.  The mode of national identity politics 
during the transition period was characterized by the dominance of Chinese nationalist 
identity.  The second pattern of national identity distribution was characterized by the 
rise and dominance of dual identity from 1994 to 2000.  The domination of the dual 
identity group means that most people during that period did not see Taiwanese national 
identity and Chinese national identity as conflicting.  Rather, they identified with both a 
Taiwanese nation and a Chinese nation.  The period since 2003 witnessed the third 
pattern of national identity distribution.  The dual identity group was no longer 
predominant, and the status quo group was no longer insignificant.  The growth of the 





appeal for Taiwanese people. 
 
 
Two Phases of National Identity Change 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the forces behind the changes to national 
identity among the general population in Taiwan after the democratic transition.  The 
first requirement of this endeavor is to portray correctly the trend of national identity 
change over the past two decades.  It is demonstrated in this chapter that the reason 
previous studies failed to present a correct picture is that they used the wrong way to 
measure national identity.  A two-level perspective is proposed in this study.  The new 
perspective leads us to adopt different ways of measurement of national identity, a fact 
which has several advantages.  First, while the previous measurements capture less than 
half of the respondents, or population, the new measurement includes all respondents, or 
population, in its analysis.  Second, the new measurement covers two important groups, 
which were neglected by previous measurements.  Third, the new method provides a 
comprehensive picture of the trends surrounding national identity after democratic 
transition in Taiwan.  It is also able to differentiate between three different patterns in 
the change of national identity over the past two decades. 
Below, the forces that form these three different modes of national identity politics 
will be discussed.  The change of national identity in Taiwan over the past two decades 
developed over two transitional phases.  Each phase has its distinct patterns of change.  





presented in graph form in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.7: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase I, 1991-2000 
 
 
The first phase is characterized as the rise of Taiwanese national identity, and lasted 
throughout the whole decade of 1990s.  The pattern of change in this first phase entailed 
the replacement of dominant Chinese nationalist identity by dual national identity.  As 
illustrated by Figure 2.7, the change was caused mainly by a shift of attitudes among 
Chinese nationalists concerning the issue of Taiwan independence.  They acquired a 
new Taiwanese national identity.  A small part of them discarded their previous Chinese 
national identity to become Taiwanese nationalists.  But most of them, having retained 
their Chinese national identity, acquired a new Taiwanese national identity.  The 
thickness of the arrows in the graphs indicates the difference in size.  The upward 
arrows show that the main direction of change in the first phase is the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity.  The bold line in the first graph indicates that the main direction of 
change was from Chinese nationalist to dual national identity.  It suggests the continual 
and stable presence of Chinese national identity, notwithstanding the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity. 
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Figure 2.8: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase II, 2001-2011 
 
 
The second phase is characterized as the decay of Chinese national identity.  The 
second phase covered the period from 2001 to 2011.  During this phase, dual national 
identity no longer accounted for a large segment among the population.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2.8, the direction of change is from dual national identity to Taiwanese 
nationalism and support for the status quo.  This change was caused by the shift in 
attitude among those with dual identity concerning unification with China.  They shifted 
their attitudes from supporting unification to opposing it.  A larger part of them also 
changed their attitudes to support Taiwan independence.  The two leftward arrows show 
the pattern of national identity change, characterized by the decline of Chinese national 
identity.  In this phase, the enduring presence of popular support for unification 
dwindled away. 
This research proposes two models of national identity change.  The first model 
tackles the rise of Taiwanese national identity in the first phase.  It suggests that the 
surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s cannot be fully explained by the 
Taiwanese nationalist movement because what is witnessed in this phase is not only the 
Dual National Identity 
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growth of Taiwanese nationalists but also the increase of people with dual identity.  The 
first model includes several research questions.  First, why was the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity not in conflict with orthodox Chinese national identity, but instead able 
to co-exist with it?  Second, what was the main force behind the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity if the Taiwanese nationalist movement was not the major force?  And, 
through what mechanism did this force affect national identity change?  Third, what is 
the nature of the nascent Taiwanese national identity?  These issues will be explored in 
Chapter 3. 
The second model depicting national identity change concerns the diminishing of 
dual identity during the second phase.  The core idea of this model is that the 
diminishing of dual identity was mainly due to the decline of Chinese national identity.  
The decline of Chinese national identity cannot be explained by the rise of the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement since popular support for independence remained stable.  The 
second model thus contains the research question of what caused the spectacular decline 
of Chinese national identity, an identity which used to be a strong and stable ideological 





The empirical study of nationalism should start from the measuring of national 
identity.  Only through appropriate measurement can we arrive at a correct explanation 





change.  Three different strategies to measure national identity have been proposed by 
Taiwanese scholars.  One is measuring by self-identification as Chinese, Taiwanese, or 
both.  Another entails measuring by preference for Chinese unification or Taiwan 
independence.  This research uses a third strategy of measurement with some 
modification on the assumption that among a significant proportion of people, Taiwanese 
and Chinese national identities are not mutually exclusive.  Four main categories of 
national identity are derived from this modified measurement: Taiwanese nationalist, 
Chinese nationalist, dual national identity, and status quo. 
The category of dual national identity emerges when we define the two national 
identities as not mutually exclusive.  Their compatibility is an important assumption of 
this study.  This assumption allows us to detect more clearly the trends and the 
dynamics of national identity change among the general populace in the country.  
Assuming the compatibility of two national identities, this chapter proposed a two-level 
framework to expose the different modes of change of the two national identities, one 
which has been overlooked previously by the one-dimensional view of national identity.  
It is demonstrated with empirical data in this chapter that the nascent Taiwanese national 
identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese nationalism. 
More specifically, two different phases can be distinguished concerning the pattern 
of national identity change during the last two decades.  The first phase, which roughly 
spanned the time from the democratic transition to the late 1990s, witnessed the 
replacement of dominant Chinese nationalism by dual national identity.  It was the result 
of former Chinese nationalists, who did not forsake the Chinese identity they had long 





is characterized by the decline of Chinese national identity.  To understand the 
nationalist politics of the country, it is contended in this research, one needs to understand 
these two different modes of national identity change, firstly the acquisition of a new 
Taiwanese national identity without giving up the old Chinese national identity, and then, 
the decline of Chinese national identity.  These two different modes of change were the 
result of changes in the political environment, both domestic and international. 
The next chapter will examine the advent of Taiwanese national identity.  It will 
differentiate between two different types, or bases, of Taiwanese identity.  One is ethnic 
in nature and the other civic.  The former was nurtured under the KMT authoritarian 
regime, while the latter was born of the democratic political participation.  The civic 
type of Taiwanese nationalism also helps us understand the important phenomenon of 







Dual National Identity and Democratic Participation: 




Students of Taiwan’s political development cannot fail to observe that the process of 
democratization was entangled with the rise of Taiwanese the nationalist movement and 
this movement’s struggle against orthodox Chinese nationalism.  Different theories have 
been proposed to explain the emergence of Taiwanese national identity.  Their views are 
even more varied when it comes to the relationship between the rise of Taiwanese 
national identity and democratization.  This chapter will begin with a review of current 
studies of Taiwanese national identity and Taiwan’s nationalist politics.  In this section, 
I will point out several puzzling questions related to the nationalist phenomenon that 
previous research has neglected to acknowledge, much less, tackle.  One of the puzzles 
is the existence of a large segment of the population that has possesses dual national 
identity since the mid-1990s.  Its existence is one of the most interesting and 
theoretically important issues evident in Taiwan’s nationalist phenomenon.  The second 
section is devoted to the discussion of dual national identity.  It is argued that dual 
national identity emerged out of the development of a new “inclusive” Taiwanese 
national identity, and that this inclusive Taiwanese identity is compatible with Chinese 





question of why an inclusive national identity, rather than the exclusive type which is a 
commonplace for nationalism, emerged with the process of democratization.  More 
precisely, the question can be put as why democratic political process helped nurture an 
inclusive Taiwanese identity, side by side with an exclusive Taiwanese identity and 
Chinese identity?  The third section proposes a causal theory of how democratization in 
Taiwan transformed the national identity of the people on the island and engendered a 
special pattern of identity change in the country.  The contribution of democracy to the 
formation of national identity lies not only in providing a base on which different ethnic 
groups are combined into a single citizenry with equal status, but also in forging a 
sentiment of common destiny through a “we-feeling” attached to the state-wide political 
community among the citizens.  Democratic practice creates a public sphere where 
people on the island recognize and communicate with each other, and are encouraged to 
participate in the deliberation and resolution of community-wide affairs.  Through 
widespread political participation, an identity attached to the island-wide political 
community was formed.  The emergence of the public sphere has turned the island from 
a place of “my residence” (a territory unit) into “my country” (a political community), 
and the inhabitants on the island into fellow citizens (co-nationals).  The last section 
analyzes empirical survey data to support the above theory and hypotheses. 
 
 
Current Studies on the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity 
 






It is a popular view that nationalism and nationalist conflict are born out of the 
process of democratization.  In his study of the correlation between democratization and 
nationalist conflicts, Snyder (2000) argues that in most societies, there is no 
long-standing popular nationalist rivalry before democratization.  It is usually 
democratization that produces nationalism.  According to the scenario he outlines, 
popular nationalism arises at the initial stage of democratization as a consequence of the 
nationalist appeals by political elites vying for popular support.  Most studies of 
Taiwan’s national identity seem to share the same view.  The emergence of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the 1980s is interpreted mainly as the product of political elites’ 
manipulation intended to mobilize native Taiwanese in the context of these elites’ power 
contest with the dominant Chinese mainlanders (Chu and Lin 2001; Hsiau 1999, 2000; 
Lin 1998; Wang 1996). 
For example, Wang (1996) tries to demonstrate the important role of the political 
opposition in forging a Taiwanese nation.  He argues that the failure of the opposition 
before 1980s was due to popular acceptance of Chinese ideology which justified the 
KMT’s authoritarianism.  The success of political opposition in the late 1980s can be 
attributed to their strategic changing of their political claim from political 
democratization to “Taiwanization” or “indigenization” [bentuhua].  The claim of 
“Taiwanization”, i.e. a claim set in the principle of self-determination and Taiwan 
independence, successfully challenged Chinese nationalism, the base of legitimacy for 
the KMT’s rule.  The content and the context of the mass rallies organized by political 





to “build and spread the ‘ethnic myths’ of Taiwanese nationalism.  “The nation which 
political opposition constructed was a ‘Taiwanese’ nation, and the enemy of this 
Taiwanese nation was the KMT’s ‘émigré regime.’  Taiwanese can restore the glory of 
their nation only after the KMT regime breaks down” (Wang 1996:183). 
The “artifact” nature of the Taiwanese nation is also presumed in Hsiau’s work 
(Hsiau 1999, 2000).  Its main theme of that research is that Taiwanese nationalism is 
exceptional in the historical sequence of nationalist movements.  In all nationalist 
movements, cultural identity formed long before the political mobilization of nationalist 
movements.  But in Taiwan, Hsiau argues, cultural nationalism followed the lead of 
political opposition.  According to him, Taiwanese cultural nationalism did not emerge 
until native intellectuals were mobilized by political dissidents advocating the creation of 
a new Taiwanese state to replace the Republic of China.  The construction of “the 
Taiwanese nation” occurred only after the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 when mobilized 
pro-independence intellectuals tried to “authenticate their political assertions and identity 
by creating collective symbols and reclaiming a particular national tradition, literature, 
and history” (Hsiau 1999:42). 
 
Theory 2: Taiwanese Nation as Hidden Seed in the Mud of Authoritarianism 
While the above studies see the Taiwanese nation as something constructed by 
opposition political elites during the stage of democratic transition, other studies see it as 
a force formed from in a bottom-up manner either during the Japanese colonial era or 
during KMT authoritarian rule.  Some research traces the origin of the Taiwanese nation 





Wu 2001).  Utilizing Anderson’s analysis of the Creole nationalisms in the eighteenth 
century (1991), Wu Rwei-Ren (2003) argued that a Taiwan-wide administrative unit 
created by the Japanese colonial system helped to shape Taiwan as an “imagined political 
community” among the native Taiwanese . 
Others, however, argue that the Taiwanese consciousness that emerged under 
colonialism was a reaction to Japanese assimilation.  The Taiwanese actually were 
conceived of at that time as being Chinese.  The turning point in the formation of a 
distinct Taiwanese nation was the post-war period, especially after the February 28 
uprising (Chen 2008).  For most native Taiwanese, the end of Japanese colonial rule did 
conclude the difficult situation of their identity being sandwiched between Han Chinese 
and Japanese citizens.22  However, the Nationalist government from the “motherland” 
brought not equality and self-rule to the people on the island but domestic colonization.  
Discrimination, corruption, and economic exploitation at the hands of the new 
“motherland government” administration drove the frustrated Taiwanese to participate in 
an island-wide uprising on February 28, 1947.  The Nationalist regime responded with a 
bloody military crackdown.  Thousands of native Taiwanese were killed,23 among them 
many native political and cultural elites.   The whole episode is referred to as the ‘228 
Incident’.24  Many scholars argue that it was only after experiencing the slaughter during 
                                                 
22 Wu Zhuo-liu wrote a famous novel in Japanese in 1956 to describe the resentment of native Taiwanese 
and their search for belonging during that period. This work has been translated in English; see (Wu 
2005b). 
 
23 The precise number of death tolls is still the subject of debate. Estimates run from one thousand to ten 
thousand. The official document released in 1992 puts the number at about eighteen thousand to 
twenty-eight thousand. 
 





the event and the following terror that Taiwanese ethnic consciousness was transformed 
into a distinct Taiwanese national identity with the political aspiration of achieving 
independence (Chen 2008; Wakabayashi 1994).  Still other studies argue that it was the 
authoritarian rule of the KMT’s émigré regime that lasted over four decades which had a 
decisive effect on the formation of the Taiwanese nation (Wachman 1994b; Wu 1993).  
In 1949, the Chinese communists announced the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in Beijing after they defeated the KMT regime and forced it into exile onto the 
island.  Until the late 1980s, the KMT ruled the island with an authoritarian party-state 
system.  Martial law was implemented and lasted for over four decades.  Political 
participation on the national level was severely restricted, if not totally blocked, for native 
Taiwanese.  The KMT legitimized its party dictatorship in terms of Chinese nationalism, 
based on and legitimized by the ideology of “legitimacy succession” (or “constitutional 
legacy”) [fa-tong].  Although the KMT had lost the whole mainland China to the 
Chinese communists, it still upheld the ‘One China’ principle with the claim that the 
ROC government was the sole legitimate state of the whole Chinese nation.  In 
accordance with the KMT’s claim of de jure sovereignty, the “fa-tong” system 
implemented a set of political arrangements to maintain the structure of government 
regulated by the ROC Constitution adopted in 1948 in mainland China.  The general 
elections on the national level were thus suspended until unification could occur.  The 
representatives elected in 1947 and 1948 in the mainland were not to be replaced, as they 
represented the sovereign will of the Chinese nation.25  The “Chinese fa-tong” on 
Taiwan created a political system in which political power was controlled by the 
Mainlanders.  The native Taiwanese, who comprised the majority of the population, 
                                                 





were excluded from this political system.  This political system thus was defined by Wu 
Rwei-Ren (Wu 2002b) as “ethnic authoritarianism” or “settler colonialism”.  In addition 
to the deprivation of political rights, the Chinese nationalist regime also deprived native 
Taiwanese of dignity and recognition with its cultural policies, as Chang (2003) has 
argued.  The Mandarin high culture imposed by the state-sponsored re-sinicization 
programs humiliated native Taiwanese, whose languages, accents, and tastes were treated 
as inferior.  As Berlin (Berlin and Hardy 1997) pointed out, “nationalism springs from a 
wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the desire for recognition.”  Some studies 
argue that the agony the native Taiwanese suffered under a Mainlander-dominated 
authoritarian regime was the major source from which a distinct Taiwanese ethnic 
consciousness arose.  Based on this ethnic consciousness, a Taiwanese nation was 
formed in juxtaposition to the Chinese identity of the émigré regime (Wu 1993; 
Wachman 1994b). 
Although these studies date the birth of a Taiwan nation differently, they share the 
common view that the absence of a Taiwanese nationalist movement on the island prior 
to the 1980s was not because of the nonexistence of a Taiwanese nation, but due to the 
severe political repression of the authoritarian regime.  The burgeoning identity 
nevertheless can be found in many “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990).  As soon as the 
authoritarian regime loosened its control, the Taiwanese nation was revived.  The 
political liberalization in the 1980’s allowed a political space for this national identity to 
surface in the public political discourse where it began to struggle with the Chinese 
ideology.  Rather than inventing the Taiwanese nation, political opposition served as its 





conform to the attitude most Taiwanese have about their national identity” (Wachman 
1994b:6). 
 
Ethno-nationalism: The Exclusive Taiwanese National Identity 
The two theories share the same view of an ethnic notion of the Taiwanese nation.  
From their perspective, regardless of whether the Taiwanese nation was formed during 
the long history of colonial repression or was constructed by the native elite as they 
competed for political power, the resultant “rediscovered” or “invented” nation is 
assumed to be based on a “core ethnie.”  Underlying their theories is the idea that 
Taiwanese is a different nation from the Chinese nation [zhong-hua min-zu].  In addition, 
these studies argue that at the heart of this Taiwanese consciousness is a great sense of 
victimization from the oppression of Chinese rule.  Taiwanese national identity thus is 
forged as a struggle against the dominant Chinese national identity.  Mobilized to fight 
against Chinese identity, its aim is to replace the latter. 
 
 
A Puzzling Situation 
 
According to the reviving theory, the arrival of Taiwanese national identity mainly 
consisted in the awakening of a long-suppressed Taiwanese consciousness.  This theory 
fairs better when used to explain ethnic politics in Taiwan.  The long-suppressed 
Taiwanese ethnic identity was given full expression after the democratic transition and 





immediately after democratic transition.  But, the theory does not help explain why the 
new emerging nation which invoked strong Taiwanese national sentiment failed to 
convert most native people into Taiwanese nationalists and bring about their rejection of 
unification with China and acceptance of an independent state.   The poll surveys on the 
general population conducted in the decade following the democratic transition indicate 
that the proportion of Taiwanese nationalists seemed to be contained under the ceiling of 
30 percent during the 1990s (see Figure 2.6).  This failure of conversion shows how 
Taiwan’s case differs from the experience of former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe 
where the transition to democracy also brought about a triumph of native nationalist 
movements. 
On the other hand, the elite-construction/manipulation argument sees the rise of 
Taiwanese national identity as the result of ethnic mobilization by native elites against the 
Chinese ideology of the KMT regime.  Their rhetoric targeted at the Chinese/KMT 
includes the assertions that the Taiwanese are not Chinese, the Taiwanese nation has its 
own history and culture which were long suppressed by the Chinese émigré regime, and 
that Taiwan’s future should not be predetermined but should instead be decided by the 
Taiwanese people.  This theoretical perspective might explain well why the national 
identity issue has been the most salient, if not the only, issue in political discourse and 
also in every national election campaign since the democratic transition.  This theory, 
however, says nothing about the fact that, contrary to the intention of native political and 
cultural elites to replace orthodox Chinese national identity with the new notion of the 
Taiwanese nation, a large portion of the population in Taiwan does not see the two 





encounter different problems when trying to cope with reality, but these problems have 
the same source.  They share the same mistaken assumption of an ethnic notion of a 
Taiwanese nation.  If we assume the ascendant Taiwanese national identity is exclusive 
in nature, this can hardly be explained. 
 
 
The Research Question 
 
This dissertation proposes a new measurement that allows both an antagonism 
between and compatibility of the two national identities.  It is found in Chapter 2 that 
the rise of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s was accompanied by the emergence 
of the phenomenon of dual identity.  The survey data illustrates that after democratic 
transition, the number of people with dual national identity increased to become a very 
significant proportion (49% in 1996, 44% in 1998, and 41% in 2000), even larger than 
that of people with an exclusive Taiwanese national identity (27% in 1996, 28% in 1998, 
and 28% in 2000) (see Figure 2.6).  The phenomenon of dual identity poses important 
questions for the study of the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan.  Why, 
when faced with the rivalry of two competing nationalisms, would a major proportion of 
the population not choose either one of them but instead identify themselves with both 
the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations?  What forces account for the shift in national 
identity?  And, what is the nature of the rising Taiwanese national identity? 
I propose in this dissertation that ethnicity explains only one of the paths for forging 





Taiwanese identity supplanted the orthodox Chinese nationalist identity.  But, the other 
major and in fact more important path that most people in Taiwan have traced entailed 
their shift from an exclusive Chinese nationalist identity to a dual national identity (see 
Figure 2.7).  This path of national identity change is totally ignored in previous studies.  
The chapter explores this neglected path.  But, before examining this particular path by 
which most Taiwanese have arrived at Taiwanese national identity, I will first discuss the 
phenomenon of dual nation identity. 
 
 
The Phenomenon of Dual Identity 
 
Taiwan is not exceptional in having the phenomenon of dual identity.  However, as 
I has discussed in the introductory chapter, the phenomenon of dual identity in other areas 
of the world is engendered by the fact that a politically activate national identity based on 
the culture and particular history of some ethnic group is embedded in a larger state-wide 
political community.  Dual identity in such cases is the combination of the cultural 
identity of a smaller nation with the political identity of a larger state, or state community.  
The case of dual identity in Taiwan, however, is different.  It is a combination of the 
political identity of a small state, or political community, and the identity of a larger 
nation.  The core question concerning dual identity in Taiwan thus calls for us to explain 
the particular political and historical situations that have given rise to this mode of dual 







This dissertation argues that the new Taiwanese national identity in essence consists 
in a sense of belonging to the Taiwan-wide political community.  But in reality this 
belonging is not based on a Taiwanese ethnic-cultural nation distinct from a Chinese 
nation, along the lines that some native cultural and political elites have attempted to 
forge it and many researchers have also suggested.  If the new Taiwanese nation is not 
based on an ethno-cultural notion, what is the basis of the identification with the 
Taiwan-wide political community?  For those cases in which people have dual national 
identities, some theorists take the civic constitution as the likely answer to this question.26  
A civic nation is not based on a common descent, history, language, culture, etc.  It is 
consolidated by the people’s recognition of the authority of a constitutional framework.  
And, the legitimacy of the polity in the civic nation relies not on prior-existent 
ethno-cultural ties, but on constitutional principles (Brubaker 1992, 1996; Greenfeld 1992; 
Kohn 1956, 1957; Smith 1983b).  
Some political theorists have criticized the idea of civic nationalism and 
constitutional patriotism arguing that as a “universalist forms” of political allegiance they 
may not accrue loyalty and identity from members of a particular nation (Calhoun 1993; 
Kymlicka 1999; Miller 1995; Yack 1996).  If the source of political identity is solely 
citizens’ attachment to democratic principles and human rights, then, the critics ask, how 
does one account for loyalty to one particular democratic polity over the other?  The 
purpose of this study is not to join the debate on the normative issue of what a desirable 
                                                 
26 Beiner (1999) argues that what Habermas labeled “constitutional patriotism” is a synonym for what 






Taiwanese national identity should be.27  Nor will I engage with the theorizing of 
constitutional patriotism as an allegiance to the democratic process rather than to abstract 
principles (Ciaran 2003; Muller 2007).  This study contends that the new Taiwanese 
identity is civic and political in nature.  But, this does not mean that once the polity 
provides a liberal constitution and inclusive democratic institutions, it will follow that 
people who value democratic principles and liberal values will identify with it.28  
Taiwanese national identity is not just the recognition of the authority of a constitutional 
or political framework.  From my in-depth interviews, it is apparent that persons who 
approved of Taiwan independence as well as unification with the Chinese mainland 
assuming preferable conditions, all gave negative responses to the question asking if 
possible would they agree to Taiwan’s joining of the United State or Japan to form a 
single country.  Their responses show clearly that people who approve of both 
unification and independence are not, as some researchers assumed, pragmatists or 
rationalists who have no committee to any particular political community.  Furthermore, 
their refusal to join advanced democratic countries seems to suggest that the basis of 
Taiwanese national identity is not simply universal democratic principles. 
 
The Imagined/Imaginary Begonia and Sweet Potato 
The term “China” has different meanings depending on the context.  In the West, it 
simply means the country now ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, the country ruled 
by the KMT from 1912 to 1949, or the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty before that.  
                                                 
27 This normative question has been explored by Jiang Yi-huah (1998). 
 





It is a concept that include the territory and the government (or state) ruling that territory.  
But in Taiwan, the term is used differently, and with various meanings depending on the 
context of the conversation or discourse.  When speaking of China, one is referring to 
the abstract notion of China with its long history and particular culture.  It does not 
necessarily mean the People’s Republic of China, which is only the current state of this 
nation.  Many people in Taiwan of course do not accept the PRC, at least until recently, 
as the legitimate state of China.  Many still think that the Republic of China, which the 
KMT built in 1912, should be the state of China.  The notion of China in this sense is 
similar to that of the Chinese nation. 
This study argues that the phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan during the 1990s 
suggests that most people began to think of themselves as belonging to two political 
communities.  One is the ROC, whose geographical boundary is portrayed as a 
“begonia” that encompasses mainland China, Taiwan, and Mongolia29 as its “inherent 
territory”.  The other is Taiwan, whose geographical shape is often described as a 
resembling a “sweet potato.”  Chinese national identity was cultivated by the nationalist 
KMT regime for the purposes of its state-building project.  A Chinese nation was 
“imagined” on the basis of a common origin, a shared history, and a common 
culture/language.30  A detail analysis of Chinese national identity will be put forth in 
Chapter 4.  There are two kinds of Taiwanese national identity that we may identify.  
One with an exclusive nature is based on a distinctive ethno-cultural community.  This 
                                                 
29 The government of the ROC refused to recognize the independence of Mongolia and claimed that the 
area of the “outer Mongolia” belongs to the territory of the ROC. It was not until 2012 that the ROC 
government officially acknowledged that Mongolia is not ROC’s territory. The PRC recognized an 
independent Mongolia in 1949. 
 





exclusive Taiwanese national identity, antagonistic to the Chinese national identity, has 
gained much attention in the political discourse as well as in academic research.  
Conceiving of Taiwanese national identity solely in ethic-cultural terms cannot explain 
the fact that most people acquired a dual national identity in the 1990s.  This also makes 
it difficult to explain the continued presence of Chinese national identity.  This study 
explores the other Taiwanese national identity that has been totally overlooked to present.  
It is argued that the new Taiwanese national identity is more of a form of identification 
with a Taiwan-wide political community rather than with a Taiwanese ethno-cultural 
community.  The source of this new Taiwanese identity seems to be the institutions of 
the state.  But it is not the constitution or the inclusive democratic institutions and 
procedures per se that most people identify with.  The identification with the new 
Taiwan nation also involves a “we” feeling with respect to the Taiwan-wide political 




Democratic Participation and the Rise of an Inclusive Taiwanese 
National Identity 
 
How could a territorial unit be turned into a political community?  Benedict 
Anderson (1991) in his famous work argued that national identity in colonial Latin 
America was largely cultivated through the “pilgrimage” of local political elites.  As 





political elites a sense of local identity.  The pilgrimage also provided elites with a 
chance to meet with their counterparts in different places in the same administrative unit.  
A sense of co-national-ness thus was forged among those local elites, who came to realize 
that they shared a common destiny with people they met in their travels more so than 
with people in the Peninsula.  Both the land travelled and the elites met were confined to 
the administrative unit.  The unit thus became the boundary of their identity, and also 
that of the future nation.  
In Anderson’s description, while the national identity of the political elites was 
forged through this experience of political “participation,” the identity of the common 
people was formed through cultural participation in the form of the consumption of mass 
media and novels, which forged an imagined community among their readers.  
Anderson’s work suggests that democracy provides the common people a new route to 
national identity formation.  Before the advent of democratic regimes, political 
participation was limited to political elites who constituted only a very small part of the 
population.  The national identity among ordinary people thus depended very much 
either on common blood or ethnic identity (Smith 1991), and/or on language (high culture) 
(Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983).  But with the emergence of democratic regimes, these 
people acquired the chance to participate in politics.  Through participation in routine 
democratic process, ordinary people are able to imagine themselves as members of a 
particular political community.  The political community becomes the boundary for a 
nation.  Citizens in that particular political community are also transformed into 






Democracy and National Identity 
The relationship between democracy and national identity has been conceived of 
quite differently in previous studies of democracy and democratic theories.  Many 
scholars have argued for the precondition for a feasible democracy as the existence of a 
legitimate national community.  As Rustow (1970) has argued, for a democracy to work, 
or to be sustained over time, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must 
have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”   
Some even argue that without the prior existence of a common national identity, a 
democracy cannot emerge (Almond and Verba 1971).  In this scenario, even if a 
democratic state strives to emerge, it will not be consolidated when national identity is 
divided among the people, and the least so in the case of a separatist nationalist 
movement.  Some even argue that the process of democratic transition may only 
mobilize the previous dormant national identity and give rise to national conflict (Snyder 
2000). 
Recently, however, some scholars have begun to notice the fact that some 
democracies with multi-nations do work well.  The robustness of the multi-national 
democracy is contributed to in large part by the deliberate choices and political strategies 
adopted by political elites.  If political elites choose to accommodate rather than reject 
the politically activate identity division with federalism, especially “asymmetrical 
federalism,” the divisiveness surrounding identity might not jeopardize the democratic 
regime.  With this constitutional design, some form of civic identification with the state 






An Island-wide Public Sphere and Shared Political Culture 
No observer of Taiwan’s politics will fail to notice the rapid surge of Taiwanese 
national identity in the 1990s.  As stated above, I contend that the rise of a new 
Taiwanese national identity is very much an effect of democratization.  But what are the 
specific mechanisms that cause the emergence of this new identity?  In the next section, 
I will discuss how the emergence of the public sphere serves as the mechanism which 
links democratization and the rise of the new national identity. 
Habermas (1996), in his theory of constitutional patriotism, argues that in a 
“post-traditional society”, unconditional identification, whether to a nation or to a 
historically specific constitution, will be replaced by dynamic processes of 
identity-formation .  The dynamics of identity-formation constitute a collective learning 
process in which citizens are asked to reflect critically upon the existing traditions and 
institutions in the name of universal norms and principles.  What is necessary for the 
formation of this “post-conventional identity” is a public sphere where open-ended 
communication is able to exist.  Although in the early version of Habermas’s theory, the 
communicative processes is located outside political institutions (Cronin 2003), his idea 
of the public sphere as a public space for identity-in-formation among citizens furthers 
our understanding of the formation of the new Taiwanese national identity after 
democratization. 
Likewise, as it happened in Taiwan, the public sphere has provided people with a 
chance to recognize each other as free and equal citizens, to engage in political and legal 
learning processes, and to make decisions collectively, if not cooperatively, concerning 





decision-making is essential for the formation of a new Taiwanese national identity.  
This privileged site became available only once Taiwan became a democracy in the 
1990s.  Before democratic transition, society was under very the tight social and 
political control of the KMT party-state.  Political participation was repressed and 
limited to a small amount of elites.  New political parties were not allowed to form.  
Channels for public political expression were strictly blocked.  Elections were limited to 
the local level, election campaigns were severely constrained to the advantage of the 
ruling elites.  Involvement in public and political affairs was not encouraged and was 
sometimes even punished.  Most people were kept silent.  Parents advised children not 
to “talk about politics” for fear of being reported by their neighbors or schoolmates.  
Public debates on policy and political affairs were totally absent.  Establishment of the 
opposition party in 1986 was a democratic breakthrough.  Unlike in 1960, the KMT did 
not repress this movement and Taiwan entered a phase of democratization.  With the 
lifting of the ban on the establishment of new political parties and new mass media, 
martial law was lifted in 1987.  New laws were instituted to codify rights protected by 
the constitution.  People in Taiwan were provided legal channels for public political 
expression and began to enjoy freedoms of speech, assembly, and association.  
Institutionalization of democratic citizenship is the necessarily condition for a population 
to participate in political life.  Nevertheless, what is essential for the emergence of 
public space in Taiwan is the opening of elections on the national level.  The two 
national representative bodies of the central government, the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan, had never been reelected in four decades, witnessed open elections in 





governor of Taiwan Province, which were previously appointed by the central 
government, were elected by popular vote in 1994.  And most importantly, the president 
was also elected by popular vote in 1996.  The mechanism of how state-wide elections 
contribute to state integration at the elite level has been addressed by other scholars (Linz 
and Stepan 1992; Linz et al. 2007; Lin 1998).  Our current focus is on the mass level.  
If a nation is a “daily plebiscite” (Renan 1990), it is the general public who makes the 
decision to form or remain in the nation.  Elections encourage widespread political 
participation.  The populace shows its enthusiasm by choosing congressional 
representatives and especially by electing the leader of the country.  The voting turnout 
was 72 percent for the first Legislative Yuan election in 1992, 76 percent for the first 
presidential election in 1996, and about 83 percent for the second presidential election in 
2000, which resulted in a power turnover.31 
A by-product of the electoral reform was the rapid growth in amount and popularity 
of the television talk shows, which allowed politicians and pundits to discuss current 
political issues.  Ordinary people were also invited to call in to express their opinions on 
politicians, policies, and public issues.  Many people in Taiwan watched these talk show 
programs almost every evening.  During the 1990s, general elections were held almost 
every year.  These island-wide elections created a public sphere, which allowed the 
populace on the island to participate in the political process through mass media reports, 
television call-in shows, political campaigns, and interest group mobilizations.  Popular 
participation in the political process helped form a common space and time among the 
citizens of Taiwan.  What people read and discussed was the same: the same statements 
from politicians, the same public policies, and the same political issues and social events.  
                                                 





This common space is congruent with the territory of the island.  People in Taiwan see 
their concerns and problems as occurring within the boundaries of the island.  The 
solutions are also to be found within the boundaries of this political community and 
within the framework of state institutions. 
An attachment to Taiwan as a legitimate political community is constantly formed 
among the citizens on the island through daily political practice (Billig 1995).  The 
notion of “we” is also created.  At the core of this “we feeling” is a trust in compatriots 
and state institutions, the latter of which is the product of democratic political institutions 
and processes.  For the case of Taiwan, two turn-over were fundamental to the 
formation of mutual trust among citizens and the formation of popular trust in the state 
institutions.32  The first power turnover occurred in the 2000 presidential election when 
the KMT ended its 50 years of rule on the island and peacefully handed power to the DPP.  
The 2008 presidential election marked the second turnover as the DPP lost the 
presidential election and turned power over to the KMT.  Popular trust in democratic 
institutions was consolidated during these two handovers of power.  Popular consent to 
electoral results cultivates mutual trust among the populace since they are certain that 
people on the island will comply with the decision made collectively.  Trust in 
democratic institutions and in compatriots is essential to people’s loyalty to the political 
community.  It constitutes the foundation of the willingness to live together and to act 
cooperatively to solve communal problems.  In addition to trust, popular participation in 
democratic processes also creates a shared political culture, which was absent amongst 
the citizens of Taiwan.  In a 1998 survey, when asked, “No matter what the position is 
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of a political party, as long as it wins the election, we should accept the electoral result,” 
approximately 58 percent of the respondents disagreed and only 36 percent of them 
approved.33  The survey was conducted two years before the first power takeover in the 
2000.  But when the DPP won the election with less than 40 percent of the vote, the 
electoral result was accepted by all citizens.  The survey data indicates that a shared 
democratic culture is not inherent to Taiwanese society; rather, it is the product of 
learning collectively from participating in the political processes. 
With the institutionalization of egalitarian citizenship and widespread political 
participation, an island-wide public sphere was formed.  The public sphere provides a 
common space for people on the island to understand and communicate with one another. 
It also allows people to engage in the legal and political learning processes together and 
to make decisions collectively.  Additionally, the public sphere cultivates mutual trust 
and shared political culture, which form the “we feeling” as well as the attachment to the 
political community among the general populace.  Popular participation in the public 
sphere constitutes the dynamic process of national identity formation in Taiwan.  The 
emergence of the public sphere has turned the island from a territory unit for residence 
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The data used in the analysis in this chapter includes seven public surveys conducted 
by academia research institutes.  The data sets are listed below: The Social Image 
Survey, July 1991, conducted in 1991, The 1992 Legislative Election Survey conducted 
in 1993, The 1995 Legislative Election Survey conducted in 1996 The 1996 Presidential 
Election Survey conducted in 1996, Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th 
Term conducted in 1998, The 1998 Legislative Election Survey conducted in 1999, and 
The 2000 Presidential Election Survey conducted in 2000. 
 
Description of the Main Variable, National Identity35 
This research operationalizes the concept of national identity in Taiwan based on 
two theoretical perspectives: first, national identity should not be presumed as mutually 
exclusive.  Thus, Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity is measured 
separately.  Second, people’s national identities are usually covered by practical 
considerations.  Thus, the measurement of national identity needs to control the 
circumstantial effects.  Two questions are used to create the dependent variable. 
The first question is “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations 
with China after declaring independence, Taiwan should go independent. Do you agree?”  
The second question is “Some people say if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan 
in the economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified 
into one country. Do you agree?”  The variable of national identity has four categories: 
Taiwanese Nationalist, Chinese Nationalist, Dual Identity, and Identification with the 
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Empirical Support of Proposed Arguments 
This chapter first argues for the two-route formation of a Taiwanese nation during 
the process of democratization in the 1990s.  There are two paths that forge Taiwanese 
national identity.  Ethnicity explains one; via this path an exclusive Taiwanese national 
identity supplants the orthodox Chinese nationalist identity.  Most people in Taiwan 
experienced the other path.  This path creates an inclusive Taiwanese national identity 
that is compatible with the existing Chinese national identity.  This chapter further 
argues that the inclusive Taiwanese identity is based on popular identification with the 
Taiwan-wide political community.  Democratic political participation explains the 
mechanism underlying the formation of inclusive Taiwanese national identity.  A 
Taiwan-wide political community has been gradually formed among the people with dual 
identity, likely through the establishment of democratic institutions and political 
participation in democratic and electoral processes. 
The findings of Table 3.1 support the argument of the two routes.  The last row of 
Table 3.1 illustrates that with the decline of Chinese nationalists, there was not only a 
growth in the percentage of Taiwanese nationalists who held an exclusive Taiwanese 
national identity but, more significantly, the rise of people holding dual identity.  
Taiwanese nationalists increased from 14.5% in 1993, to 26.7% in 1996, and to 27.6% in 
1999.  The percentage of people who held dual identity increased from 35.6% in 1993, 
to 48.7% in 1996, and to 44.5% in 1999.  Note that since 1996 dual identity superseded 





Table 3.1 also demonstrates the exclusive-vs.-inclusive nature of the two Taiwanese 
national identities.  Table 3.1 is the cross-tabulation of respondents’ self-identification 
with their national identity.  Among the people who held a Taiwanese nationalist 
identity, more than half of them identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” (52.6 % in 
1993, 65.4% in 1996, 61% in 1999, and 56.9% in 2000).  Unlike Taiwanese nationalists, 
people with dual identity increasingly identified themselves as “Both Taiwanese and 
Chinese” (38% in 1993, 47.9% in 1996, 54.1% in 1998, and 57.8% in 2000).  The high 
proportion of Taiwanese nationalists who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” 
indicates that Taiwanese national identity is based on a distinct ethnic consciousness that 
classifies Taiwanese and Chinese as two different groups.  The findings also suggest the 
inclusive nature of dual identity.  Among people with dual national identity, more and 
more of them identified themselves as Taiwanese without rejecting their existing Chinese 
self-identity. 
The characters of the dual identity are demonstrated by Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and 
Table 3.4.  This chapter argues that the emergence of dual identity results from a 
combination of political identity of a small state (a Taiwan-wide political community) 
within the identity of a larger nation (Chinese nation). 
Table 3.2 illustrates that a Taiwan-wide political community has gradually formed 
among people with dual identity.  Two questions are used to measure how the 
respondents perceive the territory and the population of the Republic of China (ROC), 
respectively.  These questions are: (1) In our society, some people think that the territory 
of the ROC covers Taiwan and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, while others 





In our society, some people think that the people of the ROC refer to the population of 
Taiwan, while others think it includes the population in the Chinese mainland. What is 
your opinion?  Using data from the 1996 Presidential Election Survey conducted after 
the first presidential election in the March of 1996, Table 3.2 shows that 60.5% among 
those with dual identity viewed the territory of the ROC is Taiwan only; and 67.2% of 
them viewed the population of the ROC includes only the population on the island.  The 
argument that a Taiwan-wide political community has been formed among the people 
with dual identity will be more persuasive if we compare them to those holding only 
Chinese national identity.  For the Chinese nationalists, around 70 percent of them 
believed that the territory of the ROC included Taiwan and the Mainland China; 60 
percent of them believed the population of the ROC included the 1.2 billion of people of 
the Chinese mainland (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.3 further demonstrates that those hold dual identity believe that the 
Taiwan-wide political community should have sovereignty.  They have developed 
loyalty to the Taiwan-wide political community.  Table 3.3 is the cross-tabulation of 
national identity with the question that measures the boundaries of the nation with that of 
the respondents who perceive as having sovereignty.  The question ask the respondents 
“In our society, some people think that only the 21 million people of Taiwan have the 
right to determine Taiwan’s future, while others think that people in the mainland also 
have the right to determine Taiwan’s future. Who you think has the right to determine the 
future of Taiwan?”  Among the people holding dual identity, 85% of them in 1996 and 
88% of them in 1999 thought that only the 21 million people of Taiwan have the right to 





These findings from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 indicate that a Taiwan-wide political 
community has gradually formed among the people with dual identity.  Compared with 
the people who only hold Chinese national identity, those with dual identity identified  
more strongly with a Taiwan-wide political community and considered Taiwan to be the 
legitimate boundary of political sovereignty. 
On the other hand, as illustrated by Table 3.4, the Chinese nation was still relevant 
for those with dual identity even after the formation of a Taiwan-wide political 
community.  Table 3.4 is the cross-tabulation of national identity with the questions 
measuring respondents’ identification with the larger Chinese nation.  These questions 
are (1) In our Society, some people think “China” includes Taiwan and the Mainland 
China, while some people think China includes only the Mainland China. What is your 
opinion? (2) Do you agree the following statement “Reclaiming China’s lost land is the 
divine mission of every Chinese”? (3) Do you agree the following statement “No matter 
how big differences between Taiwan and the Mainland China, we should overcome the 
differences so to achieve the unification of the Chinese state”?  It is important to 
emphasize here that “China” in ordinary language in Taiwanese society does not equate 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although nowadays that is what China commonly 
means. 
Table 3.4 reveals that people holding different national identities perceived the 
boundary of the Chinese state differently.  For those with dual identity, 65% of them in 
1996 and 62% of them in 1999 thought that “China” includes both Taiwan and mainland 
China.  Their perception of state boundaries in the imagined Chinese community did not 





The phenomenon of the continued idea of an imagined Chinese community among the 
people with dual identity is more evident in comparison to those who solely hold 
Taiwanese national identity.  Among Taiwanese nationalists, 67.8% of them in 1996 and 
64.7% of them in 1999 thought that “China” refers only to mainland China.  In addition, 
Table 3.4 illustrates that the Chinese national identity, which people with dual identity 
upheld, is not merely an ethno-cultural identity.  Their Chinese identity seems to involve 
a political concept.  Among people with dual identity, 63.5% of them and 56.3% in 1996 
and 1999, respectively, were Chinese irredentists and agreed with the statement 
“Reclaiming China’s lost land is the divine mission of every Chinese.”  Additionally, 
the majority of them agreed with the Chinese nationalist claim of “No matter how big 
differences between Taiwan and the mainland, we should overcome the differences so to 
achieve the unification of the Chinese state.”  The corresponding percentages are 55.9 % 
in 1996, 56.8 % in 1999, and 64% in 2000. 
These empirical findings demonstrate the continued presence of an imagined 
Chinese community among the people with dual identity.  They also reject two currently 
popular theories of dual identity.  The first conventional theory argues that the two 
identities upheld by those with dual identity are different in nature.  Chinese identity is 
ethnic and cultural, while Taiwanese identity is political.  Therefore, the two are not 
contradictory.  It explains why people are able to hold both Chinese and Taiwanese 
identities at the same time.  But the responses given by those with dual identity seem to 
reject this political-cum-cultural theory of dual identity.  Their replies show that the 
majority of those with dual identity were actually Chinese irredentists subscribing to the 





that people hold two identities based on pragmatic calculation.  They leave options open 
and do not choose until some conditions emerge that make one option more beneficial to 
their interests.  The replies of those with dual identity to the nationalist political claim 
seem to reject this explanation.  They show that most people with dual identities are 
willing to accept unification even with huge differences between the two sides of the 
strait. 
Table 3.5 illustrates the different natures of the two Taiwanese national identities.  
This chapter argues that the two Taiwanese national identities forged via different paths 
after the democratic transition are different.  The exclusive Taiwanese national identity 
is ethnic in nature, while the inclusive Taiwanese national identity (contained in the 
group of dual identity) is civic in nature.  The first section of Table 3.5 is a presentation 
of the ethnic component of Taiwanese national identity.  Question 1 asks the 
respondents if they agree with the statement “For Taiwanese to control their own destiny, 
they must break their relations with China and forge a common community of the 23 
million of people on the island.”  In 2000, around 60 percent (57.8%) of people with a 
Taiwanese nationalist identity agreed on this statement.  Question 2 asks the respondents 
if they agree with the statement “Chinese history belongs to China. We should invent 
Taiwan’s own history.”  More than 70 percent (71.7%) of people with a Taiwanese 
nationalist identity agreed on this statement in 2000.  The finding of Table 3.5 indicates 
that the Taiwanese nationalist identity is based on a distinct notion of Taiwanese ethnicity.  
It reveals that for most Taiwanese nationalists, the Chinese nation is an “other,” if not a 
barrier, to the formation of their own nation.  Forging a new Taiwanese nation requires 





Taiwanese nationalists, the relationship between the Chinese nation and a Taiwanese 
nation is conflicting and competitive.  The mission of Taiwanese nationalism thus is to 
replace orthodox Chinese national identity.  But for those with dual identity, the story is 
quite different.  As Table 3.5 shows, for those with dual identity, around 60 percent did 
not want to break ties with China for the sake of forming a Taiwanese nation.  For them, 
their Taiwanese national identity seems not to be based on a distinct Taiwanese culture or 
history. 
If, as Table 3.5 suggests, Taiwanese national identity held by those with dual 
identity has little ethnic flavor, what then is its composition?  The figures in the second 
section of Table 3.5 suggest that their Taiwanese national identity is based on political 
and civic notions.  Question 3 asks the respondents if they agree with the statement 
“China is China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan wants to pursue political autonomy. China 
(PRC) has no right to intervene.”  Around 80 percent (78.6%) of those with dual identity 
agreed with this statement.  This finding suggests that for most people with dual identity, 
Taiwan is a political community.  Its distinctiveness from the PRC is also firmly 
established.  Replies to Question 4 further illustrate how those with dual identity 
perceive the relationship between Taiwan and China/PRC as two separate political 
communities.  The question asks the respondents if they approve the policy statement of 
“the two states thesis” (proposed by Li Deng-hui’s government) that says “the relation 
between Taiwan and the mainland is a ‘special state-to-state relationship.’”36  Among 
those with dual identity, 67% approved the statement of a state-to-state relation.  In 
contrast, 48% of those who identified with the status quo and 32% of Chinese nationalists 
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agreed with this statement.  The high approval rate for those with dual identity clearly 
showed that their Taiwanese national identity is based on a Taiwan-wide political 
community.  The Taiwan that they conceive is a political community possessing 
political sovereignty with equal status to the other Chinese state (the PRC). 
The main interest of this chapter is how we should explain the rise of the other type 
of Taiwanese identity that is characterized by its inclusive and political nature.  Many 
have explained the origin of this inclusive and political Taiwanese identity by using 
liberal values and constitutional principles.  Figures in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 can serve 
as empirical evidence to see if this explanation holds. 
Table 3.6 presents an overall picture concerning the liberal and democratic values 
among different categories of nationalist group.  A group of eight questions were posed 
in the surveys of 1993, 1996 and 1998.  These surveys explored the liberal and 
democratic values among general population.  These questions are as followed: (1) 
Woman should not play a part in political activities as man. (2) State affairs, important or 
trivial, should follow the decisions of the head of the government, since he functions as 
the head of the family. (3) Criminals involving brutal crimes should be punished 
immediately; no need to go through the complex procedures of a trial. (4) There should 
be consensus; otherwise our society will be unstable. (5) Whether an opinion can be 
broadcasted to our society should be decided by the government. (6) If different civil 
organizations appear in one local community, the stability and harmony of this 
community would be affected. (7) Government will achieve no huge accomplishment if it 
is check by the legislature. (8) Judges should accept opinions from the administration 





opinions concerning these statements on a 6-point scale.  Figures in Table 3.6 shows 
that people with dual identity did not score higher, in terms of means, on the eight 
democratic and liberal values.  Table 3.7 further shows the different attitudes of national 
identity groups on liberal and constitutional principles during the 1990s.  Question 1 
asks the respondents if they agree with the statement “Criminals committing brutal 
crimes should be punished immediately, without having to go through the complex 
procedures of judicial trial.”  Question 2 asks if they agree with the statement “Judges 
should accept opinions from the administrations when a significant case is brought to 
trial.”  Table 3.7 reveals that liberal values and democratic ideas are not yet rooted in 
Taiwanese society and that those with dual identity did not perform better.  The data in 
Table 3.7 indicates that, for people with dual identity, their attitudes on liberal values and 
democratic ideas did not develop along with the process of democratization in the 1990s.  
In 1993, around 60 percent of those with dual identity disapproved the violation of human 
rights.  In 1999, the percentage dropped, rather than increased, to 40.9%.  Regarding 
the issue of judicial independence, the basic principle of constitutionalism, about 72 
percent of those with dual identity valued the principle in 1993.  It, however, dropped 
during the 1990s to 65.5% in 1999.  In addition, these figures in Table 3.7 suggest that 
those with dual identity were not more liberal or democratic than those in other 
nationalist groups.  In 1999, the percentages of those with positive attitudes toward the 
liberal value of procedural justice amongst Taiwanese nationalists, people with dual 
identity, people identified with status quo, and Chinese nationalists were 47%, 41%, 52%, 
and 46% respectively; people with dual identity had the lowest percentage.  In 1999, the 





among Taiwanese nationalists, people with dual identity, people identified with the status 
quo, and Chinese nationalists were 72%, 66%, 64%, and 70% respectively; people with 
dual identity had the second lowest number.  The findings from Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 
seem to reject the hypothesis that people acquired a Taiwanese national identity in the 
1990s because the country had instituted a democratic constitution and began to respect 
liberal values. 
This study argues that democratization in Taiwan wields a great impact on the 
formation of new Taiwanese national identity.  It is not through the attachment to the 
abstract democratic values and principles, however.  Rather, there is an attachment to 
the political community.  The collective participation processes as well as the concrete 
practices and institutions that make participation in a political community possible and 
meaningful created this attachment.  Democratic institutions and practices created a 
public sphere in which people on the island can recognize and communicate each other. 
This public sphere also encouraged Taiwanese to participate in the deliberation and 
resolution of island-wide affairs.  Through participation in routine democratic processes, 
people were able to imagine themselves as members of a particular political community.  
The political community gradually became the boundary for a nation.  Citizens in this 
particular political community were also transformed into members of this particular 
nation. 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.8 provide evidence to support this theoretical perspective.  
Table 3.2 presents findings from two surveys conducted in 1996.  One (1996a) was 
conducted before the first presidential election, while the other (1996b) was done after 





find that within only few months the perception of the territory and the population of the 
ROC had changed significantly.  For those with dual identity, the percentage of 
respondents who thought that ROC territory only included Taiwan increased from 52 
percent to 61 percent.  The percentage who believed that the population of the ROC was 
only composed of people in Taiwan also increased from 57 percent to 67 percent during 
these few months.  As these two surveys were conducted by the same research team and 
the question wordings being exactly the same, the change of percentage seems to suggest 
that the first presidential election by popular vote and participating in the electoral 
process helped the formation of a Taiwan-wide political community. 
Figures in Table 3.8 also confirm the effect of democratic political process on the 
formation of identity.  Question 1 of Table 3.8 asks respondents to evaluate how 
democratic the country currently is on a 0-10 scale; “0” represents full dictatorship, while 
“10” represents full democracy.  Question 2 of Table 3.8 asks the respondents to 
evaluate how satisfied they are with the practice of democratic politics in Taiwan on a 
0-10 scale, from extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied.  Figures in the table reveal 
that those with a new Taiwanese identity (dual identity) were more inclined to perceive 
democratic politics as being close to full democracy.  On the other hand, as the 
responses to Question 2 reveal, those with dual identity were more satisfied with the 
practice of democracy in Taiwan.  Questions 3, 4, and 5 in Table 3.8 ask respondents’ 
opinions of the electoral process of the 2000 presidential election and its impact: “The 
presidential election had advanced democratic progress in Taiwan;” “The presidential 
election had caused political instability and societal disturbance;” “The presidential 





lacking Taiwanese national identity, the opinion of those with dual identity was more 






This chapter explains why the national identities of the general populace changed in 
Taiwan during the 1990s.  I have shown in the discussion above why the conventional 
theory that attempts to explain the change regarding national identities by the 
replacement of Chinese national identity with Taiwanese ethnic consciousness is not 
complete and satisfactory.  This explanation at its best captures only part of the story.  
This research project forgoes the mutually exclusive presumption underlying the 
conventional theory and proposed to study the dynamics of national identity change in 
Taiwan with a two-level frame.  Figure 3.1 presents the two components of national 
identity in Taiwan, which have been discussed and demonstrated with empirical support 
in previous sections.  I also argued that the new Taiwanese national identity that 
emerged during the process of democratization is composed of two different types with 
different contents.  One of them, ignored by the previous studies, not only has little 
ethnic character and but is also compatible with the existing Chinese national identity.  
This national identity is formed by participation in the democratic processes.  This 
identity is basically conceptually parasitic on the Taiwan-wide political community as 





community.  These arguments are theorized into Figure 3.2.  Figure 3.2 presents the 
proposed two-paths theory of Taiwanese national identity formation. 
The following section provides a statistical test of the conventional theory and the 
theory proposed by this research project.  The method adopted is multi-nominal logistic 
regression.  The data used is the 2000 Presidential Election Survey conducted in 2000. 
 
A Test of Existing Theories (Model I, Model II, Model III) 
Model I in Table 3.9 tests the primordial theory of national identity, which assumes 
an ethnic core of national identity.  The dependent variable is national identity.  The 
model takes dual identity as the baseline comparison group.  The independent variables 
include: age, education, family income, and ethnic background.  Model I shows that the 
ethnic background of the respondents had a statistically significant effect on their national 
identity in 2000.  The coefficients of Model I show that being a native Taiwanese 
[benshengren] increased the likelihood of having Taiwanese nationalist identity, as 
opposed to dual identity.  On the other hand, being a Chinese mainlander [waishengren] 
increased the likelihood of having a Chinese nationalist identity, as opposed to dual 
identity. 
Model II in Table 3.9 tests the theory that the chief basis of Taiwanese national 
identity is ethnic Taiwanese consciousness.  The dependent variable is national identity.  
Model II also uses dual identity as the baseline comparison group.  It adds a categorical 
variable of self-identity with three categories including: “Only Taiwanese,” “Only 
Chinese,” and “Both Taiwanese and Chinese.”  The reference group of this variable is 





independent ones in Model I.  Model II shows that self-identification does have a 
statistically significant effect on national identity for 2000.  Furthermore, compared with 
the group self-identified as “Only Taiwanese”, the group self-identifying as “Both 
Taiwanese and Chinese” is less inclined toward Taiwanese nationalist identity as opposed 
to dual identity (The Relative Risk Ratio is 0.42.)  One the other hand, compared also 
with the group of “Only Taiwanese”, the group with the self-identification of “Only 
Chinese” is more inclined to Chinese nationalist identity as opposed to dual identity (The 
Relative Risk Ratio is 5.77). 
Model III in Table 3.9 includes some more independent variables in accordance with 
three theoretical perspectives.  The first perspective proposed by some liberal 
constitutionalists argues that the base of Taiwanese national identity is democratic values 
and principles.  The variable of democratic values and principle is measured by the 
following question: “of the following three views, which view do you agree with more?” 
(1) Democracy is always the best political system. (2) Under certain conditions, 
dictatorship is better than democracy. (3) For me, every political system is the same.   
The second perspective proposed by this dissertation argues that the Taiwanese 
nation and the Chinese nation each contain two essences, ethnic and political.  Two 
variables are created to operationalize the ethnic essence of Taiwanese-ness, “Taiwan 
complex, ethnic origin (Taiwan Jie, shengji)” and “Taiwan complex, ethnic Chinese 
(Taiwan Jie, zhonghua minzu).”37  The variable, “Taiwan complex, ethnic origin”, is 
measured by the question “Do you agree the following statement or not? If they do not 
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identify with Taiwan, those mainlanders who have grown up in Taiwan should go back to 
the mainland.” The variable, “Taiwan complex, ethnic Chinese” is measured by the 
question “Do you agree? For Taiwanese to control their own destiny, they must break off 
their relations with China and forge a ‘community of common destiny’ among the 23 
million people?”  The political notion of Taiwanese-ness is operationalized by the 
variable of “Political Sovereignty” measuring by the question “Do you agree the 
statements China is China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan wants to pursue political autonomy. 
China has no right to intervene.”  Similarly, two variables are created to operationalize 
the ethnic essence of Chinese-ness, “Chinese complex, ethnic glory” measuring by the 
question “Do you agree: No matter how backward China is, I am proud of is being a 
Chinese.”, and “Chinese complex, betrayer” measuring by the question “Do you agree: 
The view that ’Taiwanese is not Chinese’ is unforgivable?”  The political notion of 
Chinese-ness is operationalized by two variables, “Political Unification” and “Economic 
Integration”.  The variable of “Political Integration” is measured by the question: Do 
you agree “No matter how huge differences between Taiwan and the mainland, we 
should overcome the differences in order to accomplish the unification of the Chinese 
nation.”  The variable of “Economic Integration” is measurement by the question: Do 
you agree the following statement or not “Taiwan needs to be integrated with the 
mainland to become prosperity”. 
The third perspective proposed by this dissertation argues that an attachment to the 
Taiwan-wide political community is developed through participating in democratic 
procedures and processes.  This model creates a variable labeled “Participatory 





with questions about the following three statements: “The 2000 presidential election 
advanced democratic progress in Taiwan.”, “The 2000 presidential election strengthened 
the perception of Taiwanese as the masters of this country.”, and “The presidential 
election strengthened the legitimacy of the government.” 
Model III shows two things.  First of all, it supports my hypotheses in this research.  
Three factors, i.e. the perception of Chineseness, the perception of Taiwaneseness, and 
attachment to democratic procedures, all have statistically significant effects on national 
identity.  The upper part of Model III is the comparison between Taiwanese nationalist 
identity and dual identity.  It reveals that the two variables, “Political Unification” and 
“Economic integration”, both had statistically significant effect on people’s national 
identity.  The coefficients in this part tell us that people whose notion of Chinese-ness is 
political in its essence are less inclined to hold a dual national identity as compared to 
holding a Taiwanese nationalist identity.  In other words, the expected risk of having a 
Taiwanese nationalist identity is lower for people who have positive attitudes about 
political unification and economic integration.  The Relative Risk Ratios are 0.39, and 
0.43 respectively.  The lower part of Model III is the comparison between Chinese 
nationalist identity and dual identity.  It shows that the effects of “Political Sovereignty” 
and “Participatory Attachment” are statistically significant.  The coefficient informs us 
that people whose notion of Taiwanese-ness is political in essence are less inclined to 
have a Chinese nationalist identity compared to holding dual identity.  In other words, 
the expected risk of staying in the Chinese nationalist group (rather than the dual identity 
group) is lower for people who have positive attitudes toward Taiwan’s sovereignty.  





procedures and processes have a statistically significant effect on people’s national 
identity.  The coefficient informs us that the likelihood of staying in the group of 
Chinese nationalists (as compared to group of dual identity) is low for people who had a 
positive attitude toward democratic procedures and processes.  The Relative Risk Ratio 
is 0.82.  Additionally, the effect of self-identification as “Only Chinese” (compared to 
“Only Taiwanese”) was statistically significant.  Having self-identity as “Only Chinese” 
increases the likelihood of holding a Chinese nationalist identity rather than having dual 
national identity (The Relative Risk Rate 4.4).  The overall effect of self-identification is 
statistically significant (p=0.0067). 
The second thing Model III shows is that both the primordial and civic notions of 
national identity are unrelated.  As figures in the model reveal, when other variables are 
controlled, the variable of ethnicity no longer exhibits a statistically significant effect on 
national identity.  This discovery suggests that relationship between ethnic origin 
[shen-ji] and national identity is spurious.  The statistical test of Model III also rejects 
the hypothesis that the inclusive nature of Taiwanese national identity is based on belief 
in democratic values.  It shows that the variable of democratic values and principles has 
no statistically significant effect on popular national identity. 
 
A Test of Theory Proposed by This Research (Model A) 
Finally, I propose a model to explain the national identity of general population in 
Taiwan (see Table 3.10).  Model A conceptualizes the arguments of this research.  In 
the model, three factors are proposed as having major effects on the formation of 





perception of Chinese-ness (whether it is ethnic or political in essence), popular 
perception of Taiwanese-ness (whether it is ethnic or political in essence), and popular 
attachment to democratic procedures and processes.  These three factors are 
operationalized into six independent variables.  The ethnic notion of Chinese-ness is 
measured by the variable of “Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer”.  The political notion 
of Chinese-ness is measure by the two variables labeled as “Political Unification” and 
“Economic Integration” respectively.  The ethnic notion of Taiwanese-ness is measured 
by the variable “Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese”.  T he political notion of 
Taiwanese-ness is measured by the “Political Sovereignty” variable.  The factor of 
popular attachment to democratic procedures and process is operationalized by the 
variable, “Participatory Attachment”.   
The variable of self-identity is not included in the model, although Model III shows 
that self-identification had a significant effect on national identity.  The reason is as 
follows.  The effect of self-identity on national identity has been examined in Model II.  
Model A replaces the variable of self-identity with popular perceptions of Chineseness 
and Taiwaneseness.  Comparing the Pseudo R-squares of Model II (0.0682) with those 
of Model A (0.1817) suggests that the variables of popular perception of Chineseness and 
Taiwaneseness have more explanatory power than the variable of self-identity.  In 
addition, if we add the variable of self-identity to Model A, the Pseudo R-squares are 
0.1934.  It proves that the contribution of the self-identity variable is very little.  
Theoretically, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, this research proposes that the effect of 
self-identity on national identity is mainly explained by one’s perception of Chineseness 





will influence how they identify themselves.  If they adopt an ethno-national notion of 
Taiwaneseness, they are more likely to identify themselves as “Taiwanese only.”  If they 
adopt a political notion of Taiwaneseness, and perceive Chineseness nationally, they are 
more likely to exhibit the self-identity of “both Taiwanese and Chinese”.  Empirically 
the contribution of the variable of self-identity is very limited.  And statistically, the 
self-identity variable might cause a collinearity problem. This is the reason the proposed 
model opts to leave out this variable. 
The likelihood ratio chi-square of 327.39 with a p-value <0.0000 informs us that 
Model A as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model.  Model A is better 
than Model I and Model II since the Pseudo R-square of Model A is 0.1817, much higher 
than the Pseudo R-squares of Model I (0.0308) and Model II (0.0682). 
Table 3.10 proves three things.  Firstly, the proposed three factors, namely popular 
perceptions of Taiwanese-ness, popular perceptions of Chinese-ness, and popular 
attachment to democratic procedures and processes, all had statistically significant effects 
on people’s national identity in Taiwan.  Secondly, national identity in Taiwan contains 
two dimensions.  The variation in national identities depends on popular perceptions of 
both Taiwanese-ness and Chinese-ness.  The coefficients of Table 3.10 demonstrate that 
Taiwanese nationalists and people with dual identity shared the same perception of 
Taiwaneseness.  The major factor that explained their variation in national identity was 
their perception of Chinese-ness.  The idea of a political notion of Chinese-ness, with 
unification with the mainland as the ultimate goal and economic integration helpful to the 
prosperity of Taiwan’s future, decreased the likelihood of holding Taiwanese nationalist 





the other hand, the coefficients of Table 3.10 also illustrate that Chinese nationalists and 
people with dual national identity shared the political notion of Chinese-ness.  
Nevertheless, they differed when it came to their perceptions of the ethno-essence of the 
Chinese nation.  This finding will be elaborated on in the next chapter devoted to 
Chinese national identity.  More importantly, the main factor that had an influence on 
whether people held dual national identity or Chinese nationalist identity was their 
perception of Taiwanese-ness.  The idea of a political notion of Taiwanese-ness, with 
Taiwan as a community with political autonomy and sovereignty, decreased the 
likelihood of staying in the group of Chinese nationalists, as compared to the group of 
dual national identity (RRR=.4986).  Last but not least, the conception of a political 
notion of Taiwanese-ness is based on popular attachment to democratic procedures and 
processes.  People who are attached to participatory democratic procedures and 
processes are more inclined toward dual national identity, as compared to those holding a 





This chapter focuses on the explanation of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism.  It 
starts by examining the current theories or perspectives, which are quite popular among 
the observers of nationalism in Taiwan.  One perspective contends that Taiwanese 
national identity was formed first under Japanese colonialism and later the KMT’s 





1980s.  Another theory argues that Taiwanese national identity is based on Taiwanese 
ethnic identity, which is a reaction against the repression of Taiwanese language, history, 
and culture under the KMT’s rule. There is some degree of truth to both theories.  But 
they at best account for only a small part of the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan.  The 
first theory can say nothing about the different paths of the growth of Taiwanese national 
identity in the two decades following the democratic transition.  The second theory 
ignores the important fact that Taiwanese ethnic identity constitutes only part of the basis 
of Taiwanese national identity.  More importantly, a significant segment of people who 
hold Taiwanese ethnic identity also possess Chinese national identity.  A new 
perspective seems needed to account for both the basis and the particular contours of 
Taiwanese national identity.  This chapter tries to propose a more comprehensive theory 
of Taiwanese nationalism able to account for its basis, content, and particular trajectory. 
In understanding Taiwanese nationalism, it is necessary to tackle the phenomenon of 
dual identity.  Dual identity is totally ignored in current studies because they presume 
that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are in opposition to one 
another and also in competition.  It is true that for some people they are opposite 
identities and hence are not compatible with each other.  But for even more people, this 
is not the case.  As survey data from the past two decades show, many people continue 
to possess dual identity during this long period.  Recognizing and understanding the 
phenomenon of dual identity is the key to understanding Taiwanese national identity. 
In explaining dual identity, it becomes apparent that there are two different kinds of 
Taiwanese national identity.  One is based on a distinctive ethno-cultural community.  





more recently begun to emerge and develop, is based on identification with a 
Taiwan-wide political community, which is the product of democratic political 
institutions and processes.  Popular participation in the political process helped to form a 
common space and time for the citizens in Taiwan.  People began to see their concerns 
and problems as happening within the boundaries of the island, and to feel that the 
solutions were to be found also within the boundaries of this political community and 
within the institutional frameworks of the state.  An attachment to Taiwan as a 
legitimate political community thus is constantly formed among the citizens through daily 
political practice. 
The formation of this new type of national identity with a civic nature is not 
necessarily in conflict with Chinese national identity.  This is why many people hold 
two national identities at the same time.  Chinese national identity was cultivated by the 
nationalist KMT regime during its authoritarian rule for four decades in service of its 
state-building project.  A Chinese nation was “imagined” on the basis of a common 
origin, a shared history, and a common culture and language.  As the survey data 
presented in this chapter show, the Chinese national identity is compatible with 
Taiwanese national identity.  Together they form the basis of dual identity in a 
significant segment of population.  This dual identity, both parts of which exist on the 
national level, is unique when compared with its counterparts in other areas of the world 
in the sense that both parts of it are identify with respective states.  Therefore, dual 
identity, rather than presenting itself as a puzzling nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan, 
actually holds the key to its own understanding.  But the explanation of Taiwanese 





nationalism, which has been the dominant ideology in Taiwan’s identity politics.  It has 
also had a great influence on, and at the same time has been influenced by, Taiwanese 







Table 3.1: Self-Identification* and National Identity, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000       %(N) 















































































































Data Source: 1993: The 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 
1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey, 2000: the Presidential Election Survey. 
  
* The wordings of the question: “In our society, some people identify themselves as Chinese; other people 




Table 3.2: Territory and Population of the ROC, 1996                       % (N) 


















































The people of the ROC refer to the population on the island or include the population in the 
Chinese mainland? 













































Table 3.3: Legitimate Boundary of Political Sovereignty, 1996, 1999              % (N) 









Who do you think have the right to determine the future of Taiwan? 
Only the people 













Include the people 

























Data Source: 1996: The 1996 Presidential Election Survey. 1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey  
 
 
Table 3.4: Imagined Chinese Community in Taiwan, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2000        % (N) 

























































































Q3. No matter how the great difference between Taiwan and mainland, we should overcome it and 

























































Data Source: 1996a: The 1995 Legislative Election Survey. 1996b: The 1996 Presidential Election 

















Q1. Forging a Taiwanese nation by breaking any relation with China 
Agree 57.8(177) 39.3(176) 33.3(27) 17.9(46) 39.0(423) 
Disagree 42.2(129) 60.7(267) 66.7(54) 82.1(210) 61.0(661) 
Total 28.2(306) 40.6(440) 7.5(81) 23.7(257) 100(1084) 
Q2. Chinese history belongs to China; we should invent Taiwan’s own history. 
Agree 71.7(226) 55.6(250) 43.5(37) 26.9(66) 52.9(579) 
Disagree 28.3(89) 44.4(200) 56.5(48) 73.1(179) 47.1(516) 
Total 28.8(315) 41.1(450) 7.8(85) 22.4(245) 100(1095) 
Sovereignty 
Q3. Taiwan pursues political autonomy; China has no right to intervene. 
Agree 92.9(302) 78.6(357) 62.2(51) 43.3(106) 73.8(817) 
Disagree 7.1(23) 21.4(97) 37.8(31) 56.7(139) 26.2(290) 
Total 29.4(326)  41.0(454) 7.4(82) 22.1(245) 100(1107) 
Q4. Do you approve the policy of defining Taiwan-China relation as “special state to state relation?” 
Approve 78.1(203) 67.0(233) 48.4(30) 31.7(66) 60.6(532) 
Disapprove 21.9(57) 33.0(115) 51.6(32) 68.3(142) 39.4(346) 
Total 29.6(260) 39.6(348) 7.1(62) 23.7(208) 100(878) 





Table 3.6: Attitudes on Liberal and democratic Value in Taiwan*, 1993, 1996, 1999 
Year  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Taiwanese Nationalist 
1993 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the Presidential Election Survey, 1999: the 











Status Quo Chinese 
Nationalist 
Total 
Human Right Protection  
Q1. Criminals committing brutal crimes should be punished immediately, without having to go through 
the complex procedures of judicial trial 









































































Q2. Judges should accept opinions from the administrations when a significant case is brought to trial. 








































































Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996a: The 1995 Legislative Election Survey. 

















Evaluation on Democratic Practices 
Q1. How democratic our country is now? (on a 0-10 scale) 
Close to Dictatorship (0-4) 6.4(19) 7.6(33) 12.9(11) 11.6(28) 8.6(91) 
In between (5) 25.6(76) 22.0(96) 17.6(15) 23.6(57) 23.0(244) 
Close to Democracy (6-10) 68.0(202) 70.4(307) 69.4(59) 64.9(157) 68.4(725) 
Total 28.0(297) 41.1(436) 8.0(85) 22.8(242) 100(1060) 
Q2. Are you satisfied with the practice of democracy in Taiwan? (on a 0-10 scale) 
Not satisfied (0-4) 19.3(62) 20.4(93) 27.5(25) 27.3(70) 22.3(250) 
Satisfied (5) 37.7(120) 33.8(154) 35.2(32) 32.0(82) 34.6(389) 
Very Satisfy (6-10) 43.0(138) 45.7(208) 37.4(34) 40.6(104) 43.1(484) 
Total 28.6(321) 40.5(455) 8.1(91) 22.8(256) 100(1123) 
Attitudes on Electoral Processes and Impacts 
Q3. The presidential election had advanced democratic progress in Taiwan. 
Agree  88.6(287) 87.6(406) 80.2(71) 74.5(193) 84.3(950) 
Disagree 11.4(37) 12.4(57) 19.8(17) 25.5(66) 15.7(177) 
Total 28.7(324) 40.6(458) 7.6(86) 23.0(259) 100(1127) 
Q4. The presidential election had caused political instability and societal disturbance. 
Agree 30.7(99) 39.5(181) 53.5(46) 41.1(106) 38.4(433) 
Disagree 69.3(233) 60.5(279) 46.5(40) 58.9(152) 61.6(694) 
Total 28.6(322) 40.9(461) 7.6(86) 22.9(258) 100(1127) 
Q5. The presidential election had strengthened the legitimacy of the government. 
Agree 78.5(223) 74.8(303) 69.9(58) 62.9(60) 72.8(725) 
Disagree 21.5(61) 25.2(102) 30.1(25) 37.1(83) 27.2(271) 
Total 28.5(284) 40.7(405) 8.3(83) 22.5(224) 100(996) 
































Perceived Chinese Community 





Share in Common 




















Table 3.9: Comparison of Three Regression Models of National Identity in Taiwan, 2000 






 Coefficient RRR Coefficient RRR Coefficient RRR 
 
Taiwanese Nationalist (compared to dual identity) 
Constant -.146  .168  2.236  
Native (benshenren) .686* 1.99 .473 1.60 .341 1.41 
Age -.012 .99 -.011 .98 -.016 .98 
Education -.003 .99 .025 1.03 .011 1.01 
Income -.043* .96 -.044* .96 -.061* .94 
Self Identity (“Only Taiwanese” as the baseline) 
Both    -.852*** .43 -.057 .94 
Only Chinese   -.757* .47 -.126 .88 
Chinese Complex, ethnic glory     .029 1.03 
Chinese Complex, betrayer     .102 1.11 
Political Unification     -.938*** .39 
Economic Integration     -.852*** .43 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic 
origin 
    -.032 .97 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic 
Chinese 
    -.114 .89 
Political Sovereignty     .249 1.28 
Democratic Value     -.019 .98 
Participatory Attachment    .022 1.02 
 
Chinese Nationalist (compared to dual identity) 
Constant -2.307  -2.871  -.909  
Native (benshenren) -.652** .5219 -.410 .664 -.019 .980 
Age .033 1.034 .031*** 1.031 .027** 1.027 
Education .063*** 1.065 .049 1.051 .035 1.035 
Income .004* 1.004 .006 1.006 .008 1.008 
Self Identity (“Only Taiwanese” as the baseline) 
Both    .612** 1.844 .494 1.639 
Only Chinese   1.753*** 5.773 1.491** 4.439 
Chinese Complex, ethnic glory     -.295 .745 
Chinese Complex, betrayer     .399** 1.490 
Political Unification     .318 1.374 
Economic Integration     .002 1.002 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic origin     -.099 . 906 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese     -.099 .905 
Sovereignty     -.682*** .505 
Democratic Value     .000 1.000 
Participatory Attachment    -.196* .822 






Table3.10: Regression Model of Factors Influence National Identity in Taiwan, 2000 
National Identity    Model A 
 
 Coefficient RRR 
Taiwanese Nationalist (compared to dual identity)  
Constant 2.3411*  
Age -.0171 .9830 
Education .0046 1.0046 
Income -.0606* .9411 
Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer .0878 1.0918 
Political Unification -.8612*** .4226 
Economic Integration -.8800*** .4147 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese -.0428 .9580 
Political Sovereignty .2275 1.2555 
Participatory Attachment .0341 1.0347 
 
Chinese Nationalist (compared to dual identity) 
Constant -1.5067  
Age .0289** 1.0293 
Education .0551 1.0567 
Income .0189 1.0191 
Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer .4740** 1.6065 
Political Unification .2909 1.3377 
Economic Integration .0421 1.0430 
Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese -.1921 .8251 
Political Sovereignty -.6958*** .4986 
Participatory Attachment -.2010* .8178 
N=715 
Pseudo R2= 0.1817 
Log likehood=-737.00143 
  









ROC State and the Imagined Chinese Community: 




With the rise of China in the last decade or so, the China factor has had an 
increasingly strong impact on Taiwan’s politics and on the nation identity of its people as 
well.  The functionalist theoretical perspective presumes that economic integration has a 
spillover effect that will eventually lead to political integration.  This theory seems 
overly simplistic and doesn’t take into account many important factors.  As Deutsch 
argued long ago, economic transaction alone is not enough to cause political integration, 
which often requires a deep philosophical or ideological commitment to integration 
(Deutsch 1988).  In the case of Taiwan, this role of this deep ideological commitment 
may be filled by the Chinese identity found among many people.  This chapter argues 
that this Chinese identity-based commitment to political integration is, nevertheless, 
significantly hampered by the rigid position of the PRC government on “One China,” as 
well as the behaviors of its officials.  The rise of China, which at the first sight seem to 
provide considerable economic inducement to the people in Taiwan, will only further 
damage the commitment to political integration.  It will also diminish the Chinese 
national identity among Taiwan’s people and their support for unification with the 





Since 2000, the most salient feature of the trends related to national identity in 
Taiwan has been the decline of Chinese national identity.  In order to explain the decline 
of Chinese national identity, this chapter proposes quite a different theoretical perspective 
from the conventional view that the rise of China will incentivize people in Taiwan to 
identify with the Chinese nation.  It postulates that the influential role of China in 
international politics appeals greatly to some people in Taiwan.  The rise of China is 
likely to strengthen the identity of those who already have a Chinese identity, and to 
convert those who previously did not have a Chinese identity into Chinese nationalists as 
well.  Many, especially those inclined toward Taiwanese identity, are worried by this 
scenario.  We contend in this chapter that this speculation is based on the mistaken 
presumption regarding the nature of Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan.  
The chapter offers a quite different scenario.  The rise of China will only diminish 
Chinese national identity.  This scenario points to a very important phenomenon that has 
been totally overlooked: the complicated relationship between the state (of the Republic 
of China) and the (Chinese) nation.  Historically, the Chinese nation was very much the 
creation of the ROC state.  But strikingly enough, with the rise of the PRC we witness 
for the first time that people are willing to sacrifice the integrity of nation, with which 
they still strongly identify, to accept a separate state.  The strong identity of the ROC 
state partly explains the decline of Chinese identity and the growth of the proportion of 
people among the general population who express a preference for the status quo. 
To explain this phenomenon, this chapter proposes quite a different profile of 
Chinese national identity, which is based on information from intensive interviews of 





use data collected from poll surveys conducted in recent years to show that the portrait 
we give to Chinese national identity is largely confirmed by the trends revealed in those 
polls.  It will then show why the nature of Chinese national identity is such that it will 
only be weakened and diminished by the coming of a strong China. 
 
 
The Impact of a Rising China on Taiwan’s National Identity 
 
China’s Rise 
The growing power of China manifests in various ways.  In terms of the economy, 
China has achieved a rapid and consistent growth, with an annual GD growth rate of 
roughly 10% since 1978 when its socialist economy was liberalized under Deng 
Xiaoping’s leadership.  It surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second largest 
economy.  It is now the largest state holder of the U.S. debt.  As early as 2003, 
Goldman Sachs in its “Global Economics Paper, No. 99” projected that in less than 40 
years, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China combined could be larger than 
the G6 countries, and China that could overtake the U.S. as the largest world economy.38  
The report was widely covered in Taiwan’s media.  The widely circulated Business 
Weekly [Shangye Zhoukan] devoted two special issues, based on Goldman Sachs’ report, 
to the topic, focusing especially on the rise of China.  One article in the series was titled 
“China to Overtake USA as Number 1 in 2041.”39 
                                                 
38 http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf 
 





China’s economic power also brought for the country an influential position in 
international politics.  China’s national defense budget has grown by around 15% 
annually since 1989.  With its strong military establishment, China has become the 
dominant military power in the South Asian region.  Chinese expansion has also been 
perceived as representing a “long-term danger” to the security interests of the United 
States, or so a paper in Policy Review published as early as 1992 claimed.  The paper, 
however, advised that the US aim for an active engagement with China and eschew the 
containment model that it applied in the face of Soviet imperialism during the Cold War 
(Munro 1992).  This paper, with its clear message of a strong China, was also widely 
cited in Chinese news media. 
In the face of deep international concern over China’s new power, especially among 
the neighboring countries, the Chinese government promoted the idea of “peaceful 
rising” (of China) internationally.  Echoing a speech given by Zheng Bijian, a 
high-ranking official in charge of party propaganda, at the Boao Forum for Asia in 
November 2003, China’s premier Wen Jiabao said in his speech one month later at 
Harvard University that “Today’s China is a great nation, reforming, liberated, and 
peacefully rising….  Tomorrow’s China will be a great nation, peace loving and full of 
hope.”  Two years later, the Central Television Station launched the documentary series 
“The Rise of Great Nations.”  The series gained much attention in Taiwan’s media.  It 
was also put on the market for sale and rental.  Peaceful or not, the rise of China was 
evident.  The “rise of China” has also become a common phrase.  The Global 
Language Monitor reported in 2009 that its research into the Internet, the blogosphere 
(including social media), and the top 50,000 print and electronic media sites found that 






the “rise of China” was the top news story of the decade.  It was 400% more prevalent 
than the runner up “Iraqi War”.40 
The rising power of China takes is evident not only in the international arena but 
also in cross-strait relations.  In 2005, China surpassed the United States and Japan to 
became Taiwan’s largest export market.  Taiwan’s economy benefited from the 
economic growth of China.  In 1991, only 9 percent of Taiwan’s exports were to the 
Chinese market. The percentage increased rapidly to 28% in 2005, and 31% in 2010.41  
In 2010, the trade surplus on the part of Taiwan reached US$77.17 billion, and Taiwan’s 
investment in China reached US $97.32 billion (Gong 2011).  In June 2010, President 
Ma Ying-jeou signed the ECFA (Economic Coordination Framework Agreement) with 
Beijing government.  It was expected to further boost the already significant bilateral 
trade between the two sides of the Strait and also greatly increase Taiwan’s investment in 
China.  Since the KMT’s candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 presidential election, 
his government has pursued a policy of active engagement with China.  President Ma’s 
cross-strait policy has invited attacked from the DPP, which claims that Ma and the KMT 
are selling the country to the PRC.  Behind these attacks lies great concern and worry 
that the next step following economic integration will be political unification.  The 
concern is not without basis, as Chen Yun-lin, the president of the Chinese Association 
for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, said implicitly during his visit to Taiwan in 2009 
                                                 
40 http://www.languagemonitor.com/top-words-2/top-news-stories-of-the-decade/ 
 






that the negotiation between two sides should be “economic first, then political.”42 
As China has garnered an influential position in the international politics, and 
Taiwan’s economy has been largely integrated into Chinese markets, many people from 
both political and academic fields have expressed concern.  Will the effects of economic 
cooperation spillover into political arena?  Will the rising power of China in the 
international economy and Taiwan’s increasing economic dependency on the Chinese 
market affect the national identity of the Taiwanese people, causing them to lean more 
toward support for unification with the Chinese Mainland?  The dominant perspective is 
that the ascendant Taiwanese identity might be stifled by the rise of China and economic 
integration between two sides of the Strait.  The concern with, or perhaps more 
accurately, the curiosity about how the new phase in cross-strait relations would effect 
the the national identity of Taiwan’s people might be part of the motivation behind the 
formation in 2011 of a study group, The China Impact Research Team, at the Institute of 
Sociology, Academia Sinica.  The team has so far conducted two phone poll surveys 
exploring, among many other issues, China’s impact on the national identity of the 
general population.  The first survey found that a dominant portion of respondents 
agreed that Taiwan’s economic growth depended very much on economic relations with 
China.  But on the other hand and more importantly, Taiwanese national identity 
showed no sign of decline compared to the findings from previous poll surveys in the past 
two decades (Wu 2012). 
 
A Puzzling Situation 
These findings are interesting and important indeed.  But focusing exclusively on 
                                                 





Taiwanese national identity, the above study totally ignored a no less important 
phenomenon: the decline of Chinese identity even during a stage when most people 
believe, rightly or wrongly, that Taiwan’s future prosperity relies very much on China 
(see Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2).  This oversight is due to a theoretical perspective, which, 
firstly, sees national identities as mutually exclusive.  This perspective assumes that 
Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity are mutually exclusive.  Thus, 
the surge of Taiwanese identity in the 1990s, according to this perspective, could only 
mean the decline of the Chinese identity.  The study hence stopped at finding that 
Taiwanese national identity did not suffer a decline, albeit without salient growth either. 
This dissertation forgoes the above either-or notion of national identity and also the 
ungrounded assumption that the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of 
Chinese identity are the two faces of the same coin.  It argues that Taiwanese national 
identity and Chinese national identity should not be treated as contradictory with each 
other, and that because of this, their dynamics should be analyzed under a two 
dimensional frame.43  With this new perspective, this study has three important findings.  
First, the rise of Taiwanese national identity did not coincide with the decline of Chinese 
national identity (see Figure 2.5).  Second, Taiwanese identity increased rapidly in the 
1990s, and remained stable in the 2000s (see Figure 2.3).  In addition, when Taiwanese 
identity experienced a rapid surge, the majority of the population in Taiwan still 
maintained a Chinese identity (see Figure 2.4).  Third, and more importantly, the 
persistence of Chinese identity did not continue over time.  It has experienced a 
continual decline since 2003.  As demonstrated in Figure 2.4, the percentage of people 
who held a Chinese national identity dropped rapidly from 57% in 2000 to 44% in 2003, 
                                                 





and then to 33% in 2008. 
The neglect of the trend of decline of Chinese national identity in previous studies 
may be the result of another mistaken assumption.  It is wrongly assumed that if the 
growing power of China in international politics and the increasing embeddedness of 
Taiwan’s economy in the Chinese market have any impact on Chinese identity, the 
impact is most likely positive, i.e. attracting people to Chinese national identity (Chu 
2004; Wu 2005a).  But, empirical findings point to just the opposite direction of change 
brought about by the influence of the China factor.  In fact, the growing power of China 
was accompanied by the decline of Chinese national identity.  How do we explain the 
puzzling state of affairs that the increasing embeddedness of Taiwan’s economy in the 
Chinese market has actually coincided with the wane of Chinese national identity in 
Taiwan?  Due to the above two false presumptions, previous research has failed to 
detect this puzzling phenomenon, much less account for it. 
 
Proposed Hypotheses 
This study calls into question the functionalist assumption that economic transaction 
has the spillover effect of promoting political integration.  As Deutsch argued long time 
ago, economic transaction alone is not enough to cause political integration, which 
requires a deep philosophical or ideological commitment to integration (Deutsch 1988).  
In the case of Taiwan, Chinese identity seems to provide deep ideological commitment.  
It is, however, greatly damaged by the PRC government’s behavior and its rigid 
adherence to the notion of “one China.”  The rise of China further diminishes the 





The rise of China has been a very popular terms in Taiwan.  Googling the phrase 
“Rise of China” in Taiwan’s websites yields data showing that the prevalence of the 
phrase has greatly increased since 2005 (see Table 4.1).  The trends surrounding this 
issue and the timing of its emergence as salient in Taiwan are congruent with the 
decreasing trend of Chinese national identity.  This congruence provides empirical 
support to a causal explanation of the decline of Chinese national identity in Taiwan.  
Why does the PRC’s “One China Principle” not strengthen the commitment to political 
unification?  Why does it lead to the decline of Chinese identity instead?  To answer 
these question, a major aspect of Chinese national identity in Taiwan needs to be brought 
to the fore.  This is the fact that the essence of Chinese national identity in Taiwan is the 
bond to the ROC state, originating not from a sense of cultural affinity but rather from the 
hatred of subjugation.  The efforts by the PRC’s government to denounce the status of 
the ROC only strengthen this bond to the ROC state.  Because the PRC’s nationalist 
agenda is so rigid and exclusive as to leave no room for ROC identity, the PRC’s version 
of Chinese nationalism is perceived to be a unification dominated by communist 
dictatorship for those people with a bond to the ROC.  Recognition of China’s rising 
power and its version of the “One China Principle” thus function to undermine the 










Nationalism, as defined by Breuilly, is a “political movement seeking or exercising 
state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments ”(Breuilly 1994: 2).  
Although this definition contains two kinds of nationalism, one seeking state power and 
the other exercising it, Breuilly, like most scholars of nationalism, focuses mainly on 
nationalist oppositions to the state (Ibid.:8).  In most studies of Taiwan’s national 
identity to date, Taiwanese nationalism targets the ROC state for elimination.  It is 
obvious that Taiwanese nationalism, which demands a new state (a “Republic of 
Taiwan”), is in opposition to the ROC.  Many people inclined to Taiwanese nationalist 
identity find it very difficult to accept the ROC as the legitimate state for Taiwan.  In the 
DPP’s (Democratic Progressive Party) public rallies and ceremonies, the national anthem 
of the ROC has never been sung, nor has the national flag ever been exhibited.  The 
supporters of Taiwanese nationalism have indeed found themselves in an awkward 
position when the national flag of the ROC has been subject to the sustained and targeted 
opposition of the Chinese government and Chinese citizens in the context of international 
events.  The DPP party chairman Su Chen-chang was severely criticized for supporting 
the national flag when it was pulled down from London streets during the 2012 Olympic 
games, apparently under pressure from the Chinese government,. 
When we focus exclusively on Taiwanese nationalists’ opposition to the ROC, its 
relationship to Chinese national identity is easily overlooked.  Chinese nationalism is 
largely conceived of as only a notion demanding the unification of the “Chinese Nation” 
[zhonghua minzu].  In contrast, this dissertation argues that Chinese nationalism is a 
state-led nationalism in which the ROC is the state both representing and engendering the 





nationalism based on the interplay between nation and state.  The first pattern is the 
experience of the developed Western countries in which the sentiment of national identity 
developed prior to the crystallization of the structure of political authority.  The 
relationship between nation and state is characterized by the nation’s precedence over and 
shaping of the state.  The other pattern is the experience of many Asian and Africa 
countries.  Therein, political sovereignty preceded national identity.  The sequence is 
thus reversed: the state preceded and created the nation (Rejai and Cynthia 1969).  
Chinese nationalism follows the second pattern.  The ROC state was the creator of the 
Chinese nation, and was employed to sustain state authority and to accelerate 
state-directed modernization.  Fitzgerald argues that China is a “nationless state”; there 
is no concept of Chinese nation (Fitzgerald 1996).  The notion of the “Chinese Nation” 
was created by the ROC state.  For this kind of “state-nation”, the integrative cement is 
seldom cultural affinity. Rather, it resides in political and economic bonds (Rejai and 
Cynthia 1969).  The political dimension of Chinese nationalism, however, has rarely 
been analyzed.  This dissertation argues that the object (identifcand) of popular 
attachment to the Chinese community is more the ROC state than the ethno-Chinese 
nation.  The bond to the ROC state that separates the outsider (mainly the Chinese 
communists) from the insider originates not from a sense of ethno-cultural identity but 
from the hatred of subjugation. 
 
Chinese Nationalism in the Mainland, 1911-1949 
When the ROC was founded in 1911, the prevalent sentiments regarding affiliation 





Chinese nation had not developed at that stage.  As a matter of fact, the official ideology 
of the revolutionary Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party up to the eve of the 
breakdown of the Qing Dynasty was Han nationalism.  This entailed the driving out of 
the Manchus and the recovery of China.  The Chinese Nation, the notion of a single 
Chinese nation composed of five ethnic groups, was very much the creation of the ROC 
and did not come until later during the 1920s.  And, according to Johnson, it was not 
until the 1930s during the war against Japan, that the notion of a Chinese nation began to 
penetrate rural areas (Johnson 1962: 5).  Since the revolution of 1911, the central 
mission of the KMT was to construct a modern state, although in this endeavor they had 
little success.  Their main concerns were to achieve firmer control of the central 
government and extend their authority beyond coastal regions to warlord-controlled areas.  
To do this, it needed support from commercial and manufacturing interests to finance 
military buildup.  Because the KMT lacked resource and authority in warlord areas, it 
was able to achieve territorial gains by making compromises with the political elites in 
the peripheries rather than by replacing warlords with its own people.  As Hughes has 
pointed out, facing a society fragmented by parochial bonds of clan ties, political elites of 
the new state realized the need for a nation-building program to sustain the state authority 
and to promote the shift of popular loyalty to the central state (Hughes 1997: 7).  In this 
political situation, nationalist ideology emphasized the coordination among diverse 
interests rather than social mobilization (Breuilly 1994: 231-34).44  Nationalist ideology 
played the role of garnering support for the KMT regime from groups with diverse 
political interests.  Mass action to some extent was incompatible with the strategy of 
                                                 






coordination as it might undermine the authoritarian-mode linkages the KMT regime had 
established.45  The state-building process and the nation-building program of the KMT, 
however, were interrupted by an eight-year war against Japan and civil war against 
communists which followed. 
 
Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan 
In 1950, the KMT resumed the process of state-building not in its homeland but on a 
newly acquired island.  The end of the Second World War released Taiwan from fifty 
years of Japanese colonization.  But, it also placed Taiwan on the battleground of the 
Chinese Civil War.  In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced the 
establishment of the PRC in Beijing while Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT retreated to 
Taiwan, and relocated the central government of the ROC to Taipei.  Taiwan began to 
serve a dual role as both a province of the republic state and the sole representative of the 
Chinese nation.  The political situations the KMT encountered on the island were to 
some extent similar to those it did in mainland China.  Their major objectives were still 
to bring the central government firmly under its control and recover the territory under 
the control of the communists.  But the KMT was better equipped this time.  An 
official nationalist ideology [sanmin zhuyi]46 and a military-dominated authoritarian 
                                                 
45 Authoritarian reform nationalism had also appeared in Shogun Japan and in Turkey. By Breuilly’s 
definition, authoritarian reform nationalism is the specific response from new modern states with a strong 
center aiming at reconstructing state power by adopting nationalist ideology to coordinate different political 
claims (Breuilly 1994, Ch. 11). 
 
46 Beginning in 1924, Sun Yat-sen gave a series lectures on Chinese nationalism which were published 
under the title Sanmin Zhuyi (Three Principles of the People). He proposed a program for a revolution in 
three phases, namely a military stage, a tutelary stage in which the party exercises dictatorship until society 
becomes familiar with the new ideology of liberal democracy, and finally a constitutional government. This 





regime had been developed during its nationalist movement on the mainland.  More 
importantly, the major obstacle of coordinating a set of diverse political interests they 
encountered on the mainland was removed.  As the regime migrated to this new land, 
warlords, landlords, and the red-hat merchants all lost their assets and depended upon the 
regime to bring them back to their land and property.  In addition, in Taiwan, a recently 
decolonized society, the political power of local elites and autonomous business interests 
had not developed yet. 
There were also other new political problems.  In the new political situation, a 
strong state apparatus was no longer sufficient for the survival of the KMT regime, whose 
legitimacy was questioned by the people in the new territory.  Those territories 
previously under the control of warlords were taken by the communists to establish a new 
state, which challenged the legal status of the ROC.  In addition, unlike in costal China 
where the KMT regime had enjoyed well-established connections, Taiwanese society and 
the state were new to one another.  Chinese nationalism became an important tool of 
legitimation for the survival of the KMT regime island, as some scholars have pointed out 
(Wu and Cheng 2011).  What has not been explained yet is how the KMT could 
legitimize the authority of the state by appealing to Chinese nationalism in a divided 
nation.  How was the KMT to foster popular loyalty to the ROC state in the name of the 
Chinese nation when the PRC was also a Chinese state? 
 
Nationalisms in a Divided Nation 
Taiwan’s situation is not exceptional; it is similar to those of Germany and Korea, 
                                                                                                                                                 
was adopted by the KMT government to legitimize party dictatorship in terms of the mission of achieving 
territorial integrity of the Chinese nation-state. The Three Principles of the People became a state ideology 





which were divided into two separate states during the Cold War.  To cultivate national 
identity when the nation is divided, the architect of nationalism needs to find other basis 
with which to substitute cultural identity.  In West Germany, the concept of 
Verfassungspatriotismus was proposed by Dolf Sternberger in 1970 as “a kind of civic 
reason that would make citizens identify with the democratic state.” (Muller 2007: 21)  
It is argued that the general population identification with West Germany was based on 
their attachment to the Constitution.  As Muller pointed out, Sternberger’s constitutional 
patriotism did not exclude the populace in East Germany since they legally remained 
citizens of the Federal Republic.  In theory, they were also subject to its constitution 
(Muller 2007: 25).  In South Korea, a recent study pointed out that a new national 
identity figuring South Koreans as dutiful subjects of the Republic of Korea emerged 
during the economic development period (Moon 2008).  The developmental state 
fostered economic interdependence by creating a variety of Administered Mass 
Organizations to mobilize South Koreans to participate in these organizations and 
economic development projects (Moon 2008: 5-6). 
In Taiwan, similar to the cases of West Germany and South Korea, the state served 
as the object of identification.  Chinese nationalism had been adopted to legitimize state 
authority.  Partly due to the situation of a divided nation, the cement for consolidating 
popular identification with the state could not be the cultural bond.  More importantly, 
although Chinese Hans constituted 95 percent of the population on the island, Chinese 
culture and language (Mandarin) were new to the local people, who had been under 
Japanese colonialism for a half century.  When the national central government moved 





territory of the ROC.  The formula for identification thus had to be political in nature, 
rather than cultural.  The idea of the ROC as the legitimate China and a sense of hatred 
for subjugation (rejection of communist Soviet domination) became the new formula for 
forging national identity. 
Chinese ideology emphasizes that the legal status of the ROC claiming that the ROC 
was the sole legitimate government of the Chinese nation and had de jure sovereignty 
over the Chinese territory.  To make this claim credible despite the existence of the PRC, 
international endorsement was essential.  In 1950, the ambassador of the ROC to the 
United Nations asserted a the meeting of the UN Security Council that Soviet Russia’s 
proposal to dismiss the ROC from the UN was an act of invasion.  He stated that the 
Beijing regime was a puppet regime of the Soviet Union since not a single member of the 
communist government was elected by the Chinese people and none of its rules and laws 
was approved by the Chinese people or their representatives (Guo shi guan 2000: 64-67).  
In addition to denouncing the PRC’s status, nationalist principles were adopted to 
legitimize the legal status of the ROC.  In the same statement to the UN, ambassador 
Chiang declared, “my government is produced according to the Chinese constitution.  
The constitution was passed by the National Assembly held by the representatives of the 
Chinese people.  The government is led by a president and vice-president who were 
elected by the National Assembly.  The Executive Yuan is responsible to the Legislature 
Yuan which is composed of seven hundred popular elected legislators.” (Guo shi guan 
2000: 66).  The same statement was reiterated during the following two decades as a 
response to questions over the ROC’s right to represent the legitimate China.47 
                                                 
47 This argument does not ignore the decisive role of geopolitics in settling the status of the ROC in the 





Ambassador Chiang’s statement to the UN made it clear that the claim of the ROC 
to represent the legitimate China was based on the Chinese fatong, which referred to the 
ROC Constitution and the national government produced by the Constitution.  When the 
KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it brought with it the ROC state apparatus: a 
constitution approved by elected representatives in 1946 and a central government 
composed of hundreds of national representatives elected in 1947 from various 
constituencies in mainland China.  The continuation of these constitutional institutions 
in Taiwan and recognition of the legal status of the ROC enabled the KMT to apply 
Chinese nationalism to legitimize its authority in Taiwan. 
In addition to legitimizing the authority of the ROC state in Taiwan, Chinese 
nationalism also served to distinguish it from the outsider, the Chinese communists 
(CCP).  The Chinese communists were labeled puppets of Soviet imperialism.  
Anti-communism [fangong kang’e] hence was enshrined as a nationalist mission seeking 
territorial integrity in resistance to foreign intervention.  The claim for national survival 
against foreign invaders was not new to the mainlanders who fled with the KMT regime 
to Taiwan during 1949-50.  This claim had been the main theme of Chinese nationalism 
ever since its birth.  It began with the crisis of the Qing Dynasty under the pressure of 
Western powers and was strengthened with the Japanese invasion., Their lives and 
memories of most mainlanders were marked by endless fleeing and parting with family 
members caused by foreign invasions.  The hatred of native Taiwanese for foreign 
                                                                                                                                                 
attitude and ensured international recognition of the legal status of the ROC. Nevertheless, the moral basis 
of the KMT regime is worthy of consideration for two reasons. First, although Chiang Kai-shek knew well 
that only a world war would change the civil war situation to his advantage, its arrival was beyond the 
KMT’s control. What the Nationalists could do was project a cause to their émigré communities in foreign 
countries hoping they would influence foreign policy. Second, although the moral cause might have a 
limited effect on the formulation of foreign policy, it would serve as a means to justify an existing policy, 






invasion was similar even though they had never suffering foreign invasions after having 
been colonized by Japanese for fifty years.  The bond to the ROC state therefore was not 
based on a sense of ethno-cultural identity, but rather on the hatred of subjugation.  
 
The ROC and the Chinese Nation 
Table 4.2 suggests that ethno-cultural identity is not an essential basis for people in 
Taiwan to identify themselves with the Chinese nation, especially for those who possess 
dual national identity.  The responses to Question 1 show that only 36 percent of people 
with dual identity agreed with the statement “Taiwanese are Chinese and the view that 
Taiwanese are not Chinese is unforgivable.”  Their identification with the Chinese 
nation apparently was apparently not based on primordial origins.  Nor was the sharing 
of the same culture and history the source of their identification with the Chinese nation.  
Replies to Question 2 showed that less than half of people with dual identity objected to 
the view that Taiwan’s history is different from Chinese history.  Compared with 
Chinese nationalists who overwhelmingly (73%) rejected the view that Taiwan’s history 
is different from Chinese history, people with dual national identity conceived of the 
Chinese nation as resting on a political and not ethnic and cultural basis. 
More importantly, the figures in Table 4.3 demonstrate that the ROC state, rather 
than the cultural Chinese nation, was the major object of identification for people with 
Chinese national identity in Taiwan.  Even long after the seat for China in the UN was 
taken by the PRC in 1971, and most countries in the world recognized the PRC as the 
state for China and established formal diplomatic ties with it, the idea that the ROC was 





Chinese national identity.  In 2003, when asked, “If the two sides of the Strait are to be 
unified, what name should be adopted?” 67 percent of the respondents holding dual 
identity and 56 percent of Chinese nationalists picked the ROC (see Table 4.3).  
Excluding the response of “Decided in the future,” 84 percent of those with dual identity 
and 86 percent of Chinese nationalists selected ROC as the name for the unified Chinese 
nation (see Table 4.3).  The PRC earned very little allegiance.  Only 5 percent among 
those with dual identity and 2 percent among Chinese nationalists picked PRC for name 
of a unified China (see Table 4.3).  Even excluding the choice of “Decided in the 
Future,” the percentages in the two groups were 6% and 3% (see Table 4.3).  
These figures might explain why the PRC’s proposal of the “one country two 
systems” formula, which had been successfully applied to Hong Kong, showed very little 
popularity in Taiwan (see Table 4.4).  In addition to favoring the ROC as the state for a 
unified China, those with Chinese national identity also strongly hoped to raise the status 
of the ROC in the international community.  The respondents were asked in poll in 2000, 
“Some people think the tension in the cross-Strait tensions comes from our government’s 
effort to raise the ROC’s status in the international community.  To avoid irritating the 
PRC, our government should suspend such efforts (such as applying to join the UN, and 
state visits by the President.)  Other people think our government should keep up its 
efforts to gain international recognition, no matter what reaction the PRC would have. 
What is your opinion?”  Table 4.3 shows that around 90 percent (89.4%) of those with 
dual identity and 86 percent (86.3%) of Chinese nationalists supported government’s 
effort to raise the status of the ROC state in the international community even if it will 







The Political Impact of China’s Rise 
 
For the people in Taiwan, China’s rise was much more than a phenomenon 
involving a shift in the balance of power in international politics.  What emerged with 
China’s growing economic and political power was the PRC’s exclusive Chinese 
nationalism, a nationalism which has inhibited Taiwan’s claim to any national identity 
(including the Chinese one) in the world community.  If China’s rapidly expanding 
economy brought great opportunities for Taiwan’s economy, China’s rise was also a 
source of worry and concerns regarding the status of the ROC.  Seemingly with the 
intention of making a reality of the concerns of the Taiwan’s people, the Beijing 
government has been using its powerful position to challenge the ROC’s status in the 
international arena.  One of the most salient cases may be China’s efforts to obstruct 
Taipei’s application for membership in the World Health Organization in 2003 in the 
midst of SARS epidemic.  The first case of SARS in Taiwan was found in early March 
2003.  The next month, a public hospital was close down, and hundreds of it patients, 
nurses, and doctors were quarantined within the confines of the hospital.  The epidemic 
became a statewide crisis.  Taipei applied to the World Health Organization for 
membership in May, hoping that the sharing of information concerning the epidemic with 
the world medical community might be of some help to solve the crisis.  The application 
was swiftly blocked by the Beijing government.  Its representative, the Vice-Premier 





assembly “a shameful farce.”  “As a province of China,” she said, “Taiwan is not 
qualified to be a member nor to be an observer to participate the activities of the 
organization….  If Taiwan wants to participate in any activity of the WHO, it has to be 
under the permission and arrangement of Chinese central government.”  Worse still, 
when asked by a reporter about the needs of twenty three million people in Taiwan, a 
PRC official rudely replied, “It was already rejected.”  “Who cares about you?”  The 
story was widely reported in Taiwan’s media, and the film clip replayed many times on 
all TV channels.  Two days later, Taiwan was listed by the organization as an infected 
zone.  
To people in Taiwan, these PRC officials’ comments were certainly a humiliation 
and caused fierce irritation.  The frequent humiliation caused by the Beijing government 
and some of its people may significantly contribute to the growth of the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement (Dittmer 2005).  What has been overlooked is that the PRC’s 
exclusive and rigid version of the “one China principle”, which it has promoted in hopes 
of forcing the island to identify with the Chinese nation, has ironically been damaging to 
the commitment to unification among those people who held a Chinese national identity 
in Taiwan.  As this dissertation has argued, the essence of Chinese national identity in 
Taiwan is the bond to the ROC state.  Beijing’s effort to denounce the status of the ROC 
would only strengthen the attachment to the ROC state.  This mechanism was 
demonstrated by the overwhelming support among those people who held a Chinese 
national identity for efforts to raise the ROC’s status in the international community even 
if damaging to cross-strait relations (see Figure 4.2).  Moreover, Beijing’s behavior 





exclusive but also rigid in nature.  The events in the wake of SARS showed clearly that 
even on matters concerning the health of the whole population, the PRC would not allow 
any flexibility on the status of the ROC.  Since the PRC’s Chinese nationalism leaves no 
room for ROC identity, in the eyes of those people who feel attached to the ROC, 
unification under the PRC’s nationalist agenda means domination by communist 
dictatorship.  Both the recognition of China’s rising power and the dominance of the 
PRC’s version of “one China principle” are considerably damaging to the commitment of 
people in Taiwan to unification.  These have also resulted in the waning of Chinese 
national identity on the island. 
As early as 1998, Hu Chi-chiang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KMT 
government, openly complained in a press conference that the Beijing government had 
been trying very hard to bully Taiwan in the international community.  Its aim was to 
achieve a state of “Zero Diplomacy” on the part of the ROC.  Hu also warned Beijing 
that its policy would only bring about “Zero Unification” for two sides of the Strait 
(United Evening News 1998/12/30).  After 2000, under the DPP government, China’s 
bullying efforts were greatly escalated.  To cite only a small number of incidents, 
Taiwan’s representatives to the WHO’s Conference on the Post-Tsunami Health Situation 
were rejected for attendance of the meetings in 2005, albeit with formal invitations and 
official registration.  In 2005 the official titles of all of Taiwan’s representatives to the 
World Trade Organization were eliminated from the official roster book.  In the 2006 
annual report of the World Economic Forum, Taiwan’s membership name was changed 
into Taiwan, China.  In the WTO’s Conference on the Fishery Subsidy in Geneva, 





high school students who had won two gold medals and two bronze medals in the 
International Biology Olympiad held in Canada wept in front of the press because 
Taiwan’s national flag was removed from the assembly hall. Similar stories were 
published once for a while in Taiwan’s media.  They all lead to the growing popular 
understanding that unification with the mainland means domination by the PRC. 
It was also during this period that we witnessed a steady decline of Chinese national 
identity in Taiwan.  Contrary to the conventional view that the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy removed the practical obstacles to unification, and that a strong China 
would induce people in Taiwan to identify with it order to be citizens of a powerful 
nation, the fact is that a powerful China works only to diminish the Chinese identity 
among the general populace.  Figure 2.5 illustrates that in the early 1990’s when social 
scientists began to conduct national poll surveys on national identity, high percentages of 
respondents expressed that they would like to see unification with China under the 
favorable scenario of political and economic parity between Taiwan and the rest of China.  
The percentages of those who would want to go independent without risking war in the 
first few years, 67 percent in 1991 and 58 percent in 1993, represented a doubling of 
these numbers (originally 37% and 38% respectively).  By the year 2000, the percentage 
of those with a Chinese national identity remained roughly constant around 60 percent.  
But in the years after 2003, in what amounts to a radical break, this declined with a 
precipitously around 30 percent.  It went down to 44 percent in 2003, and further to 33 







The above explanation is supported by the information collected from intensive 
interviews with people who discarded their Chinese national identity.  In my 2003 study 
of changes in national identity, I selected some respondents who changed their national 
identity from a panel study of poll surveys in 1998 and 2000 for intensive interviews in 
2003.  The respondents resided in various parts of the country, from the far south of 
Pingtung County to Metropolitan Taipei and northern extremity of Keelong, a harbor city.  
They also belonged to different occupations.  Their change of national identity during 
these years occurred in various patterns.  Some had possessed Chinese national identity 
in 1998 but acquired in 2000 an additional Taiwanese national identity such that they 
exhibted dual identities.  Some had dual identities in 1998 but dropped the Chinese 
national identity in 2000 to become Taiwanese nationalists.  Others identified as 
Chinese nationalists in 1998, but dropped their former identity such that they then 
supported maintaining the status quo or becoming Taiwanese nationalists.  The 
information collected from the intensive interviews with those who dropped their Chinese 
national identity seems consistent with the theory that Chinese national identity was 
mainly based on a bond to the ROC state.  The rise of China as a factor contributing to 
the decline of Chinese national identity is also confirmed. 
Informant No.24, a college graduate in his forties, was an employee in the finance 
sector of an international cargo company.  A New Party supporter, he was a Chinese 
nationalist in 1998.  When asked why he supports the New Party, he replied, “the New 
Party is the defender of the Republic of China.”  His bond to the ROC state also 
explained his rejection of Taiwan independence.  When asked “if Taiwan independence 





Republic of Taiwan, but if the country after the independence is still called the Republic 
of China, I will accept it.” 
Informant No.15, a college graduate in her forties, was running an afterschool 
program for primary school students in suburban Taipei.  As a native Taiwanese, she 
has no high regard for mainlander parents, who often give her a hard time when 
unsatisfied with her performance in taking care of their children.  Being a longtime 
KMT supporter, she held dual identities in 1998, but gave up her Chinese national 
identity in 2000.  She is now in the status quo group, rejecting both unification and 
independence.  “I am a Chinese and an ‘ROC person’ [zhonghua minguo ren],” she 
claimed.  
 
So, I do not support Taiwan independence.  I am for “one country two systems.” 
But my idea is different from the situation of Hong Kong.  Hong Kong is China’s 
puppet.  Taiwan should have its independent territory, and not have to report to 
Beijing on every matter.  
No matter what kind of arrangement is settled in the future, Taiwan should be an 
independent entity, with its independent institutions and without any restraint from 
China.  I am not saying I am not Chinese. But I am against unification.  Yes, I am 
a Chinese.  But, I do not want Taiwan to become their province. 
 
Asked what the name of the nation should be if the two sides end up unifying in the 
future, she replies definitely the “Republic of China.”  Her identification with the ROC 
state seems quite strong.  Her answer suggests that the reason she agreed with 
unification in 1998 was because the idea of the Republic of China encompassing the 
whole Chinese nation was in her mind.  But since the rise of Communist China has 





Taiwan to become their province.”  She supports “one country two systems.”  But in 
her interpretation, it is more like “one China, two Chinese states.”  Her identification 
with the ROC state also prevents her from supporting independence.  She says, “even if 
most countries do not recognize the Republic of China, there is no need for a Republic of 
Taiwan.  We are Chinese; our country is the Republic of China.”  For her, the 
international isolation of the ROC is no reason for giving up her identification with it. 
Informant No. 32 says the first priority of the government is to “make the world to 
recognize our Republic of China.”  He is a native Hakka college graduate working for a 
high-tech company.  His case shows most clearly the strength of the ROC identity in 
forming Chinese national identity.  Several times during the interview he denied that he 
was a Taiwanese.  Instead, he would rather be called an “ROC person [zhonghua 
minguo ren].”  What greatly troubles him is that when he was abroad he had to say he 
was from Taiwan, because no one knew what Republic of China was, and most often they 
confused the Republic of China with People’s Republic of China.  He had been a 
Chinese nationalist in the previous survey.  But in an interview in 2003, he belonged to 
the status quo group.  Asked why he was against unification, he said: 
 
Unification now involves a problem; the problem is it is no longer under our control. 
Since childhood we have been told we are the Republic of China.  Unification now 
would cause a contradiction because we will become the People’s Republic of China.  
My opinion is that we should be the Republic of China.  
 
Since he is such a staunch supporter of the ROC, his acceptance of unification with 
China owes to the fact that he imagined the ROC as being the state for the unified 






The above two respondents, who maintained a strong attachment to the ROC state 
when interviewed in 2003, changed their attitudes about the future of their nation from 
unification to the status quo.  What factor may explain the change?  Informant No. 29 
says explicitly that: 
 
China does not identify with us.  They think we are just a small island.  After 
having contact with the mainland, I no longer wanted unification.  China is very 
strong and we are small.  China is just like a boss in a big company.  Whatever he 
promises to give, he can always change his mind and take back. 
 
In his fifties, this man worked as an engineering designer for a computer hardware 
maker.  He was in the category of Chinese nationalist in 1998, but shifted to the 
category of dual identity in 2000.  When interviewed in 2003, he showed himself to be a 
supporter of the status quo.  At the time of interview, he did not support unification 
because after having lived and worked in China for couple of years he discovered that 
“China is stronger”, and “China does not identify with us.” 
When asked if his rejection of unification is due to the fact that China does not treat 
Taiwan in a friendly manner regarding the status of the ROC, he says,  
 
Yes, exactly. But even if they [the PRC] were friendly now, I would not believe in 
them…. We will benefit more from independence than from unification because 
under an independent Taiwan, we can decide our own policy.  Thus, I want de 
facto independence, but nominal unification. 
 






In the future for the younger generation, if they consider their own interests, they 
will not want unification because unification means domination by dictatorship…. 
Unification should only be nominal.  Taiwan can still have its sovereignty.  China 
should not infringe on our rights. 
 
His idea of “de facto independence, nominal unification” seems to be a form of “two 
Chinese states.”  Because of the rise of China and Beijing’s staunch position of forcing 
Taiwan to accept its version of unification, he changed his previous Chinese nationalist 
position to defending the status quo.  Later in the interview, he even uses Tibet as an 
example in his reply to the question “Why do you still accept an independent Taiwan 
although you think Taiwanese are also Chinese?”  He says, 
 
Just like Tibet, if the very basic spiritual life cannot be secured, of course they want 
independence.  It is understandable under dictatorship. 
 
The same factor motivated the change of national identity among other informants 
such as Informant No. 60.  He is in his forties and working as an engineer in a high-tech 
industry.  Like Informant No. 29 above, he was Chinese nationalist in 1998, but shifted 
to the category of dual identity in 2000.  Interviewed in 2003, he shows himself to be a 
supporter of the status quo. 
 
We are Chinese, but Chinese need not stay in the same state.  As long as you are 
under oppression, you can seek independence.  Mongolia is one case; Tibet is 







Mainland China is now a great power.  Neither their government nor their people 
recognize the status of the ROC.  They think Taiwan is theirs.  But, according to 
Chinese history, Taiwan belongs to the ROC.  They occupied the Chinese 
mainland.  The current situation is two divided sovereignty states. 
 
The most salient effect of China’s rise on Chinese identity may be in the case of 
Informant No. 49.  Our informant, a native Taiwanese with a college degree in his 
thirties, worked for a bank.  His replies in the 2000 poll revealed that he was a Chinese 
nationalist, accepting unification with China and rejecting Taiwan independence even 
under the favorable condition that no war would be provoked.  But in the interview in 
2003, he opted for the status quo.  That is, he no longer accepted unification even if 
China were to become a democratic country.  He says there is no need for Taiwan to 
declare itself a new independent country, since China cares about it so much.  Neither is 
unification a good option, because “unification with China will definitely result in the 
situation that Taiwan is unified [by the PRC].” 
But why did he agree with unification with China in the previous survey?  His 
reply to the question of historical memory in the intensive interview suggested that what 
he had in mind several years ago was a unified China with the ROC as its state.  The 
only things he could think of as worth being included in history textbooks were Sun 
Yat-sen’s persistent revolutionary endeavors and the valuable things embedded in 
Chinese nation—five thousand years of history, traditional culture, and the beautiful 
landscape.  Nevertheless, to him, only the ROC has preserved the Chinese national 
heritage.  Mainland China under 50 years of communist rule had developed a different 





were all diminished by the rise of China.  Once the ROC cannot recover mainland China, 
he no longer opts for unification. 
The information collected from the focus group interviews demonstrates that the 
decline of the Chinese national identity among many people in Taiwan is less due to the 
idea that the Taiwanese constitute a unique nation and thus should have a state of its own.  
The predominance of the PRC’s “one China principle” is what causes those who held a 
Chinese national identity in the 1990s to forgo their wishes for a unified Chinese state. 
The trend of declining Chinese national identity is actually linked to the rise of China.  
This finding runs counter to the expectation by many people that, because one of the 
missions of nationalism is to achieve national glory, the rise of China should compel the 
people of Taiwan to identify with a powerful China.  This expectation largely ignores 
the fact that the Chinese identity of some people in Taiwan is based on an attachment to 
the ROC state.  The rise of China with its growing influence in international politics has 
made the PRC’s nationalist agenda dominate the prospect of unification.  Under the 
PRC’s agenda, the ROC has no standing in a unified Chinese state.  When our 
informants with Chinese national identity began to realize this, they changed their 
preference regarding the future of their nation from unification to defend the ROC by 
maintaining the status quo and at the same time hoping to raise the status of the ROC in 
the international community. 
 
 






Data Source and the Dependent Variable 
This section uses survey data to examine the proposed argument and the findings 
from the focus group interviews.  Data used in this section was collected in the 
following two research projects: the survey of the research project “Analysis of the 
Unification and Independence Preference of Taiwan’s Public,” and the “China Impact 
Survey.”48  These surveys used the same question to measure Chinese national identity.  
The question is “Some people say that if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan in 
terms of economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be 
unified into one country.  Do you agree?”49  In 2010, 41.3 percent of respondents 
wanted unification if the two sides of the strait were under similar economic, social, and 
political conditions.  53.2 present of respondents disagreed with the statement (see Table 
4.5).  
 
Political, Cultural, and Economic Factors 
Table 4.5 presents information about how the China factor affects Chinese national 
identity in Taiwan.  The first two questions examine the cultural and economic 
dimensions of the China factor.  The first question asked the interviewees “some people 
say that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture, while some others said that Taiwanese 
culture and Chinese culture are two entirely different cultures.  Which statement do you 
agree with?”  The two statements received a similar degree of support.  46.4 percent of 
respondents agreed with the statement that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture, while 
                                                 
48 For detailed information from the survey datasets, see Chapter One. 
 





45.6 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the two cultures are fully 
different (see Table 4.5).  Among those respondents who think Taiwanese culture 
belongs to Chinese culture, about half (55.1%) had a Chinese national identity.  
However, 39.7% of respondents who thought that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture 
disapproved of unification (see Table 4.5).   
The second question asked interviewees “Is it possible that the mainland’s future 
economy will be better than Taiwan’s economy?”  Most respondents (83.4%) thought 
that China’s future economy would be better than Taiwan’s.  Nevertheless, among them, 
less than half (45.1%) had a Chinese national identity (support unification) (see Table 
4.5). 
It seems that Chinese cultural affinity is not sufficient for the forming of people’s 
attachment to the Chinese political community.  Question 4 asked interviewees “Is your 
impression of mainland China good or bad?”  32.5 percent of respondents said that they 
have a good impression, while 52.8 percent of respondents had a bad impression of the 
mainland China (see Table 4.5).  Among those who had a bad impression, 71.6 percent 
rejected unification even if the mainland were to be comparable with Taiwan in terms of 
economic, social, and political development (see Table 4.5).  Question 5 asked the 
interviewees “Do you trust the government of mainland China?”  Only 10.8 percent of 
respondents had trust in the Beijing government. 83.7 percent of respondents said they do 
not trust mainland China (see Table 4.5).  Among those who do not trust the Beijing 
government, 60.5 percent rejected unification (see Table 4.5).  Question 4 and Question 
5 shown in Table 4.5 reveal that the Beijing government with all its efforts to push 





The PRC’s behavior intentioned to suppress the ROC’s status in the international arena 
created a bad image for people in Taiwan, and did nothing to win their trust.  A 
impression on the mainland and lack of trust in the government of the mainland had 
negative effect on Chinese national identity as they had harmed populace’s attachment to 
the Chinese community and their commitment to Chinese unification. 
The information provided by the intensive interviews is consistent with the findings 
from poll survey data analysis. 
 
The Decline of Dual Identity and the Rise of the Status Quo 
In addition to the trend of declining Chinese national identity since 2003, Figure 2.6 
also illustrates the patterns of national identity change in the general population.  The 
proportion of those with dual national identity has decreased rapidly.  People with dual 
national identity used to be the largest group in the 1990s.  But after 2000, the size of 
the group shrank drastically from 41% in 2000 to 26% in 2003 and then to 23% in 2008.  
A recent survey conducted in 2011 shows that this group only constituted ten percent of 
the sample (see Table 4.5).  Meanwhile, the proportion in the Taiwanese nationalist 
group increased from 28% in 2000 to 34% in 2003 and eventually to 42% in 2008.  But 
the most significant trend was the great expansion of the status quo group, those who 
want neither independence nor unification.  This group used to be very small.  In the 
1990s it accounted for less than ten percent of the population.  But its size grew 
tremendously since 2003, from 8% in 2000 to 20% in 2003 and 19% in 2008.  The 2011 
poll shows 31 percent of the sample to be in this group (see Table 4.5). 





surge of the status quo group?  Why do people who used to identify with the Chinese 
nation no longer want unification with the Chinese mainland?  The information 
provided by the intensive interviews suggests that the main factor causing this change is 
related to ROC state identity.  Table 4.6 provides support to the findings from the 
intensive interviews.  The numbers therein show that the dual identity group (whose 
members accept unification with China) does not differ from the status quo group (those 
who reject unification) in terms of ethnic and cultural identity or in terms of the economic 
dimensions of national identity.  About the same proportion of the two groups (70.8 
percent for the dual identity group and 65.8 percent for the status quo group) agreed that 
people in Taiwan and mainland China share the same ethnic origins and the same culture 
(see Table 4.6).  Ethno-cultural identity cannot explain the variance in their attitudes 
concerning Chinese unification.  For both groups, material benefits and pragmatic 
reasoning seem to have no effect on national identity.  Table 4.5 shows that they agreed 
that cross-strait economic transactions will benefit Taiwan’s economy (the percentages 
for dual identity and the status quo being 82% and 81% respectively) (see Table 4.5).  
Neither does economic integration with China have a significantly different impact on the 
personal welfare of these two groups.  The group supporting the status quo (rejecting 
unification) even has a higher proportion of respondents reporting that cross-strait 
economic transactions have a positive impact on their family welfare, 44% of them 
compared to 39% for the dual identity group (see Table 4.6).  On the issue of whether 
respondents thought that China’s economic development in the future would outpace 
Taiwan’s, the two groups show little difference, 77% for the dual identity group and 74% 





ethnic-cultural identity nor material interest is the basis of Chinese national identity.  
These factors cannot explain the difference behind the holding of dual identity and 
support for the status quo. 
The attitude that differentiates the two groups, one for the unification the other 
against it, is political in nature.  When asked to evaluate whether mainland Chinese treat 
people with respect, 74.9% of the status quo group gives negative scores, while much less 
of the dual identity group does so (see Table 4.6).  The question is designed to measure 
Taiwanese people’s evaluation of the level of civility of the Chinese.  But it can also be 
interpreted as showing how Taiwanese think Chinese would respect the will of others, 
including people in Taiwan.  
The information collective from the focus group interviews suggests that most 
people in Taiwan see Beijing’s actions intended to prevent the ROC from participating in 
international institutions as “unfriendly”, “oppressive”, and displaying no respect for the 
will of the people in Taiwan.  And the reason for their rejection of unification was 
expressed as the notion that China does not “identify with us.”  The figures in Table 4.6 
seems to suggest that those people who recognized the PRC’s as “unfriendly” and as 
having no respect for the will of the people in Taiwan were more likely to reject 
unification.  Furthermore, Table 4.6 shows that the more significant difference in 
attitude between the two groups is their evaluation of the prospects for China’s 
democracy.  In the dual identity group, 63.9% think that China will become democratic 
in the future.  Only 46% in the status quo group, however, believe so (see Table 4.6).  
Democracy is always an important factor in Taiwanese people’s consideration of 





democratic regime, but also because only through democracy can Taiwan’s interests and 
the identity of its people be articulated.  As Informant No.6 made clear, “if the mainland 
becomes democratic, they will respect our will and rights.  They will not as they are 
doing now force us to accept their version of unification.”  For those people with an 
attachment to the ROC state, when the mainland becomes democratic, unification would 
no longer mean the end of the ROC because under a democratic regime, the form and 





It is impossible to fully understand the nature and particular trajectory of Taiwanese 
nationalism and nationalist politics in Taiwan without understanding the Chinese national 
identity in the country.  On the other hand, because Chinese national identity is an 
important factor in cross-strait relations, the analysis of its future, especially under the 
impact of the rise of China, will have many political implications.  With the rise of 
China, many people in Taiwan are worried that the growth of Taiwanese nationalism will 
be halted and people will be drawn to Chinese national identity.  The Beijing 
government hopes that the economic integration of the two sides will eventually lead to 
political assimilation. 
The data collected by poll surveys suggests that the pessimism of Taiwanese 
nationalists and optimism of the Beijing government are both ungrounded.  It has been 





recent decade did has not encroached upon Taiwanese identity.  This chapter further 
exposes that Chinese national identity actually declined with the rise of China.  In order 
to understand this puzzle, we need to understand the nature of Chinese national identity 
among the general populace in Taiwan.  With that understanding, we can also better 
comprehend its “competitor,” or counterpart, Taiwanese nationalism.  
Historically the Chinese nation began to be constructed by the ROC in the 1920s.  
Unlike in the case of nation-states, the Chinese nation is largely a state-nation, or 
state-led nation.  The state, the ROC, has not only engendered the Chinese nation, but 
also always been its legitimate representative in the mind of many people in Taiwan.  
Because scholars of nationalist politics in Taiwan wrongly assume that Chinese national 
identity is based on Chinese culture and its long and glorious history, this particular 
relationship between the Chinese nation and the ROC state has been largely overlooked 
among observers of Chinese nationalism.  This relationship actually holds the key to 
understanding the decline of Chinese national identity during the rise of China.  It is 
shown in this chapter that the Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is not 
based on cultural and historical legacies.  Rather it is the state, the ROC, which 
constitutes the base of Chinese national identity.  But, with the rise of China, the ROC 
state, with which the Chinese nationalists identify, is bullied and ostracized by the strong 
power China now enjoys in international politics.  Since the Chinese nation and ROC 
state are like two sides of the same coin, the belittling of the ROC state also means the 
belittling of the Chinese nation.  As the survey data presented in this chapter shows, the 
rapid decline of Chinese national identity occurred during the late 2000s, when the rise of 





the Beijing government actively engaged in bullying Taiwan in the international 
community. 
The decline of Chinese national identity also affects dual identity and had 
ramifications for nationalist politics in Taiwan.  People with dual identity used to 
constitute the largest category among the various nationalist groups.  With the decline of 
Chinese national identity, it has now shrunk to around only 10 percent of the population.  
By contrast, the segment of the status quo group that is neither inclined toward 
unification nor independence has significantly increased.  But the most important of all 
is the fact that, as emphasized above, the rise of China along with deepening economic 
integration between the two sides has failed to convince people in Taiwan to align with 









Table 4.1: Frequency of the term “Rise of China” on 

























Table 4.2: Ethno-Cultural Affinity and Chinese National Identity in Taiwan, 2000      % (N) 




Status Quo Chinese 
Nationalist 
Total 
Q1. The view that “Taiwanese is not Chinese” is unforgiving. 
Agree 2000 29.5(92) 36.1(161) 47.8(43) 63.0(162) 41.4(457) 
Disagree 2000 70.5(220) 63.9(285) 52.5(47) 37.0(95) 58.6(648) 
Total 2000 (312) (446) (90) (257) (1105) 
Q2. Chinese history belong to China, We should create Taiwan’s own history. 
Agree 2000 71.7(226) 55.6(250) 43.5(37) 26.9(66) 52.9(579) 
Disagree 2000 28.3(89) 44.4(200) 56.5(48) 73.1(179) 47.1(516) 
Total 2000 (315) (450) (85) (245) (1095) 
















Name after Unification* 2003 
























Total NA (418) NA (191) (713) 
International Status**  2000 




















Total (305) (436) (82) (241) (1064) 
Data Source: 2000: the Presidential Election Survey, 2003: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th poll of the 
4th Term. 
* The 2003 questionnaire asked only those respondents who answered they want unification the following 
question: “If, in the future, the two sides of the Strait would be unified, they should be unified under which 
name?” 
**The 2000 questionnaire asked “Some people think the cross-Strait tension is due to our government’s 
effort to raise ROC’s status in the international arena; to prevent irritating the PRC, our government 
should suspend such effort (such as applying for joining the UN, diplomatic visits by the President.) Other 
people think our government should keep the effort to gain international recognition, no matter what 
reaction the PRC would have. What is your opinion?” 
 
Table 4.4: Attitudes on “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan*, 2001-2008 
 Agree Disagree No opinion/ Reuse to Answer Total 
2001.6 10.6% 75.2% 14.2% N=1069 
2002.7 10.8% 70.2% 19.0% N=1091 
2003.5 10.3% 72.6% 17.0% N=1082 
2004.7 9.4% 73.6% 17.0% N=1153 
2005.8 11.4% 72.6% 16.0% N=1096 
2006.5 13.3% 76.3% 10.4% N=1068 
2007.8 14.8% 67.8% 17.4% N=1095 
2008.8 8.1% 81.8% 10.1% N=1094 
Data Source: Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). These public polls were conducted 
by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University. 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=6331&mp=1 
 
*Question: Regarding cross-Strait relation, China proposes “one country, two systems” 
which treats Taiwan as their local government under the rule of the PRC. The ROC will 






Table 4.5: Factors of China on Chinese National Identity, 2010 
Raw/ Column                    Unification if the two sides are comparable in all aspects   %(N) 
 Agree Disagree Depends/No Opinion Total 

























Total 41.3(408) 53.2(526) 5.6(55) 100.0(989) 

















Total 41.0(394) 54.0(519) 5.1(49) 100.0(962) 

























Total 41.2(402) 54.1(527) 4.7(46) 100.0(975) 

























Total 40.0(413) 54.4(561) 5.6(58) 100.0(1032) 

























Total 40.3(368) 55.4(547) 4.4(43) 100.0(988) 

















I. Ethno-cultural Dimension 
People in Taiwan and in mainland China share the same ethnic origin and same culture. 
Agree 51.5(223) 70.8(68) 65.8(198) 84.3(118) 62.6(607) 
Disagree 48.5(210) 29.2(28) 34.2(103) 15.7(22) 37.4(363) 
Total (433) (96) (301) (140) (970) 
II. Economic Dimension 
Q1 the effect of cross-Strait economic transaction on Taiwan’s economic development 
Positive 47.3(169) 82.4(75) 80.7(226) 96.1(124) 69.3(594) 
Negative 51.0(182) 16.5(15) 18.9(53) 3.9(5) 29.8(255) 
No Effect 1.7(6) 1.1(1) 0.4(1) 0(0) 0.9(8) 
Total (357) (91) (280) (129) (857) 
Q2 the effect of cross-Strait economic transaction on personal economic condition 
Positive 20.7(82) 39.3(35) 44.4(123) 49.6(60) 33.9(300) 
Negative 51.1(203) 28.1(25) 26.4(73) 14.9(18) 36.1(319) 
No Effect 28.2(112) 32.6(29) 29.2(81) 35.5(43) 30.0(265) 
Total (397) (89) (277) (121) (884) 
Q3 China will keep rapid economic growth 
Agree 73.6(315) 76.5(75) 74.3(223) 83.5(111) 75.5(724) 
Disagree 26.4(113) 23.5(23) 25.7(77) 16.5(22) 24.5(235) 
Total (428) (98) (300) (133) (959) 
III. Political Dimension 
Q1 the Chinese society in the mainland treat others with respect 
Bad 76.6(333) 63.9(62) 74.9(221) 51.8(71) 71.3(687) 
In-between 18.6(81) 28.9(28) 20.0(59) 32.8(45) 22.1(213) 
Good 4.8(21) 7.2(7) 5.1(15) 15.3(21) 6.6(64) 
Total (435) (97) (295) (137) (964) 
Q2 China will become democratic 
Agree 37.0(159) 62.5(60) 45.8(137) 69.7(92) 46.8(448) 
Disagree 63.0(271) 37.5(36) 54.2(162) 30.3(40) 53.2(509) 
Total 44.9 (430) 10.0 (96) 31.2 (299) 13.8(132) 100(957) 







Chapter 5  




With its salience in Taiwan’s national politics, the issue of national identity has 
gained wide attention from both the general public and social scientists, local and 
international.  Many important findings have already been made.  Aided and inspired 
by the previous research, the dissertation offers a new explanation of the nationalist 
phenomenon in Taiwan.  This new perspective may appropriately be called a state 
theory of nationalism.  The theory contends that one of the two types of Taiwanese 
national identity is based on identification with the political community in Taiwan.  It is 
also engendered through democratic political participation.  The state thus constitutes 
the core element whether in the definition or in the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity.  This notion of national identity has been largely overlooked in previous 
research.  On the other hand, the new perspective also defines Chinese national identity 
in terms of the state.  The basis of Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is 
mainly their identitification with the state of the Republic of China, rather than with 
Chinese ethnicity, culture and history.  Only in light of this new theory can we explain 
some puzzling aspects of the nationalist phenomena in Taiwan, such as the compatibility 
of two national identities in a large segment of the population and the decline of Chinese 





politics and relations with China, we hope the new perspective will prove to hold great 
relevance for the understanding of current politics and the prospects for the future in both 
of these spheres.  The study of nationalism has grown into an important area in the 
social sciences in recent decades.  We also hope the theory proposed in this study may 
shed some new light on the theory of nationalism.  
The first new perspective proposed in this study is the two-dimensional view of 
national identity.  Faced with the obvious competition between Taiwanese national 
identity and Chinese identity, all previous research had presumed that the two are 
incompatible and mutually exclusive.  The fact that Taiwanese identity is on the rise 
while Chinese identity is in decline has reinforced this one-dimensional view.  
According to this perspective, Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity lie at the opposite 
poles of a single dimension or spectrum.  One grows at the cost of the other.  We have 
seen in the previous chapters that this one-dimensional view, in which the two national 
identities are viewed as incompatible, may serve as a sound basis for understanding the 
nationalist part of the population and, especially, those cultural and political elites who 
advocate a new national identity or defend the old national identity.  But this perspective 
leaves out a large proportion of the population, which is composed of two different 
groups. 
One group that is left out comprises those who agree with both Chinese unification 
and Taiwan independence under favorable conditions.  The persistence of the 
one-dimensional view in the literature to date may explain why, after the innovative 
measurement of national identity by Wu was proposed and frequently used for two 





Those few who have tackled this group however identified them as “pragmatists”, 
“realists”, or “rationalists.  They wrongly presumed them to be lacking any particular 
national identity and stopped short of any serious analysis thereof.  If they are 
pragmatists or rationalists without any particular national identity, one may ask how we 
should explain the fact that Chinese identity continued to decline as China became more 
powerful and Taiwan’s economic growth became more dependent on integration with 
China.  Those who can accept both Chinese unification and Taiwanese independence, or 
even people in Taiwan generally, are certainly not pragmatists or rationalists, who, 
lacking any particular national identity, opt for any situation which would further their 
material interests. 
The second group left out in the previous research is made up of people who reject 
both Chinese unification and Taiwan independence.  Compared to the former group, it is 
even less studied.  In categorizing this group as having a preference for the status quo, 
much previous research has assumed that they also lack any national identity.  As the 
data from poll surveys reveal, the size of this group has expanded greatly in the recent 
years.  If we see them as lacking national identity, the tremendous growth of this group 
is a puzzle indeed.  Why, as the Taiwanese identity gains ground among the general 
population, would many people rapidly give up their national identity?  Using a 
different theoretical perspective, this study has also tried to explain this striking 
phenomenon of recent years.  
We propose a two-dimensional view to categorize the first group of people and offer 
a more comprehensive and theoretical explanation of trends related to national identity.  





not lack national identity.  On the contrary, they possess both Chinese and Taiwanese 
national identities at the same time.  Although this study largely focuses on two groups 
of people left out in the previous research, it is not intended only to compensate the block 
missing when the one-dimensional view is employed.  We believe the study of this 
group may yield significant insight into the theory of nationalism in general. 
The idea at the core of our two-dimensional view of national identity in Taiwan is 
that, contrary to conventional and popular perspectives, Chinese identity and Taiwanese 
identity are not two poles on the same spectrum, existent on the same level of identity.  
Thus, neither rises nor declines at the cost of or benefit to the other.  We have shown 
with empirical data in Chapter 2 that the two national identities changed according to 
their own courses and according to different patterns.  Taiwanese national identity 
exhibited the most salient growth from 1991 to 1996.  Chinese national identity did not 
decline at all during this period.  On the other hand, even when views expressing 
rejection of Chinese unification increased, the acceptance of Taiwan independence did 
not grow with it. 
Based on this two-dimensional view, a typology of four categories of nationalist 
groups is developed in this study: Taiwanese nationalist (exclusive Taiwanese national 
identity), Chinese nationalist (exclusive Chinese national identity), dual identity 
(inclusive of Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity), and the status 
quo.  The advantages of our typology are apparent when compared to the conventional 
one-dimensional view,.  The one-dimensional view captures only three categories of 
nationalist group: Taiwanese nationalist, Chinese nationalist, and status quo.  These 





Yet, nearly all previous research focused on these three groups.  The studies’ portrayal 
of national identity was thus limited to less than half of the population, and therefore very 
much biased.  Besides, it is obviously problematic to assume that more than half of the 
population in a country does not possess any national identity. 
A two-level view allows us to do more than offer a comprehensive picture of various 
attitudes regarding national identity among the general populace.  It also reveals 
different modes of change during three different periods.  The first period, the 
democratic transition, witnessed the domination of Chinese national identity.  During 
the second period, roughly from 1995 to 2000, the category of dual identity represented 
the largest segment of the population.  But during the third period, the category of dual 
identity decreased rapidly, while the number of those supporting the status quo 
experienced significant growth.  Based on these different modes of identity formation, 
we are able to embark on a new theoretical approach to analyze the national identity 
phenomenon in Taiwan. 
We begin this theoretical endeavor with the trends of change.  The three modes of 
identity formation mentioned above were the result of two trends of identity change in 
two different phases.  During the first phase, roughly corresponding to the 1990s, the 
trend of change was the growth of dual identity, which chiefly resulted from attitude 
change among Chinese nationalists. They shifted from rejecting Taiwan independence to 
accepting it.  Many of them, however, came to accept Taiwanese identity without 
forsaking Chinese national identity.  But interestingly enough, the main trend during the 
second phase, from 2001 to 2012, was the rapid shrinking of the group with dual identity, 





largely resulted from a change in their attitude that led them to forgo their wish for 
unification with the Chinese mainland. 
Three mutually related research questions, or quandaries, come to light when these 
modes of identity formation and trends of change are acknowledged and taken into 
account.  The first, lying at the core of current research, is the question of why the 
ascendance of Taiwanese identity is able to coexist with the stability of orthodox Chinese 
identity.  The two national identities are often seen as juxtaposed and hence in 
competition with each other.  Our empirical data, however, shows that they are very 
much compatible in a sizeable portion of population.  This significant phenomenon has 
been totally overlooked by previous research that is based on the conventional theory of 
nationalism, which puts so much emphasis on the cultural and political difference 
between “we” and “they.”  A new theoretical perspective on national identities in 
Taiwan is needed to adequately explain this important phenomenon.  The second 
research question, related to the first one, concerns the nature of Taiwanese identity.  If 
the two national identities are compatible with each other, then their nature and bases, at 
least for those possessed by people in Taiwan, deserve further examination from a 
different theoretical perspective.  Besides, the modes of identity formation and trends of 
change descrbied above suggest that the driving force behind identity change is not the 
rise of Taiwanese nationalism, as often assumed.  It may be largely ascribed to attitude 
change among people with Chinese national identity.  They came to accept a new 
Taiwanese identity without forsaking the Chinese identity from the first phase, and thus 
helped to form a large group characterized by dual identity.  But now, in the second 





and Chinese unification alike.  This change compels us to rethink the nature of their new 
Taiwanese national identity.   
The third question concerns the nature of Chinese identity held by people in Taiwan.  
Why do they reject Chinese identity at a time when China has been elevated to the status 
of a strong power both politically and economically?  Their Chinese national identity 
was strong only when China lagged far behind Taiwan.  This puzzling situation also 
compels us to develop an understanding of Chinese identity different from the 
conventional wisdom, at least for Chinese identity in Taiwan,.  The answers to these 
three questions, or puzzles, may hopefully lead to a new theoretical perspective regarding 
the nature and basis of national identity and nationalism. 
To solve the first puzzle related to the compatibility of Taiwanese and Chinese 
national identities, a theory of dual identity is proposed in this study.  To be sure, 
Taiwan is not the only case where we may observe the existence of multiple and 
complementary identities.  Students of nationalism have noticed its existence in 
Belgium, Canada, Britain, and Spain, where people develop and simultaneously maintain 
two different identities, a political one with the state and a cultural and ethnic one with 
the nation.  But the case of Taiwan is unique in two aspects.  Firstly, while in other 
areas the cultural community in embedded in a larger political community, i.e. the state, 
in the case of Taiwan, the state is smaller and is included in a larger national community.  
Secondly, while in other areas the mission of the nationalist project is to forge a larger 
(than cultural) political community, in the case of Taiwan, it is to form a smaller (than 
national) political community.  





conventional exclusive nationalism, which is based on ethnic-cultural identity.  Nearly 
all previous research focused on this traditional type of nationalism.  But the Taiwanese 
national identity among those with dual identity, we contend, is of the other type.  It is 
based more on identification with the Taiwan-wide political community.  Political, 
rather than ethnic-cultural, in its nature, it is close to the notion of civic nationalism.  
But, it is wholly to be found in the identification with the idea of constitutionalism or 
democratic values, as many students of civic nationalism presume.  Rather, we assume, 
this identity affiliated with a political community is engendered through the process of 
democratic participation through public discourses as well as electoral engagement in 
national politics.  A public sphere composed of equal citizens, or co-nationals, thus is 
created.  The public sphere in which each one has a stake is confined to the particular 
territory of the political community.  The transition to democracy thus provides 
members of the political community who do not or cannot identify with Taiwanese 
ethnicity, culture, or history with a different route to the formation of national identity.  
Our analysis of the empirical data collected from seven national poll surveys in the past 
two decades also illuminates the different bases, political vs. ethnic-cultural, of these two 
types of Taiwanese nationalism.   
It is this new type of Taiwanese national identity, based on identification with the 
political community and engendered through the process of democratic participation that 
is compatible with Chinese national identity.  Different from the traditional notion of 
nation, it does not imply a unique nation in want of an independent state.  Rather, the 
nation is conceived as a political community in the present tense, which is compatible 





found in Taiwan is thus different from its counterparts in other areas where the dual 
identity is composed of an identity with a cultural nation combined with identity with a 
state.  Some observers of nationalism in Taiwan also assume, mistakenly, that the two 
identities upheld by people with dual identity are different in nature, the Chinese one 
ethnic-cultural and the Taiwanese one political.  According to our theoretical 
perspective, which is supported by the empirical data, both identities may be said to be an 
identification with a state, the present Taiwan state and future Chinese state. 
Chinese identity has had a long life in Taiwan.  The incorrect assumption that 
Chinese identity is mainly based on Chinese ethnicity, culture and history may be caused 
by two facts.  The first is the close affiliation between Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, 
including proximate languages and religions, the Han origin of the people, and historical 
legacy.  During the four decades of the KMT’s authoritarian rule, partly for the purpose 
of legitimizing its rule, Chinese nationalism was upheld the official nationalism. It was 
imposed by educational institutions and governmental propaganda.  Faced with the 
puzzling fact that Chinese national identity continued to persist with the rise of 
Taiwanese identity, many assumed that Chinese identity was ethnic-cultural in nature.  
But as the information collected from in-depth interviews reveals, Chinese identity, like 
its counterpart Taiwanese identity, is also about the state.  The Chinese identity that 
many people in Taiwan exhibit is based on an identification with the ROC state.  It is 
because of this identification with the ROC state, which has long represented the Chinese 
nation, that many people in Taiwan agree with Chinese unification.  It is because after 
the rise of China, the ROC cannot represent the whole Chinese nation that many people 





Government have also done much to encourage the decline of Chinese national identity.  
First, as the ROC state lies at the core of Chinese national identity, belittling it in the 
international community hampers Chinese national identity.  Secondly, by eliminating 
the ROC in the future unified China, the Beijing government also hinders their hope for a 
unified China.  Beijing’s appeal to the common ethnicity and culture of two peoples 
hence misses the whole point and does not help the unification at all.  Many in Taiwan 
use the case of American independence to counter its appeal.  Most importantly, the 
Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is not based on Chinese ethnicity and 
culture.  
As the above discussion suggests, the relationship between the state and the nation is 
an essential element of our state-centered theory of nationalism.  Nationalism is often 
defined, especially in work by social scientists, as the demand of a nation or a 
nation-in-formation for an independent and sovereign state.  The aspiration for a state is 
the most important, if not the only, mission of nationalism.  It differentiates nationalist 
movement from ethnic mobilization.  On the other hand, the nation is also conceived of 
as an artifact manufactured by the state.  There are so many cases in which nation is 
deliberately engendered by the state, as epitomized by the famous exclamation of an 
Italian politician in parliament right after the unified Italy was established: “We have 
made Italy. Now let us start making Italians.”  The element of the state is always to be 
found in both nationalist movements and nation formation, and also the research on 
nationalism.   
But, the role of the state in our study is different in two ways.  The first difference 





state engenders the nation through public policies, whether this be indoctrination in 
educational institutions or through governmental propaganda.  It is a deliberate action by 
the state, or rather of political elites.  But according to our perspective, the role of state 
in forging national identity is not through deliberate and intentional actions or policies.  
What is needed from the state to form national identity is the provision of equal and 
democratic participation in national politics, which turns citizens into co-nationals in the 
context of the individual’s political conversation with all others.  Insomuch as this 
conversation and collective decision-making is constrained in a particular (state) territory, 
the territory of the political community also becomes the boundary of nation. 
When the state business becomes the ground in which the nation grows, it is not 
surprising that the state also comes to function as the basis of national identity.  This is 
the second characteristic concerning the role the state plays in our perspective.  In the 
traditional perspective of conventional theories, the state is the object the nation strives to 
achieve.  The object of identification is the nation, rather than the state.  But in our 
perspective, the state can be an object of identification.  Nation and state in this sense 
are hard to differentiate from each other.  National identity becomes identity associated 
with a certain political community, either Taiwan or mainland China.  Only with this 
conception of national identity can the phenomenon of dual identity be explained.  The 
existence of this political community-based nation calls for a different understanding of 
nationalism.  As a new phenomenon, it also requires further and more intensive study.  
I believe a careful study of this phenomenon found in the case of Taiwan may shed light 
on the theory of nationalism.  What is left out in this study and requires more research is 





identity of this group is very much like the one possessed by those with dual identity, i.e. 
a national identity formed by and based on political community.  Right or wrong, this 
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